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Abstract
This study examines the state of Fourth Amendment search law in relationship to the
decision in the recent, landmark case of United States v. Jones. This study focused on the effects
of the Jones decision, trespass doctrine, relative to the former precedent of Katz v. United States,
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine, and the rates of searches being found under these two
tests (or a combination of both). This study used a qualitative content analysis of federal
appellate cases which cited Jones and/or Katz to answer the following questions: Which tests
were being used in federal appellate cases where a search was in question? And; Depending on
the test being used, was a search more or less likely to be found? This study concluded, through
the analysis of 34 cases pre-Jones decision and 38 cases post-Jones decision, that both tests are
still being used, depending upon the parameters within the case itself (as Jones has very specific
criteria for determining a search). This study also concluded that since the Jones decision, cases
citing solely Jones found more searches to have occurred (100%, 11 cases) than did cases citing
solely Katz (27.2%, 3 out of 11 cases) or cases which cited both (37.5%, 6 out of 16 cases).
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Understanding and defining a police search is a basic, crucial task for the criminal justice
system. A search aids in gathering evidence for cases and holding criminals responsible for their
actions. Without police searches, there would be large gaps in evidentiary support for case
convictions. The framers of the Constitution and in particular the authors of the Bill of Rights
highlighted the importance of these searches when they wrote into this vital document protection
for citizens against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. This protection is contained
specifically in the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights as a protection guaranteed to the
American people.1 It is necessary to be clear on this topic: the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit searches, just unreasonable ones. Therefore, a legal search (what is referred to as a
‘search’ for this study) is one which triggers Fourth Amendment protections.
As time has progressed, the question of what defines a police search has been asked
repeatedly by the courts and other criminal justice institutions. Originally, a search was found to
have occurred when law enforcement officers had physically trespassed onto a citizen’s property
or person (the trespass doctrine).2 As time moved forward and technology changed, this physical
trespass requirement became antiquated and in need of reform. In 1967, a case came before the
United States Supreme Court that would fundamentally change Fourth Amendment search law. .
In this landmark case (Katz v. United States) involving a phone booth, it was decided that a
search would be found if there was a reasonable expectation of privacy for the person being
searched, and if that reasonable expectation of privacy had been violated.3 This decision was a
drastic move away from the trespass test and ushered in a new era of search inquiries by courts in
the United States. (Katz is explained in more detail at the end of this Introduction section).
1

U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928.
3
Katz v. U.S, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967).
2
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For forty-five years, Katz and the reasonable expectation of privacy test had stood as the
sole test for deciding if a search under the Fourth Amendment had occurred. Katz is widely
applicable, as it is by itself a rather nebulous, general idea without concrete terminology or
specifics about what is or is not a search (though courts over the years had certainly provided the
privacy concept with more specific meaning, or content, through case law).4
Overall, though, as technology has grown and become more sophisticated since 1967,
questions are beginning to arise about specific instances where the Katz privacy notion is not
necessarily adequate, in and of itself, to address whether or not a police search has occurred.
Specifically, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided another landmark Fourth
Amendment search case that built upon the Katz decision, and has helped to develop more
specific parameters for defining a search. In particular, United States v. Jones reintroduced a
physical trespass concept to define searches under the Fourth Amendment while also retaining
the Katz privacy concept (to define searches). Significantly, Jones involved the physical
attachment by police of a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) device to a vehicle and subsequent
monitoring of that vehicle through the device.5 (Jones is explained in more detail at the end of
this section). Since it was decided, Jones has had an impact on federal appellate court case law,
both in those instances when these courts now use the trespass criterion as the sole criterion to
decide whether a police search has occurred and in those instances when these courts use the
trespass test in conjunction with the Katz privacy test.6

4

See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619 (1976) for third party doctrine.
U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 948 (2012). The United States Supreme Court held “the Government’s attachment of
the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements; constitute a search
under Fourth Amendment.” Id.
6
See Grady v. North Carolina, 132 S.Ct. 1368, 1369 (2015) as an example of the courts using solely the Jones test to
answer the Fourth Amendment search inquiry. See U.S. v. Castellano, 716 F.3d 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2013) as an
example of the courts using Jones test in conjunction with Katz test.
5
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Since Katz was a foundational, familiar case for the courts, the shift into incorporating
Jones has been more gradual but nonetheless noteworthy, at least for the federal appeals courts
included in this study. Jones is a relatively new decision, and its full implications for Fourth
Amendment search jurisprudence will certainly be further seen as time progresses. However, the
changes in Fourth Amendment search law since Jones deserve further exploration and
examination, both for their relevance to police investigatory practices and strategies under the
law, and for their relevance to court actors and scholars. In general, this study examines how
Jones has impacted the way federal appellate courts handle search inquiries. This research study
first assesses whether federal appeals courts in the wake of Jones are using its trespass test to
decide whether a police search has occurred or rather, these courts are using the Katz privacy test
or a combination of the two tests. Second, this study analyzes the current impact of the Jones
decision in terms of whether a federal appellate court finds a police search has occurred (for
example, whether these courts are more likely to find a search has occurred after Jones using its
trespass test , the Katz privacy test, or a combination of the two tests together). This latter inquiry
allows comparisons to be made between the numbers of search findings after Jones under each
permissible test/approach. Third, to assess the impact of Jones on search determinations by
courts, this study evaluates and compares the number of police searches found to have occurred
in federal appeals cases both pre- and post (i.e., following) the Jones decision. Finally, the study
addresses overall implications for future Fourth Amendment search law.
This research is an important step in examining Fourth Amendment search laws. These
inquiries facilitate being able to quantify the impact Jones is having on police search law and lay
the groundwork for future study. This will also assist in identifying any patterns that may be used
by police and future researchers interested in Fourth Amendment search inquiry procedures. In
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regards to police practices and strategies, this research is important because courts determination
of a search is crucial to criminal investigations. Courts finding no search before or after Jones
would mean that police would generally not have to concern themselves with the judicial rules
established by the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, if courts find a search, police must follow all
the guidelines set forth by the Fourth Amendment, which could potentially limit investigative
approaches. Additionally, this study can assist scholars of courts and criminal law and procedure
because it gives them further empirical evidence with which to evaluate whether judges are
currently more due process or crime control oriented in crafting their decisions (i.e., if courts are
more frequently finding searches in period after Jones compared to period prior to Jones, then
there might be evidence of the courts being in a more due process orientation).
This research study employed a comprehensive, content analysis approach to evaluating
all significant federal appellate cases which cited United States v. Jones through May 31, 2015.7
To obtain these cases, a legal research tool known as a citator was used (i.e., “KeyCite”). To
have a more complete understanding of Fourth Amendment search law post-Jones, it was
decided to also examine through the citator all of the significant federal appellate cases which
referenced Katz v. United States (i.e., since Jones retained Katz as a possible test to decide
whether a police search occurred under the Fourth Amendment). This examination was
completed from the date Jones was decided (January 23, 2012) through May 31, 2015. Finally,
to better understand the impact of Jones on police search law, it was decided to evaluate
significant federal appeals cases through the citator which cited Katz prior to the Jones decision,
and explore any possible changes in search trends between the period prior to and following

7

Significant treatment refers to the federal appellate court cases providing substantial coverage to the case under
examination (e.g., Jones or Katz). For a more in depth explanation, refer to the methodology section.

5

Jones. To have an adequate number of pre-Jones cases, it was decided to research cases from
January 22, 2002-January 22, 2012.
In Katz v. United States, Charles Katz was charged and convicted in District Court for
transmitting wagering information.8 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents obtained this
information by attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public
telephone booth.9 This device allowed the government to listen in on the calls made by Katz. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.10 Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion.
The United States Supreme Court held that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment
protections when he placed the calls inside the telephone booth.11 The Supreme Court famously
stated, “The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” and thus, “What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”12 The Supreme Court explained once Katz entered
the phone booth and closed the door, Katz reasonably believed that his conversation would be
kept private. The Supreme Court stated although the Katz was physically visible inside the phone
booth, once Katz entered and closed the door, he took the necessary steps to prevent an
“uninvited ear.”13 Additionally, the Supreme Court addressed the former trespass doctrine was
no longer effective at determining Fourth Amendment search inquiries.14 Thus, the Supreme
Court concluded that Katz Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and reversed the
8

Katz. v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 348, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967).
Id.
10
Id. at 349.
11
Id. at 352.
12
Id. at 351.
13
Id. at 352.
14
Id. at 353.
9
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judgment.15 It was Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion who first explored the notion of a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.16
In United States v. Jones, a joint taskforce of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Metropolitan Police Department were investigating Antione Jones for trafficking narcotics.17
Jones owned and managed a nightclub in the District of Columbia. Over the course of the
investigation, the joint task force used a variety of methods to monitor Jones’ movements,
including visual surveillance, wiretaps, camera footage of the nightclub. This information led the
taskforce to apply and obtain a warrant to use an electronic tracking device on the Jeep owned by
Jones’ wife.18 This warrant was valid in the District of Columbia and expired after 10 days. The
taskforce installed the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) device to the Jeep on the 11th day,
while it was parked in a public parking lot in Maryland.19 The taskforce monitored Jones’
movements for the next 28 days, producing more than 2,000 pages of data on Jones’
whereabouts. Ultimately, Jones and several associates were indicted for conspiracy to distribute
large quantities of cocaine.20 As a result, Jones filed a motion in District Court to suppress the
evidence obtained through GPS monitoring. The motion was granted by the District Court, but
with some reservations. The District Court held that the information obtained while the vehicle
was in the garage of Jones’ residence should be suppressed.21 The District Court held that the
data obtained while the vehicle was out in the public should remain admissible because “[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of

15

Id. at 359.
Id. at 360-361.
17
U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
16
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privacy in his movements from one place to another.”22 Jones’ trial resulted in a hung jury on the
conspiracy charge. As a result, the government re-tried Jones and his accomplices at a second
trial.23 At the trial, the government introduced all the data obtained through the GPS which
ultimately resulted in the jury finding Jones guilty.24 Jones was sentenced to life in prison. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction
based on the government violating Jones’ Fourth Amendment by producing evidence obtained
from GPS device.25
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The United States Supreme Court
decided unanimously with Justice Scalia writing the opinion of the Court. The Supreme Court
held that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”26 However, the Supreme
Court’s rationale did not rely on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Instead, the
Supreme Court explained when the government commits a physical intrusion onto private
property with the explicit intention of obtaining information, this intrusion is tantamount to a
search, thus implicating the Fourth Amendment.27 The Supreme Court’s rationale revolved
around the original text of the Fourth Amendment which has close ties to idea of common-law
trespass. Additionally, the Supreme Court explained the common-law trespass test does not
overwrite Katz. Instead, the Supreme Court emphasized “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”28 As a result, the

22

Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 103 S.Ct. 1081. 75 L.Ed. 2d 55 (1983)).
Id.
24
Id. at 949.
25
Id.
26
Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 952.
23
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Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
decision.
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
This literature review begins by presenting historical cases which detailed the creation of
the property based test to evaluate Fourth Amendment searches. Next, this literature review will
explore two distinct, but important assessments among academics concerning the United
Supreme Court decision in Jones. The first assessment describes Jones as being a crucial and
significant change to Fourth Amendment search laws. The second assessment broadly views
Jones as a missed opportunity to make any substantial change to Fourth Amendment search law
with regards to modern technology.
Historic Cases
The definition of what constitutes a search has largely developed over time. Originally,
the trespass doctrine was the governing jurisprudence on Fourth Amendment search law. One of
the earliest cases known for upholding this idea of “trespass” was the case of Olmstead v. United
States (1928).29 Olmstead was known as a high profile bootlegger during the time of
prohibition.30 His sales of alcohol were significant, which warranted the attention of law
enforcement. The defendant was eventually convicted of importing, possessing, and selling
liquor unlawfully. The evidence was obtained through wire taps made by police, who believed
they were not committing any form of trespass as the defendants did not own that specific
property where the wire taps were placed. The United States Supreme Court held that police
actions did not constitute a search because wiretaps on public telephone lines were not

29

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928)
Ryan Evaro, THE COURT LOSES ITS WAY WITH THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: UNITED STATES V. JONES
RETREATS TO THE “CLASSICAL TRESPASSORY SEARCH”, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 113, 120 (2013)
30
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considered a trespass into a constitutionally protected area (such as individual’s private
property).31
The United States Supreme Court would further rely upon the trespass doctrine in On Lee
v. United States (1952).32 In this case, the defendant, On Lee, had been living in a laundromat.33
He was approached by an old acquaintance, Chin Poy, inside the area and the defendant made
some incriminating statements during the conversation. Unbeknownst to the defendant, Chin Poy
was working for the Bureau of Narcotics and was an undercover agent. Bureau of Narcotics
agent Lawrence Lee had stationed himself outside and had been recording their conversation
through a microphone on Chin Poy.34 From his position, Lee was able to see the individuals and
record the conversation through the electronic device attached to Chin Poy. Defendant On Lee
argued that the evidence should have been deemed inadmissible because it was illegally obtained
by police; therefore, police violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and
seizures. On Lee reasoned that the fraudulent hiding of the microphone violated his rights and
had he been aware of his listening device he would not have consented to allowing Chin Poy
inside.35 The United States Supreme Court ruled that an unlawful search had not occurred
because Chin Poy had been invited into the residence by defendant, and therefore no trespass had
been committed.36
Law Review Journal Article
I. First Category
31

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928)
U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012)
33
On Lee v. United States, 747, 749, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952)
34
On Lee v. United States, 747, 749, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952)
35
Ryan Evaro, THE COURT LOSES ITS WAY WITH THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: UNITED STATES V. JONES
RETREATS TO THE “CLASSICAL TRESPASSORY SEARCH”, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 113, 123 (2013)
36
On Lee v. United States, 747, 751-752, 72 S.Ct. 967 (1952)
32
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The articles in this category generally accept the Jones decision as being a major
milestone for Fourth Amendment search law, and these academics provide some critical
assessment regarding the application of a physical trespass test in an era revolving around
modern technology.
Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz, and Gerald Jenkins explained how the Jones decision
provided a more reliable form of Fourth Amendment protection.37 Namely, the Court recognized
the government’s ability to collect, record, track, and analyze large amounts of information.
Moreover, the Jones decision reflected an attempt by the Supreme Court’s to uphold customary
Fourth Amendment rights in an era where technology is rapidly advancing. This is extremely
valuable as many academics point out the pitfall of the concept of reasonable expectation of
privacy, namely, that society has none in such an interconnected society. Finally, the authors
mention the notion of the “justifiable reliance test.”38 This proposed standard combines both the
Katz and Jones tests to create a broader test: “(1) that the person relied on his Fourth Amendment
privacy and/or property rights, and (2) that the reliance was justifiable under the
circumstances.”39 The advantage of this test would be its increased applicability to our digital
age while still maintaining the integrity of the Fourth Amendment protections.
Similarly, Sean Kilbane agreed that the Jones decision bolstered citizens’ Fourth
Amendment rights. Kilbane discussed that the former Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy

37

Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz, and Gerald Jenkins, The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo And Jones:
Reinstating Justifiable Reliance As A More Secure Constitutional Standard For Privacy, 22 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 3
(2013).
38
Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz, and Gerald Jenkins, The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo And Jones:
Reinstating Justifiable Reliance As A More Secure Constitutional Standard For Privacy, 22 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 4
(2013).
39
Richard Sobel, Barry Horwitz, and Gerald Jenkins, The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo And Jones:
Reinstating Justifiable Reliance As A More Secure Constitutional Standard For Privacy, 22 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 43
(2013).
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test failed to account for technologies involving aerial surveillance.40 More commonly referred to
as drones, these unmanned aerial vehicles have the ability to travel through public airspace with
high-tech cameras and peer into private areas, such as the curtilage of a home. These drones have
the ability to fly 1,000 feet into the sky, which is important as the courts had previously held any
altitude above 400 feet is considered public.41 However, due to the recent Jones decision, courts
will need to analyze this form of Fourth Amendment protections from a trespass perspective
instead of a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy perspective. As a result, Jones has provided
citizens with more protections than Katz ever could in scenarios involving flyovers or other
similar forms of advanced technology.42
Erica Goldberg argued that the Jones decision is more groundbreaking than most
realize.43 In particular, Jones has the potential to give courts an additional, analytical
“framework” through which to evaluate a search under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore,
Goldberg claimed it is possible to see the Jones’ property test ultimately replace the Katz inquiry
as a “clearer, cleaner metric” for courts to analyze Fourth Amendment cases.44
Lauren Smith briefly discusses privacy as an antiquated notion that has no place in
today’s society.45 Smith explains privacy protections are quickly becoming obsolete, namely
because of the technology at the disposal of common individuals and law enforcement. This

40

Sean M. Kilbane, NOTE: Drones And Jones: Rethinking Curtilage Flyover In Light Of The Revived Fourth
Amendment Trespass Doctrine, 42 Cap. U.L. Rev. 249, 249 (2014).
41
Sean M. Kilbane, NOTE: Drones And Jones: Rethinking Curtilage Flyover In Light Of The Revived Fourth
Amendment Trespass Doctrine, 42 Cap. U.L. Rev. 249, 249 (2014).
42
Sean M. Kilbane, NOTE: Drones And Jones: Rethinking Curtilage Flyover In Light Of The Revived Fourth
Amendment Trespass Doctrine, 42 Cap. U.L. Rev. 249, 282 (2014).
43
Erica Goldberg, How United States V Jones Can Restore Our Faith In The Fourth Amendment, 110 Mich. L. Rev.
First Impressions 62, 62 (2011).
44
Erica Goldberg, How United States V Jones Can Restore Our Faith In The Fourth Amendment, 110 Mich. L. Rev.
First Impressions 62, 69 (2011).
45
Lauren Elena Smith, PRIVACY LAW: Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of United States
v. Jones, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1003, 1003 (2013).
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advanced technology has diminished what many consider to be an expectation of privacy and has
enabled law enforcement to obtain a plethora of digital information, such as email or GPS
tracking information. The courts have been always been playing the game of catch up when
trying to keep up with technology and the law, but many were hopeful of the decision in Jones to
provide guidance and bolster our Fourth Amendment protections.46 Prior to Jones, it was
difficult to discern whether one had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this type of
information under the Katz test. Although the Jones majority focused on the specific intrusion
made by law enforcement and GPS devices, the concurring opinions did raise hope for future
discussions on privacy in the digital age.47 Furthermore, Smith concluded that Katz’s reasonableexpectations-of-privacy test would become obsolete whenever there is a trespass (i.e., if courts
find a trespass has occurred, a search has occurred, and at that point the analysis could end).
Thus, Smith theorized the Katz test will only be applied when there is an absence of a
governmental trespass.48
Related to privacy, Jennifer Arner examined the Fourth Amendment rights in digital
information, namely e-mail. This article explained that the privacy of e-mail depends on where it
is being stored: whether on a personal computer or with a third party.49 The distinction may seem
arbitrary at first glance; however, when email messages are stored on the computer (i.e. personal
property), then the owner of the computer has full access to Fourth Amendment protections.
However, if it is stored a web-based email, then it becomes unlikely that the rights will be

46

Lauren Elena Smith, PRIVACY LAW: Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of United States
v. Jones, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1003, 1004 (2013).
47
Id.
48
Lauren Elena Smith, PRIVACY LAW: Jonesing for a Test: Fourth Amendment Privacy in the Wake of United States
v. Jones, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1003, 1032 (2013).
49
Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward By Looking Backward: United States v. Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment
Property Rights Protections in E-mail, 24 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 349, 349 (2014).
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afforded to the individual.50 To conclude, Jones did not provide clear cut rules for “intangible
property,” however, there does seem to be some hope for courts to recognize property rights in
digital information.51 If that does come to fruition, then Jones would have been a substantial
change in Fourth Amendment search law.
John Stratford argued that under certain circumstances police searches have gone
overboard with the use of warrantless GPS tracking and data retention.52 Furthermore, Stratford
claimed these types of surveillance, whether on the “infobahn or autobahn,” are part of the same
underlying problem, which involves “the assumption of risk” doctrine (i.e., the doctrine that in
general one “assumes the risk” of disclosure of information to other individuals, including
unintended individuals, when one shares his or her private information with others). Stratford
concluded that this doctrine has become obsolete in the modern era and thus requires
modification to reflect the realities of today’s world.53 For example, individuals expose private
information about themselves online and in person on a regular basis in order to function
properly in today’s society. Therefore, Stratford supports a more specific test in this area where
certain information voluntarily exposed is still nonetheless private and must be considered for
Fourth Amendment protections.54

50

Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward By Looking Backward: United States v. Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment
Property Rights Protections in E-mail, 24 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 349, 350 (2014).
51
Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward By Looking Backward: United States v. Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment
Property Rights Protections in E-mail, 24 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 349, 379 (2014).
52
John A. Stratford, Adventures On The Autobahn And Infobahn: United States V. Jones, Mandatory Data
Retention, And A More Reasonable “Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy”, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 986
(2013).
53
John A. Stratford, Adventures On The Autobahn And Infobahn: United States V. Jones, Mandatory Data
Retention, And A More Reasonable “Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy”, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 986
(2013).
54
John A. Stratford, Adventures On The Autobahn And Infobahn: United States V. Jones, Mandatory Data
Retention, And A More Reasonable “Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy”, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 1014
(2013).
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Looking more into advanced technology, Lon Berk discussed a similar concern with
cloud computing and how the Fourth Amendment may have a difficult time protecting individual
rights in this area.55 With the introduction to smart phones, tablets, and social media applications
(i.e., Facebook or Twitter), society has become more focused on sharing information. The
government has access to an incredible wealth of information, sometimes referred to as “big
data,” and this information could contain an enormous amount of material about the individual.
A major concern is focused on Cloud computing. The Cloud is a modern electronic storage
device that has the capability to accumulate almost limitless amounts of information (i.e.
pictures, documents, and data) at the discretion of the individual. This storage device is easily
accessible by the general public and has become quickly integrated in other devices to ensure
luxury. However, some may wish the information stored on the Cloud to be kept private. At the
same time, the information stored on the Cloud has greatly increased the curiosity and the scope
of data which the government may want to search and seize.56
This has resulted in some tension and confusion between what users wish to keep private
and what the government is constitutionally allowed to search and seize. The Courts have had
little success in providing a reliable and socially accepted method. In fact, Lon Berk claimed
Jones is just another example of the fact that technology has quickly evolved and improved over
a short period of time and that the law is having a difficult time keeping up. Lon Berk further

55

Lon A. Berk, After Jones, The Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s Treatment Of Information, Big Data And The
Cloud, 14 J. High Tech. L. 1, 2 (2014).
56
Lon A. Berk, After Jones, The Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s Treatment Of Information, Big Data And The
Cloud, 14 J. High Tech. L. 1, 2 (2014).
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questioned whether returning to a property based approach in the face of modernity would
facilitate the Fourth Amendment inquiry or create unforeseeable problems.57
Arnold Loewy argued that the trespass test is, overall, a more sensible inquiry for Fourth
Amendment search questions compared to the reasonable expectation of privacy test.58
Furthermore, Loewy claimed the Katz test was so malleable that it had become nearly useless in
determining Fourth Amendment search questions. For example, courts had created a multitude of
exceptions under the flexible and subjective expectation of privacy test.59 Moreover, the Jones
decision is a logical step forward in establishing a more specific and detailed form of analyzing
Fourth Amendment searches.60 According to Loewy, Jones also has the ability to tackle some of
the more difficult Fourth Amendment questions, such as the use of modern technology and how
it may affect an individual’s privacy.61
Caleb Mason described Jones as the decision which dramatically expanded the scope of
the Katz test in this new era of surveillance technology.62 This “new” test was created by the
Courts after analyzing what it is the threshold governing a search. Furthermore, Mason
questioned how the exclusionary rule will apply under the newly decided Jones test, as
thousands of pending GPS surveillance cases have the potential to be impacted by this decision.
Briefly, the exclusionary rule eliminates any evidence which may have been obtained illegally
and, is therefore, unusable in a court of law.63 However, there are numerous exceptions to the

57

Lon A. Berk, After Jones, The Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s Treatment Of Information, Big Data And The
Cloud, 14 J. High Tech. L. 1, 41 (2014).
58
Arnold H. Loewy, United States V. Jones: Return To Trespass-Good News Or Bad, 82 Miss. L.J. 879, 880 (2013).
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exclusionary rule, including the Davis exception. Six months prior to the Jones decision, the
Court in Davis v. United States held that the exclusionary rule does not apply if law enforcement
were acting in good faith reliance on governing appellate precedent at the time.64 Mason posited
that if courts adopted a “narrow” interpretation of Davis, then the Fourth Amendment will be
able to adequately meet the ongoing balance between the potentially invasive use of technology
at the disposal of law enforcement and citizens’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights.65
After examining the rationale of Jones, Brian Davis argued that the government should
not freely be able to obtain cell-phone location data without a warrant.66 Davis discussed how
tracking cell-phones is a violation of Fourth Amendment protections from both perspectives, or
tests, including location-based test (i.e., trespass doctrine) and situation-based test (i.e.,
reasonable-expectation of privacy doctrine).67 Furthermore, Davis argued, based on the locationbased and situation-based tests within the Fourth Amendment, that these electronic searches
should be deemed unreasonable without probable cause and a warrant.68 Finally, Davis explained
that Congress should pass legislation related to the disclosure of such data by third-party
providers.69 This bill could help fill the gap and explain how law enforcement is required to
conduct electronic surveillance or other investigations relying upon advanced technology under
Fourth Amendment principles.
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Brad Turner argued that, at one point, the third-party doctrine made sense when people
understood that there was no expectation of privacy in information when it is knowingly
exchanged and exposed to others; however, in today’s society, it is not so simple.70 For example,
peoples’ actions and words today literally become data which is shared with others, whether that
data is knowingly volunteered or not. As a result, Turner posited that the third-party doctrine
now threatens to eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections. However, according to Turner,
courts should follow Justice Alito’s reasoning in Jones; that is, when the government acquires
“Big Data,” a search under the Fourth Amendment has occurred.71 This approach may help
resolve some unsettled issues under the Fourth Amendment in light of recent advancements in
technology.72 Turner concluded by remarking that if the government conducts a search under
Jones through the acquisition of GPS data, then surely it would be more intrusive to obtain “Big
Data” (and hence it should also constitute a search when the government seeks to obtain this type
of data).73
Stephen Henderson explained that the return of the property based approach in Jones
along with the approach of Katz means that there is a higher likelihood courts will be able to
more accurately determine the Fourth Amendment search question.74 The combination of these
two tests will allow courts the flexibility necessary to analyze Fourth Amendment search
inquiries on a case-by-case basis. However, Henderson admitted that the Jones decision does
leave some important questions unanswered (namely dealing with third-party doctrine and
70

Brad Turner, When Big Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should Apply United States v. Jones to Protect
People’s Data, 16 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 377, 381 (2015).
71
Brad Turner explains that he defines “Big Data” as the “entire ecosystem of data trackers, collectors, analyzers,
shares, and sellers of people’s data.” Data is further defined as any type of information in an electronic form.
72
Brad Turner, When Big Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should Apply United States v. Jones to Protect
People’s Data, 16 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 377, 433 (2015).
73
Id.
74
Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C.
J.L. & Tech. 431, 458 (2013).

19

whether this represents the Court’s attempt to gradually remove the Katz test), and it will be
interesting to witness how the lower courts react to this decision.
Fabio Arcila, Jr., explained that Jones has the potential to be groundbreaking, since Katz
was decided approximately four decades ago.75 One of the main reasons why Jones could be
groundbreaking is because of the various rationales reflected in the justices’ opinions in the case.
Furthermore, these opinions are important because they will influence Fourth Amendment
surveillance jurisprudence; thus, according to Arcila, these opinions are vastly more crucial to
Fourth Amendment search questions than the holding itself of Jones. Additionally, this case was
a crucial decision since the federal government had used approximately 3,000 warrantless GPS
devices annually to monitor suspects and, therefore, the case provides some necessary guidance
to the government in this area.76 Arcila stated that Jones is also significant because it finally
settles the relevant inquiry for Fourth Amendment search questions (i.e., property “versus”
privacy).77
James Dempsey mentioned Jones was a momentous change for Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence because it exposed how much focus the lower courts were giving to the third-party
doctrine.78 More interestingly, Dempsey pointed out that the Jones Court unanimously disagreed
with the government’s claim that citizens lack any privacy interest in information voluntarily
disclosed. Dempsey posited that Jones will usher in a new era of Fourth Amendment law that

75

Fabio Arcila, Jr., Tracking Out Of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States V. Jones And The Katz Conundrum,
91 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 5 (2012).
76
Fabio Arcila, Jr., Tracking Out Of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States V. Jones And The Katz Conundrum,
91 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 5 (2012).
77
Fabio Arcila, Jr., Tracking Out Of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States V. Jones And The Katz Conundrum,
91 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 77 (2012).
78
James X. Dempsey, Big Brother in the 21st Century?: Reforming the Electronic Communications Privacy Act:
Speech: Keynote Address: The Path to ECPA Reform and the Implications of United States v. Jones, 47 U.S.F. L. Rev.
225, 241 (2012).

20

will require courts to closely examine how the implications of their decisions affect the thirdparty doctrine.79
David Reichbach claimed that Jones’ modification of what constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment has strengthened privacy protections for the homeless.80 Prior to Jones, the
homeless were generally understood by the courts to be unprotected from police surveillance
because they were seen as having their personal belongings out in public, which means they were
not afforded the same rights of privacy under Katz as their home-owning counterparts.81
Reichbach stated that the Jones decision remedies this lack of protection for the homeless by
evaluating a Fourth Amendment search under the trespass test instead of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. Accordingly, Jones’ trespass test and its focus on ownership or
possession of personal belongings avoid omitting the homeless from the same protections all
citizens should rightfully enjoy.82
The Honorable Garrison Hill explained several notable outcomes concerning the “legacy
of Jones.”83 First, the Court universally rejected the government’s claim of no reasonable
expectation of privacy in public. Second, the Court created another model for lower courts to
follow in Fourth Amendment search analysis (i.e., the trespass test). Third, there was universal
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agreement among the justices in Jones that the trespass doctrine and the reasonable expectation
of privacy doctrine are exclusive to Fourth Amendment law.84
Melanie Reid posited the Jones decision could be the end of the privacy inquiry for
Fourth Amendment searches, as these searches are now being governed by the common law
trespass test.85 Moreover, this change may signal an end to society’s subjective expectations of
privacy as the shift to a trespass-based understanding of Fourth Amendment protections occurs.
Reid theorized that it is highly likely to be able to predict an outcome when the facts of a case
implicate both trespass and privacy notions, or tests, but it is harder to predict outcomes when
one test is triggered and the other is not.86 In a post-Jones era, this could cause some uncertainty
and controversy as the lower courts attempt to tackle this critical scenario. Reid concluded, with
an expression of hope, that either the United States Supreme Court or Congress will intervene to
resolve this uncertainty.
Vikram Iyengar stated that although the justices agreed that a search occurred in Jones,
their rationales were vastly different.87 Looking specifically at Justice Alito’s concurrence,
Iyengar reasoned a search occurred because the government’s conduct amounted to violating
Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy. Additionally, Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice
Alito’s argument on the risks and dangers of advanced technology for citizens’ privacy rights.88
Iyengar questioned the constitutional boundaries inherent in the government’s ability to intrude
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on these rights in light of the vast amount of information available through social media and
other third party sites.89 Furthermore, rules on domestic drone surveillance are still unclear in the
wake of Jones. Iyengar concluded both Congress and the United States Supreme Court will need
to further define the limitations for government’s use of these devices.
II. Second Category
The articles in this category describe how the Jones decision either didn’t meet
expectations or the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to make real headway in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. These academics discuss that physical trespass has no real place in a
digital society. Furthermore, they posit that former Fourth Amendment search criteria (i.e., Katz
or Mosaic Theory) are more than adequate in guiding Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence.
Medinger discussed how at first, Jones was supposed to further change Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in the area of advanced technology, such as a GPS device.90 However,
instead of “breaking new ground,” the Court turned to the common-law property based Fourth
Amendment test. Furthermore, the Court left many unanswered questions with the Jones
holding, such as whether it applies retroactively or whether there are certain circumstances which
would make the warrantless attachment of a GPS device “reasonable.”91 This lack of clarity has
resulted in lower courts needing to take it upon themselves to answer these vague questions. As a
result, the district courts have turned to long-standing precedents. Furthermore, Jones may prove

89

Vikram Iyengar, U.S. v. Jones: Inadequate to Promote Privacy for Citizens and Efficiency for Law Enforcement, 19
Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 335, 348 (2014).
90
Jason D. Medinger, Privacy Rights & Proactive Investigations: 2013 Symposium on Emerging Constitutional Issues
in Law Enforcement: Article: Post-Jones: How District Courts are Answering the Myriad Questions Raised by the
Supreme Court’s Decision in United States v. Jones, 42 U. Balt. L. Rev. 395, 395 (2013).
91
Jason D. Medinger, Privacy Rights & Proactive Investigations: 2013 Symposium on Emerging Constitutional Issues
in Law Enforcement: Article: Post-Jones: How District Courts are Answering the Myriad Questions Raised by the
Supreme Court’s Decision in United States v. Jones, 42 U. Balt. L. Rev. at 398.

23

to change our understanding of Fourth Amendment searches. Medinger’s post-Jones data proved
that courts had not adapted to the change as of yet.92
Andrew Talai explained that law enforcement has the ability to send out drones
throughout the country in order to conduct surveillance.93 Talai pointed out a critical question on
everyone’s mind following Jones: whether drone surveillance is considered a search. Moreover,
there is no clear answer from the Supreme Court on how advanced technology, such as drones, is
governed by the United States Constitution. Jones has “splintered” the law into three main
aspects: the trespass test, reasonable expectation of privacy test, and Mosaic Theory.94 Mosaic
Theory posits that the collection and subsequent analysis of information from non-searches could
invoke Fourth Amendment protections.95 The main idea is that this conglomeration of nonsearches could become a Fourth Amendment search, after a certain point. Talia concluded that
the Mosaic Theory is a good foundation for securing Fourth Amendment protections in public
areas; however, it must be re-developed to account for police discretion.96
Jace Gatewood described that, prior to the development of modern technology, privacy
was more practical in nature.97 In today’s world, however, modern technology has blurred what
is considered private and what law enforcement is legally able to do. This advanced technology
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has the capability to track and monitor anyone, regardless of time and place.98 Gatewood
suggested that the Mosaic Theory could help alleviate some issues in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Furthermore, this theory could create a balance between the practicality of the
Fourth Amendment and law enforcement’s need to control crime.99 The Mosaic Theory refers to
the notion that the aggregate collection of data from non-searches could invoke Fourth
Amendment protections.100 After a careful analysis by law enforcement, the aggregate data from
these non-searches could become a Fourth Amendment search. Moreover, Gatewood posited that
the Mosaic Theory has a unique capacity to meet and protect the real world expectations of
privacy as opposed to merely responding to and safeguarding the alternative of what a person
exposes to the public, knowingly or otherwise. Additionally, according to Gatewood, this theory
would help to shed some light on the subject of advanced technology and privacy rights. 101
Priscilla Smith argued that the Mosaic Theory was incomplete and further stated that the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test remains adequate, despite certain criticisms that the
test is ill-equipped to respond to modern technological advances.102 Furthermore, the
concurrences in the Jones decision viewed the warrantless GPS surveillance to be a violation of
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy based on the original notion of privacy protection
and protections against abusive law enforcement tactics.103
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Daniel Pesciotta explained that the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test can still
protect citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights in the post-Jones world.104 Lower courts appear to be
applying Katz tests when considering Fourth Amendment matters dealing with video
surveillance and e-mail searches.105 Furthermore, the courts seem to favor citizens’ privacy rights
while keeping law enforcement from gaining easy access to advanced technology. Pesciotta
further claimed that in a post-Jones world, the Katz test was not “dead;” it will endure so long as
both society and the court system continue to rely on citizens’ reasonable privacy interests.106
William Kim argued that a “capability-based” warrant requirement would help alleviate
some of the pitfalls with the Jones decision.107 Kim described the “capability-based” procedure
as law enforcement detailing the capabilities of the technology they are using in the warrant. For
example, if a GPS solely transmits the pin point location of a vehicle, then law enforcement need
only specify such; on the other hand, if the GPS device has the ability to record conversations,
then law enforcement must specify this capability during the application of the warrant. 108 This
would have many foreseeable advantages, including serving the dual purposes of safeguarding
privacy protections without hindering the criminal investigations of the police.109
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Kathryn Horwath states that the use of location-based technological applications and
services compromise an individual’s privacy.110 Moreover, as citizens become more
interconnected, it has left an open question as to what this means in the context of Fourth
Amendment protections. Horwath suggests that users of these location-based applications and
other electronic communications need to receive Fourth Amendment protections.111 Overall, the
Court in Jones had sidestepped the larger question of whether prolonged governmental electronic
surveillance would violate individual privacy rights afforded by the Fourth Amendment.112
Ryan Birss explained the Jones decision caused much turmoil for the FBI as they had to
deactivate nearly 3000 GPS devices tracking the whereabouts of persons of interest.113 Birss
explained in the post-Jones era, the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Skinner best illustrates the vast
limitations found in a property-based, trespass approach to Fourth Amendment searches by
police involving electronic surveillance.114 For example, the Skinner court found a way around
the implications of the physical trespass test by noting that police used cell phone location data to
track the whereabouts of the suspect. Moreover, Birss stated based on Justice Alito’s concurring
opinion in Jones, courts would be able to protect privacy interests while also keeping more
creative governmental intrusions in check.115
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David Gray, Danielle Citron, and Liz Rinehart claimed that the decision in Jones has
great potential for protecting citizens from unwanted intrusions while also helping law
enforcement fight cybercrimes and health fraud.116 Jones helps to guide, and at the same time
place limits on, law enforcement as they attempt to use new types of surveillance technology.
Moreover, the authors argued that law enforcement interests are at stake if police do not keep up
with technological advances that are now at the disposal of those involved in cybercrimes.
According to the authors, law enforcement officers must be allowed to use digital surveillance
technology to prevent and prosecute various degrees of cybercrimes.117
Stephen Henderson further argued that the return of the property based approach in Jones
along with the approach of Katz means that there is a higher likelihood courts will be able to
more accurately determine the Fourth Amendment search question.118 However, Henderson
admitted that the Jones decision does leave some important questions unanswered, and it will be
interesting to witness how the lower courts react to this decision. Henderson stated that the
critical question is what restraints or regulations should be placed on the government to survey
and record information.119 This has been a gray area, which is why many scholars and critics
were hopeful for Jones to establish some clear precedent. However, that did not necessarily
happen. Henderson explained that the lack of guidance in the Jones decision is not surprising for
a few reasons; first, the government did not raise certain issues such as the reasonableness of a
police search using a GPS device and second, any precise guidance from the Supreme Court in
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the area of electronic surveillance would be difficult to formulate.120 Furthermore, Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion in Jones, as well as other critics and legal scholars, have repeatedly argued
Congress would be more suited to providing guidance in this area.121
Elizabeth Elliot argued that warrantless tracking of cell-site location data and warrantless
GPS surveillance were common practices in law enforcement, but the recent Jones decision has
created a “new” test for courts to apply to Fourth Amendment cases involving the use of this
technology.122 Furthermore, Elliot argued that the tracking of cell-site location data is vastly
similar to GPS surveillance and thus, should also require law enforcement to obtain a warrant.
Elliot concluded that law enforcement has too much power in being able to request this
information acquired by technological devices on a whim, and that the Supreme Court needs to
address the issue of the government or “Big Brother” being able to rather easily invade anyone’s
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in light of recent technological
advancements.123
Ber-An Pan raised a similar issue in regards to information obtained from cell-phones.124
Nearly everyone owns or has access to a cell-phone and a massive amount of information is
stored on these phones using the various functions, such as GPS, texts, phone calls, and internet.
The Jones Court determined that the government conducts a search when they attach a GPS
device to track a suspect. However, Pan argued that the Court avoided addressing various
120
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loopholes in Fourth Amendment protections caused by modern technology.125 Furthermore, the
recent Jones decision also raised quite a few legal uncertainties for law enforcement in the area
of technology and the application of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, Pan pointed to Justice
Sotomayor and Alito’s concurring opinions, which disapproved of returning to the property
rights approach to Fourth Amendment searches.126 It was reasoned that in this modern age, a
substantial amount of information is no longer viewed as part of a “physical document,” but
instead consists of “intangible” data. Pan criticized Jones for sidestepping the Fourth
Amendment issues related to this electronic data and thereby creating a degree of vagueness and
uncertainty in this area.
Similarly, George Dery III and Ryan Evaro discussed how the Court in Jones missed an
opportunity to drastically change the landscape of Fourth Amendment searches and instead
returned to an outdated physical intrusion test for these searches.127 Moreover, the authors argued
that the Court in Jones appeared to forget that the Katz Court found that a search occurred
because of the electronic interception of a conversation, not from the actual attachment of an
electronic device to the outside of a telephone booth to obtain the information.128 Hence, the
Jones Court missed the opportunity to answer how far the government can go with advanced
technology, such as a GPS device, before it invades an individual’s expectation of privacy.

125

Ber-An Pan, The Evolving Fourth Amendment: United States V. Jones, The Information Cloud, And The Right To
Exclude, 72 Md. L. Rev. 997, 998 (2013).
126
Ber-An Pan, The Evolving Fourth Amendment: United States V. Jones, The Information Cloud, And The Right To
Exclude, 72 Md. L. Rev. 997, 1037 (2013).
127
George M. Dery III and Ryan Evaro, The Court Loses Its Way With The Global Positioning System: United States
V. Jones Retreats To The “Classic Trespassory Search”, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 113, 115 (2013).
128
George M. Dery III and Ryan Evaro, The Court Loses Its Way With The Global Positioning System: United States
V. Jones Retreats To The “Classic Trespassory Search”, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 113, 151 (2013).

30

Kyle Robbins points out the major pitfall of the Jones decision in that it did not explain if
warrantless GPS data obtained by police prior to this decision is admissible.129 As a result, lower
courts are forced to struggle with this decision, and must rely on available, appellant precedent.
Furthermore, any evidence obtained by officers who acted reasonably under the circumstances
prior to Jones, is generally protected from the exclusionary rule (i.e., under the good-faith
exception).130 Also, courts remain resistant in applying the exclusionary rule in this context
because it would fail to meet its intended purpose of deterring corrupt police investigations
infringing upon a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Susan Freiwald described Jones as “anything but definitive” because it lacked a rule on
how to govern cases which did not implicate a physical trespass element.131 According to
Freiwald, the Court in Jones left many questions unanswered, and it is up to the lower courts to
interpret this new test and identify solutions. However, this process may take longer because of
the Davis good-faith exception.132 The Court in Davis v. United States held that the exclusionary
rule does not apply if law enforcement were acting on governing appellate precedent at the time.
Tamara Lave pointed out that many scholars have criticized the rationale in Jones and its
adoption of the trespass doctrine for Fourth Amendment search inquiries.133 Only Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion in Jones was willing to question whether reasonable expectation of privacy
has a place in the digital age where information is constantly voluntarily disclosed to third
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parties.134 Furthermore, the Jones decision has caused a great deal of confusion in the realm of
law enforcement; for instance, many agencies do not know what degree of electronic tracking is
allowed, if any, before this tracking encroaches upon a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. 135
As a result, the FBI had taken the drastic step of completely deactivating thousands of GPS
devices across the nation. Lave further argued that the United States Supreme Court’s history
regarding technology appeared to reflect the protection of the interests of wealthy “elites,” as
binoculars and other forms of permissible police technology could be blocked with a house or
taller fences.136 However, with the recent advances in technology, both the privileged and
disadvantaged have reason to fear the eye of “Big Brother” as society becomes more interconnected with technology.
Thomas Clancy argued that the opinion of the Court, written by Justice Scalia, did not
offer any novel approaches to Fourth Amendment search questions; thus, according to Clancy,
Jones lacks significant precedential value.137 Clancy explains that trespass is a Fourth
Amendment concept from an earlier time which really never completely faded away.
Additionally, the concurrences did not offer any specific guidance, but instead made vague
observations regarding advanced technologies and Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Clancy
argued these concurring opinions will only add to the confusion in this area rather than being a
guide for lower courts in the post-Jones world.138 Clancy concluded by stating that “Jones is but
the most recent failure” and reasoned the United States Supreme Court in Jones did not develop
134

Tamara Rice Lave, Protecting Elites: An Alternative Take on How United States v. Jones Fits into the Court’s
Technology Jurisprudence, 14 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 461, 464 (2013).
135
Tamara Rice Lave, Protecting Elites: An Alternative Take on How United States v. Jones Fits into the Court’s
Technology Jurisprudence, 14 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 461, 466 (2013).
136
Tamara Rice Lave, Protecting Elites: An Alternative Take on How United States v. Jones Fits into the Court’s
Technology Jurisprudence, 14 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 461, 484 (2013).
137
Thomas K. Clancy, United States v. Jones: Fourth Amendment Applicability in the 21st Century, 10 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 303, 303 (2012).
138
Id.

32

any framework for new technologies and Fourth Amendment rights.139 However, Jones does
provide a method regarding how lower courts should evaluate physical intrusions (i.e.,
trespasses).
Erin Murphy explained that Jones had forced the United States Supreme Court to answer
a difficult question, one on which they have avoided confrontation for a period of time. The
Supreme Court had a decision to make, one where they would decide where the line is to be
drawn for Fourth Amendment protections.140 However, Murphy claimed the majority of the
justices fell short in their analysis which failed to address the critical question concerning the use
of technology by law enforcement. Instead, the majority provided lower courts with a specific
rule and returned to the trespass doctrine to govern Fourth Amendment search inquiries. But the
issue of electronic surveillance which doesn’t implicate a physical trespass was largely
overlooked in Jones. Justice Sotomayor was the only justice who made any genuine attempt at
tackling this difficult question.141 Murphy concluded, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion may be held
in similar regard to Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz, in that it could be held as a set
standard.142
Benjamin Priester claimed that the Jones decision lacked clarity in its reasoning as three
different rationales emerged from the various opinions in the case.143 Additionally, Priester stated
that the various opinions managed to avoid clarifying how Fourth Amendment rights apply in an
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“Internet-interconnected age.”144 Although the United States Supreme Court in Jones managed to
avoid this clarification, Priester claimed it is inevitable that the Court will be confronted with this
question again, and the justices at that time will have to make significant changes to Fourth
Amendment law in this area.145
Jace Gatewood compared the Jones decision to a child waking up on Christmas morning
and expecting gifts under the tree from Santa, but instead finding that Santa had forgotten all the
good stuff.146 This feeling can be characterized as disappointment. This disappointment stems
from the hope that the United States Supreme Court in Jones would have provided more
direction and guidance in the area of Fourth Amendment rights and technologies used by law
enforcement in the digital age.147 Moreover, a plethora of data is constantly being stored about an
individual (i.e., on Facebook, Twitter, etc.), and the possibility of law enforcement being able to
access this information without any form of physical intrusion makes the Jones decision appear
“illusionary.”148 Gatewood concluded by remarking that the Court in Jones missed a
considerable opportunity to address the many questions regarding how the government is
permitted to use advanced technology under the Fourth Amendment.149
Mary Leary claimed the opinion in Jones failed to yield any meaningful results in the
area of technology and privacy expectations, but it did manage to expand the definition of a
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Fourth Amendment search.150 Leary also argued that due to “commercial conditioning,” society
no longer possess a true subjective expectation of privacy.151 This “commercial conditioning”
has come in the form of society being presented with devices and tools which allow it to easily
exchange information with third-party businesses, including Facebook and Twitter, without any
expectation of privacy. Cell-phones with GPS devices enabled are constantly gathering and
aggregating massive amounts of data on a single individual and as a result of these forms of
advanced technology, Leary claimed society has relinquished any opportunity it may have had to
demonstrate an expectation of privacy.152
Angelique Romero argued that after the decision in Jones, the inquiry for courts to
determine if a violation of Fourth Amendment rights has occurred has become more blurred.153
This vagueness stems from Jones’ adoption of two inquiries, or tests, to decide Fourth
Amendment search questions: the common law trespass test and the reasonable expectation of
privacy test. Although it failed to answer some of the more pressing questions within Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, Romero explained the trespass test may in fact have a place in the
overall Fourth Amendment inquiry in the modern era. For example, if police obtain a suspect’s
DNA without a warrant or consent, the courts could easily rely on the trespass test to evaluate
whether a violation of the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights had occurred.154
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The Honorable Kevin Emas and Tamara Pallas questioned whether the Jones decision
may have been the death of Katz.155 Based on the opinion of the Court as written by Justice
Scalia, Emas and Pallas claimed that once the application of the trespass test does not result in a
finding of a Fourth Amendment search, then courts are able to resort to the Katz test.156
Additionally, Justice Scalia’s opinion required using the Katz test to assess the “reasonability” of
the search, not necessarily for whether the search had occurred. Emas and Pallas both agreed that
the Jones trespass test is but the first step in a paradigm shift away from the Katz test in Fourth
Amendment analysis.157
Michael Snyder mentioned that the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones left a number of
questions unanswered. One such question left unaddressed is whether police use of a GPS device
to track the whereabouts of a suspect constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment when
there is no physical trespass present.158 Additionally, the reasoning of the majority and
concurring opinions in Jones does not address whether the police conduct in the case constitutes
a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Because of these lingering questions, critics and skeptics
wonder if the Court’s holding is extremely limited in both its applicability and utility. 159 Snyder
concluded by claiming that due to the limited holding of Jones, there is no assurance of Fourth
Amendment protection to individuals who carry cell-phone devices.
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Ebony Morris explained the holding in Jones failed to answer a crucial question: when
the government uses a warrantless GPS device without accomplishing a physical trespass, does
the person have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information obtained (from the
device)?160 This is a critical question because in the modern age, physical intrusions are much
less likely, and conversely, electronic or digital intrusions are much more common. Thus, the
Jones Court missed an opportunity to help guide future cases involving advanced technology.
However, as Justice Alito pointed out in his concurrence, Congress is fully capable of remedying
this grey area.161
Brittany Boatman argued that the Jones decision was a disappointing one as the United
States Supreme Court’s revival of common law trespass will further complicate Fourth
Amendment cases.162 Boatman explained that while the Court’s holding reflected societal
changes, the Court nonetheless revived an outdated system instead of making the necessary,
groundbreaking alterations to Fourth Amendment law. This approach is seen as especially
foolish by Boatman because society is rapidly becoming more connected through advanced
technologies. These technologies, according to Boatman, will only further blur the lines between
the notions of privacy expectations and physical trespasses.
Kevin Bankston and Ashkan Soltani explained that the Jones decision produced three
separate opinions; furthermore, as reflected in these opinions, four United States Supreme Court
justices rejected the majority’s notion of a trespass and argued that the prolonged electronic,
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GPA monitoring of defendant Jones’ vehicle violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.163
Bankston and Soltani proposed a new supplementary tool, which they named “order-ofmagnitude,” to help courts decide if a privacy expectation exists in cases involving surveillance
technologies.164 This system uses cost as a metric to determine the privacy expectation of
individuals under electronic surveillance. Bankston and Soltani explained one limitation of their
tool includes how it might apply above and beyond tracking types of electronic surveillance. In
addition, if their tool does gain acceptance, it will require much discussion and debate on the
exact cost calculus.165
Dana Raigrodski explained that with the recent Jones decision it is time to rethink Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.166 Raigrodski introduced a feminist argument that Fourth
Amendment is not about privacy or property interests, but instead about the power and control
inherent in police searches and seizures. Furthermore, according to Raigrodski, the Fourth
Amendment was construed to protect the interests of white privileged men in order to perpetuate
male ideology. Raigrodski concluded by stating that feminist jurisprudence is not limited by
privacy or property, but instead re-conceptualizes the idea of power and offers multiple new
perspectives.167
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David Twombly examined how in a post-Jones world the Davis good-faith exception
applied to certain federal cases and circuits with clear binding precedent.168 Additionally, some
lower courts appear to have extended the Davis good-faith exception in circuits without clear
binding precedent, relying on nearby circuits’ then-binding precedent. Twombly concluded
lower courts appeared to have disagreed on the application of Davis to police conduct prior to
Jones related to G.P.S. devices, where some courts use the good-faith exception more narrowly
based on a close reliance to the facts and holding of then-binding precedent; meanwhile, other
courts apply the exception more broadly to cover all relevant police conduct prior to Jones.169
Nancy Forster claimed that the Jones decision is a significant change in Fourth
Amendment law.170 Moreover, Forster’s main argument is that society has lost its objective
reasonable expectation of privacy. This is mainly due to the fact that so many individuals give
away so much information through their cell-phones and various social media websites. This
information is often viewed as voluntarily given, and thus, third parties through cell-phones and
other social media platforms gain access to this information.171 Furthermore, advanced
technology could reach a point where society no longer has an expectation of privacy. Forster
concluded with an example of law enforcement using x-ray glasses and being freely able to
examine the contents of a purse out in public. Forster posited the question of privacy will
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ultimately depend on the type of technology available to law enforcement which will cause the
Courts to drastically shift society’s perceptions of Fourth Amendment law.172
The final article which appeared in the citator list based on the specific criteria did not
actually have “Jones” in the title. The citator appears to have inadvertently and incorrectly
included the article in the list of articles with “Jones” in the title.173 As can be seen from the
literature, academics are split on whether the Jones decision was beneficial in further developing
Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence or not. Those in favor of Jones being a significant and
productive change explain that the resurgence of the trespass doctrine is an important milestone
as society moves into a digital age. More specifically, the Jones decision has vastly changed the
scope of what constitutes a police search. Additionally, the trespass doctrine has the ability to
work alongside Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. Those against the Jones decision
generally describe it as a “missed” opportunity. These academics describe that returning to the
trespass doctrine solves nothing, namely because the law moved away from the trespass doctrine
to the Katz test in the wake of modern technology developed in the 1960s (i.e., wire taps). This
has left many to wonder why the current United States Supreme Court felt it was reasonable to
return to the trespass doctrine. Some academics believe that Katz or the Mosaic theory is enough
to ensure the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment, with some deliberation on specific
instances. Others mentioned Jones is too specific or narrow to be widely applied. The United
172
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States Supreme Court has come under much criticism as some argue that it dodged crucial
questions with regards to modern technology and Fourth Amendment search inquiries.
This study will help to fill the gap in literature by carefully examining and interpreting
federal appellate cases to see how these courts are applying the Fourth Amendment search
inquiry as it was developed by the United State Supreme Court in Jones. The primary purpose of
this study is to examine, in the aftermath of Jones, which test - the Katz privacy test and/ or the
Jones property/ trespass test - the courts are using and whether they found a search occurred (i.e.,
if a search was found, then it would invoke the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to all
under the Constitution). The secondary purpose is to compare the period prior to Jones and
following Jones in terms of the rate of “search” findings by the federal appellate courts. This has
led to two overall hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that, in the wake of Jones, the majority of
the federal appellate courts would be relying on the trespass doctrine to determine Fourth
Amendment search inquiries (i.e., since Jones itself recently resurrected this doctrine). The
second hypothesis is that the majority of the federal appellate courts after Jones would find that
no police search occurred (i.e., if no search was found then the citizen would not receive the
protections of the Fourth Amendment). The first hypothesis is theorized as such because Jones is
one of the most recent cases to address Fourth Amendment search law, and, as such, it is
expected that more courts will want to weigh in and utilize this new precedent. The second
hypothesis is theorized as such because of the post-9/11 crime control era that the American
criminal justice system is currently experiencing. Historically, during these crime-control leaning
times, courts tend to side with law enforcement officers over protecting or expanding individual
freedoms.
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Chapter 3 - Methodology
The purpose of this research is to get a better understanding of how certain courts are
interpreting the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jones. Therefore, a
qualitative approach was employed for this research project to analyze large amounts of case
information. The type of analysis chosen for this study was a directed content analysis. This type
of analysis was employed because of its efficiency in analyzing large amounts of text data. More
specifically, this technique was used to help analyze and interpret the numerous amount of
federal appellate cases chosen for this study. A directed content analysis is defined as an analysis
whereby the researchers use existing theory or prior research to develop a coding scheme prior to
the start of the project.174 This type of analysis is most often thought of as an inductive research
technique, which makes educated predictions among the relationships between the variables. As
the research becomes more developed, the coding scheme becomes more refined.175
For this study, it was decided to create a coding scheme of specific groupings based on
the type of test the federal appellate courts used to decide a particular case. This coding scheme
originally was broken up into three sections: “Jones,” “Katz,” or a combination of the two tests
referred to as “Both.” This study examined the relevant facts, holding and rationale of the court
cases in order to determine which test was used. For example, if the court mentioned the trespass
concept from Jones and relied substantially on the United States Supreme Court’s rationale in
Jones to decide if a search had occurred under the facts of the case, then this case was
categorized under the “Jones” grouping. Conversely, if the court mentioned the reasonable
expectation of privacy concept from Katz and relied substantially on the United States Supreme
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Court’s reasoning in Katz to determine whether a search had occurred under the facts of the case,
then this case was categorized under the “Katz” grouping. Finally, if the court mentioned both
the Jones and Katz concepts, or tests, and examined the search question using the reasoning
from both of these cases, then this case was categorized under the “Both” group.
Additionally, the analysis included whether the particular federal appellate court found a
search had occurred under the applicable legal test (Jones, Katz or Both) and facts of the case.
This part of the analysis consisted of a simple dichotomy of the court cases into “search” or “no
search” categories, or groupings. For example, if a court relied on the Jones common-law
trespass test to hold that a search had occurred under the facts of the case, then that case would
be categorized under the “search” grouping.
The cases used for this project were obtained through the use of legal citators provided by
Westlaw and/or LexisNexis. The purpose of a citator is to catalog cases, secondary sources, and
any other forms of authority by analyzing what they say about the sources they cite. 176 Citators
are maintained and constantly updated by editors at LexisNexis or Westlaw who are trained in
the law. In sum, citators are an essential tool for legal scholars and practitioners to determine if
certain authority is still “good law,” which generally means that the law has not been changed or
overturned.
Westlaw provides a citator called KeyCite.177 KeyCiting refers to a process or technique
to identify cases or other sources which have been cataloged based on the sources they cite. In
Westlaw, a KeyCite entry for a case has three sections: full history, direct history, and citing
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references.178 The full history option in the KeyCite provides information on (1) the direct
history of the case; (2) any negative indirect history; (3) and any procedural phrases. 179 The
direct history option provides an illustration of the procedural history of the case. This chart is
also known as “Graphical KeyCite” under Westlaw.180 Lastly, the citing references option shows
the complete indirect history of the original case and various types of citing sources attached to
the case.181 This option allows the user to change the parameters of the criteria for finding cases
which cite the original case depending on the goals of the researcher (i.e., cases associated with a
certain jurisdiction, level of court, treatment depth, etc.).182 For example, if the researcher was
interested in accessing all or certain cases which cited Jones, then using the citing references
option would obtain these cases.
Accessing the citator is relatively straightforward. Once you arrive at the Westlaw home
page, there is an option at the top of the page called “KEYCITE.183” Accessing that option brings
the user to another page which reads “KeyCite this citation” above a search bar on the left. This
is where the user may type in the legal citation to have access to the case and the various sections
in Keycite for that case.184 The Jones legal citation for purposes of Keycite is “132 S.Ct. 945”
and once entered, it brings up the Jones decision under the “Full History” view option. Since the
current research project is interested in how federal appellate cases are deciding Fourth
Amendment search law, accessing those cases which reference Jones is accomplished by using
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the “Citing References” option on the left of the page185. This will bring the user to a page which
shows all materials that reference Jones, a total of approximately 3083 various documents.
Since the focus of the research is to interpret federal appellate court cases, the search can
be narrowed using the “Limit KeyCite Display” option at the bottom of the screen. 186 After
accessing this option, another webpage appears with additional options for narrowing the search
criteria. The Limit KeyCite Display may limit the search depending on the (1) document type;
(2) headnotes used in the case; (3) location; (4) jurisdiction; (5) date; and (6) depth of
treatment.187 For this project, the search parameters were first narrowed by document type (i.e.,
federal appellate cases). This document type was chosen since the federal appellate courts
would offer insight on how the higher, precedential courts are interpreting searches following the
Jones decision. Accordingly, “highest court” and “other courts” options were selected for this
specific search criteria. This would allow the citator to narrow the search to only include federal
appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court.188
Second, under the Limit KeyCite Display option, the depth of treatment was used to
narrow further the list of citing cases for the Jones decision.189 This was done to focus on the
cases which gave “significant treatment” to Jones, meaning that Jones was examined or
discussed in the citing case.190 This limit was applied to eliminate cases which merely cited or
briefly mentioned Jones rather than discuss the impact of the case. Westlaw’s KeyCite uses a
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system of star categories which range from one star to four stars, where one star is the lowest
amount of treatment a citing case can provide and four stars are the highest amount of
treatment.191 Accordingly, the search was narrowed to only include citing cases identified with
three or four stars.
Finally, under the Limit KeyCite Display option, jurisdiction was used to narrow the
search.192 This option allows the user to include or exclude citing cases associated with Jones
from certain jurisdictions. For this research project, the jurisdiction was narrowed to United
States Supreme Court, the eleven numbered federal circuit courts, the United States Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia, and the Federal Circuit Court.
After applying all of these search criteria within the Limit KeyCite Display option of the
citator by selecting the “apply” button on the left side of the screen, the list of citing cases was
narrowed to 58 cases that fit the specific criteria. The total number of cases which cited Jones
was reduced to 53 after eliminating cases that were overturned or did not sufficiently answer the
Fourth Amendment search question.193 The search results for the citing cases include cases from
the date of the Jones decision (January 23, 2012) through May 31 of 2015.
As the research became more refined, the original groupings had to be expanded to
include two initially unforeseen groups. The first newly established category included cases
wherein the factual events of the case occurred prior to the Jones decision; however, the case
was actually heard at the federal circuit level after Jones. Since the facts occurred prior to Jones,
191
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These cases were eliminated due to their decisions being overturned by a future case or did not sufficiently
address the Fourth Amendment search question. The four withdrawn/ vacated or reversed/ overturned cases are: (1)
United States v. Wahchumwah, 704 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 2013); (2) United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187 (2014 ); (3)
United States v. Davis 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014); (4) Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 686 F.3d 1085 (2012 ). The
one case that did not address the Fourth Amendment search question is American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper,
785 F.3d 787 (2nd Cir. 2015).
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federal circuit courts were turning to their previous, pre-Jones circuit decisions (i.e., precedent)
to help analyze the Fourth Amendment search question (e.g., whether a search had occurred
through police use of a GPS device). The category created for these court cases was titled “thenbinding precedent.”194 Though their existence is mentioned in the findings section, these cases,
which reflect a reliance by circuit courts on relevant pre-Jones binding precedent, were
ultimately excluded from the study’s reported findings since they failed to answer the intended,
applicable research question (i.e., how federal appellate courts are interpreting Jones following
its decisional date and application).195 For example, in these cases, federal appellate courts are
relying on pre-Jones search laws and rationales underlying the application of those laws. This
approach by these courts is somewhat expected due to how recent the Jones decision is.
The second, new category was titled “procedural error.” The cases categorized under this
grouping included federal appellate court cases which contained some form of procedural error
which prevented the courts from deciding on the merits whether a search under the Fourth
Amendment had occurred. An example of these types of cases included the defendant’s failure to
raise a timely motion in court objecting to the admission of evidence obtained through the police
search.196 Thus, the lack of the court’s analysis on the search question in these cases warranted a
new category. This category was kept for classification purposes, but the category did not offer
any answers to the study’s substantive research questions and therefore the cases in this category
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This title, or label, was chosen as a majority of circuits were turning to their previously binding precedent as
courts could not hold law enforcement or attorneys guiding them accountable under Jones for conduct occurring
prior to Jones (i.e., since Jones was not explicitly stated as being retroactive).
195
Five (5) cases were exempt from exclusion and instead categorized as Jones since the courts made an in depth
Fourth Amendment search analysis which led to the courts concluding a search had occurred under Jones;
however, these courts ultimately turned to binding appellate precedent and applied Davis good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. These cases include U.S. v. Sellers, 512 Fed.Appx. 319 (4th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Fisher, 745 F.3d
200 (6th Cir. 2014); U.S. v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.
2013); U.S. v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2014)
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See the Appendix A section to review all the Binding Precedent “BP” or Procedural Error “PE” cases.
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were omitted from the reported findings. Overall, the omission of the cases falling into these two
categories reduced the original sample of fifty three (53) citing cases for Jones to thirty three
(33) cases.
To ensure a more complete analysis of Fourth Amendment search law following Jones ,
the citator was also used to search for any cases which cited Katz during this period (i.e., from
the date of Jones through May 31, 2015). This approach was undertaken because Jones retained
the Katz test as a possible, single lens through which lower courts may examine the search
question. This would also produce the most accurate view of how courts are determining Fourth
Amendment search questions by capturing all cases which either cited Jones or Katz in the
citator.
To use the citator for Katz, the same steps were followed as with Jones (above) with one
more additional step. First, the “KEYCITE” option was accessed at the top of the Westlaw page.
The legal citation for Katz was entered into the search bar --- “389 U.S. 347” --- and the citator
results appeared. Clicking on the citing references at this point brought up a webpage with over
32,000 citing documents.
Next, the search parameters were reduced by using the “Limit KeyCite Display” option at
the bottom of the screen. Following the same search parameters used for Jones, under document
type, both the “Highest court” and “Other courts” were the only options selected. Jurisdiction
was limited to United States Supreme Court, the eleven numbered federal circuit courts of
appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Depth of treatment was maintained at three stars and four stars so as to
only include cases which examined and discussed Katz. Finally, the date limitation was used to
further narrow the search. This option was used to only include cases which cited Katz after
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Jones was decided. After applying these search limitations, the citator produced twenty three
(23) cases which referenced Katz after the decisional date of Jones. Cross referencing the list
produced from the citator of Jones with the citator of Katz, there was an overlap of eighteen (18)
cases. This left five (5) cases which needed to be evaluated and incorporated into the findings.
These five (5) cases from the Katz citator were added to the thirty three (33) cases from the Jones
citator, which totaled thirty eight (38) cases for the post-Jones findings.
To compare and contrast how Fourth Amendment search law has changed since Jones,
the citator was used to examine Fourth Amendment search determinations under Katz during the
ten (10) years prior to the Jones decision. To accomplish this, the “Limit KeyCite Display”
option was again applied in the citator (for Katz). The date option was selected and January 22,
2002 was inserted into the “AFTER” box. Next, the date January 22, 2012 was inputted into the
“BEFORE” box. A ten (10) year timeframe was selected so as to acquire a sufficient number of
federal appellate cases providing significant treatment to Katz to substantially equal, or match,
the number of Jones cases previously obtained (i.e., thirty nine cases). The treatment limitations
selected were the same as those selected for the Jones cases, (i.e., “discussed” and “examined”).
Additionally, the jurisdiction parameter was set to the same search criteria as in the Jones
analysis --- United States Supreme Court, the eleven numbered federal circuit courts of appeal,
and the United State Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Lastly, “higher court”
and “other court” options were chosen for the document type parameter. This search using the
citator obtained thirty nine (39) citing cases for Katz.
These thirty nine (39) citing cases from the federal appellate courts were used to examine
whether they found a search had occurred under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.
This determination left two groupings of cases in which one group concluded a search had
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occurred and another group found a search had not occurred. However, the original thirty nine
(39) citing cases were reduced due to the case later being overturned or overruled.197 The final
working sample of Katz cases decided prior to Jones consisted of thirty four (34) cases. Five (5)
cases were eliminated for various reasons. First, a lower court case within the Jones litigation
was eliminated because it had been overturned (i.e., by the United States Supreme Court in Jones
itself).198 Second, United States v. Maynard was eliminated because both its holding and
reasoning focused upon the reasonableness of a police search as opposed to whether a search had
initially occurred. In addition, this case was related to the Jones litigation since defendants
Maynard and Jones were co-defendants (i.e., in United States v. Maynard).199 Third, cases were
eliminated because they were overruled or overturned by another case which appeared in the
citator or on other grounds unrelated to a Fourth Amendment search question.200 Fourth, cases
were eliminated because they did not reference Katz in the majority opinion, but instead
discussed or examined Katz in their dissenting or concurring opinions.201 Because these latter
opinions do not constitute the law, these cases were removed from the study’s findings. Finally, a
case was eliminated because it was more focused on a procedural question, and not on the
determination of whether a search had occurred under the Katz privacy test.202
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Cases which were eliminated, included Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008);
U.S. v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, (D.C. Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Circ. 2010); U.S. v. Crawford, 372
F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004); Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2009).
198
The case denied the government’s petition to have Maynard decision reviewed again.
199
Jones case by Supreme Court essentially agreed with Maynard court’s finding that a search had occurred when
police attached a GPS device to Jones’ vehicle, but disagreed on the basis for this --- Maynard case said search
occurred because Jones’ privacy rights were violated while Jones case said a search occurred because Jones’
property rights violated at the time of GPS attachment/ monitoring. In sum, Jones Supreme Court case essentially
overrules Maynard court (i.e., at the very least its rationale).
200
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008) was overruled by City of Ontario, Cal. v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, (2010); U.S. v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) overruled U.S. v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700
(9th Cir. 2003) on grounds outside of Fourth Amendment search law.
201
The citator found Katz referenced in the concurring and dissenting opinion. U.S. v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048,
1074 (9th Cir. 2004).
202
Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2009).
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The literature review was created by accessing law review articles through the database
LexisNexis Academic.203 LexisNexis Academic and its widely known and accepted legal citator,
“Shepard’s,” allowed for a more specific focus on only those law reviews which cited Jones in
their title (i.e., law review articles that provided substantial treatment of Jones).204
To access the LexisNexis Acadmic database of legal periodicals first, log onto the site
and click on the dropdown box above the search bar. This box should be titled “Search By
Content Type” and then click on law reviews. Next, enter the legal case citation for Jones into
the search bar. The Shepard’s produced 999 law reviews and other legal journals which cited
Jones. In order to focus more on only those law review and legal journals which provided
substantial treatment of Jones, the “Advanced Options” feature in Shepard’s was applied. Using
the Advanced Options, the search was narrowed to law reviews and journals whose titles
included the word “Jones.” To produce this restriction, one possibility is to type in the space
provided for restrictions the following phrase ---“TITLE (JONES).” Another possibility is to
select “TITLE” from the available dropdown box, and then type in “JONES” in the space
provided. The search bar should read “132 S.Ct. 945 AND TITLE (JONES).” To finalize this
restriction, the “apply” button is selected, and then the “search” button. This search produced
fifty (50) law reviews and journals which both cited Jones and had the word “Jones” somewhere
in their title. The literature review also included historical United States Supreme Court “search”
cases decided prior to Katz v. United States, such as On Lee v. United States (1952) and
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Amy E. Sloan, Basic Legal Research 47 (5th ed. 2012). Law reviews are legal periodicals written by legal scholars,
judges and practitioners, and students studying the law.
204
Id. at 145.
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Olmstead v United States (1928). These cases were included to provide historical context on the
development of Fourth Amendment search law in the United States over time.205

205

These cases were mentioned in the majority opinion of Jones by Justice Scalia. See U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945,
950-952 (2012).
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Chapter 4 - Findings
Overall, the findings consists of two sections. The first section (part I) consists of the
summary of the findings. This includes all relevant findings related to the post-Jones and preJones data. At the end of this section there are tables which represent the findings. The second
section (part II) consists of the detailed findings. This section begins with the detailed post-Jones
findings which includes all cases that cited Jones or Katz after the Jones decision and then ends
with the pre-Jones findings which cited Katz prior to the Jones decision.
I. Summary of the Findings
The post-Jones working sample totaled thirty eight (38) cases which gave significant
treatment to Jones and Katz from the date Jones was decided until May 31, 2015.206 The
breakdown of the cases are as followed. First, eleven (11) cases strictly used the Jones trespass
test to decide Fourth Amendment search question.207 All eleven (11) of these cases found a
search had occurred under the Jones trespass doctrine. Second, eleven (11) cases strictly used the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Of these cases, three (3) found a search had occurred
and eight (8) found no search had occurred. Finally, sixteen (16) cases fell under the “Both”
category. This means that these cases used both the Jones trespass doctrine and the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine to answer the Fourth Amendment search inquiry. Of
these cases, six (6) found a search had occurred, meanwhile ten (10) had found a search had not
206

Cases were eliminated due to their decisions being overturned by a future case which appeared within citator.
Refer to the Methodology section for a detailed explanation of the cases which were eliminated in this research
study.
207
There are five (5) cases which were categorized as Jones since the courts made an in depth Fourth Amendment
search analysis which led to the courts concluding a search had occurred under Jones; however, these courts
ultimately turned to binding appellate precedent and applied Davis good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
These cases include U.S. v. Sellers, 512 Fed.Appx. 319 (4th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2014); U.S.
v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2013); U.S. v. Stephens, 764
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2014).
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occurred. Lastly, fourteen (14) cases were classified as “Binding Appellate Precedent” and six
(6) fell under “Procedural Error.”208
The second section of pre-Jones findings includes all cases which cited Katz during the
ten (10) years prior to the Jones decision (January 22, 2002-January 22, 2012). The pre-Jones
working sample totaled thirty four (34) cases.209 Of the thirty four (34) cases, sixteen (16) found
a search had occurred and eighteen (18) found a search had not occurred.

Figure 1 represents all cases which cited Jones or Katz after the Jones decision. This is all
thirty eight (38) cases. First, eleven (29%) cases solely relied on the Jones trespass test to find if
a search had occurred. Second, eleven (29%) cases exclusively used the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test to find if a search had occurred. Finally, the last category includes the
208

Refer to the Appendix A for a detailed summary of the cases which fell under “Binding Appellate Precedent” or
“Procedural Error”. These cases were not included in the analysis since they failed to answer the Fourth
Amendment search questions.
209
Cases were eliminated due to their decisions being overturned or overruled. Refer to the Methodology section
for a detailed explanation of the cases which were eliminated. These cases included Quon v. Arch Wireless
Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010); U.S. v.
Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Circ. 2010); Bentz v. City of Kendallville,
577 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2009).
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remaining sixteen cases (42%) which used both the Jones trespass test and Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test to find if a search had occurred.

Figure 2 represents all post-Jones findings and whether the courts found a search or not a
search. Of the eleven (11) cases which used Jones, 100% (11) found a search had occurred. Of
the 11 cases using Katz, 27.2% (3) were found to have decided a police search transpired and
72.8% (8) found no search occurred. Finally, of the remaining 16 cases which used both tests,
37.5% (6) of the cases found searches and 62.5% (10) of the cases found no search.

55

Figure 3 represents all cases spanning 10 years prior to the Jones decision. Of the 34
cases which cited Katz, 47% (16) cases found a search had occurred and 53% (18) cases found a
search had not occurred.
II. Detailed Findings
Post-Jones
Key: K=Katz, J=Jones, B=Both (i.e., Jones and Katz tests); S=Search; NS=No search

1. U.S. v. Mathias (B-NS)
Officer Murray received an anonymous tip that Richard Mathias was growing marijuana
plants in his back yard which was enclosed by a fence.210 Officer Murray inspected the fence and
on the north side was able to peek inside the area where he saw marijuana plants. During his
inspection of the fence, Officer Murray did not manipulate or disturb the fence to make these
observations. Based on what he had observed, Officer Murray obtained a warrant and arrested
Mathias. In court, Mathias claimed that officer Murray physically intruded into his area when
looking through the fence.211
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained that in order to establish “a Jones
trespassory search …requires the challenged intrusion to be into a constitutionally protected area
enumerated within the text of the Fourth Amendment.”212 The Court reasoned that Officer
Murray’s precise location was within an “open field” when he merely looked through Mathias’
fence, without any manipulation. Thus, Officer Murray’s actions did not constitute a search
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U.S. v. Mathias, 721 F.3d 952, 954 (8th Cir. 2013).
Id.
212
Id. at 956.
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under the Jones trespass doctrine.213 The Court then turned to the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test. Taking into consideration that officer Murray had a right to be in a public vantage
point and the fact that Mathias’ fence had small gaps; the Court ruled that Mathias had no
reasonable expectation of privacy and ultimately had no Fourth Amendment protection.
Therefore, no law enforcement search occurred under Jones or Katz.
2. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data (B-NS)
In October 2010, the United States filed three applications under § 2703(d) of the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712.214 The purpose of this order was to
seek evidence relevant to three separate criminal investigations. The applications requested “the
cell phone service provider to produce sixty days of historical cell site data and other subscriber
information for that particular phone.”215 Furthermore, the Government requested the same cell
site data in each application: specifically requesting “the antenna tower and sector to which the
cell phone sends its signal.”216
This information was requested during times when the phone was both actively sending a
signal to a tower to obtain service and when the phone was turned off.217 The ACLU argued that
under certain conditions, individuals “have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location
information when they are tracked.”218 The ACLU depended on the concurrences of Justice
Alito, who was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in Jones, “which concluded that
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lengthy GPS surveillance of a vehicle could constitute a search.”219 It was further argued by the
ACLU that individuals are only in their vehicles for various amounts of time, but most people
have a cell phone on or near their person at all times.
The Court of Appeals ruled that cell site data are similar to that of business records and this
significantly alters the district court’s decision by applying a different legal standard.220 Since a
third party was recording the data and not the government, there was no physical intrusion.221
Furthermore, the Katz reasonable expectations of privacy test does not apply to what “a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office” and therefore, “is not subject
of Fourth Amendment protections.”222 The Court concluded that there are indeed changes in
society’s reasonable expectations of privacy with technological advances; however, the Congress
is the best governmental body to address any privacy concerns.223 As a result, the cell site data
should be analyzed under a different legal standard. The Court concluded that “the SCA’s
authorization of § 2703(d) allowing orders for historical cell site information if an application
meets the lesser ‘specific and articulable facts’ standard, rather than the Fourth Amendment
probable cause standard, is not unconstitutional.”224 Thus, the court ultimately concluded that no
search occurred under Jones or Katz.
3. U.S. v. Castellanos (B-NS)
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On September 2010, Reeves County Sheriff, Captain Roberts was conducting patrol at a
truck stop.225 Captain Roberts suspicion was raised when a commercial car carrier [Direct Auto
Shippers (DAS)] transporting a vehicle bore a dealership placard on the Ford Explorer. Captain
Roberts questioned the driver of the car carrier about the Explorer oddity, namely the vehicle not
having a “normal” license plate. The driver provided Roberts with the shipping documents which
identified the owner of the vehicle as Wilmer Castenada.226
The officer asked the driver of the DAS car carrier for permission to search the Explorer after
being unable to contact Wilmer Castenada. The driver consented and Captain Roberts found
fresh tool marks near the rear of the seats, a strong odor of Bondo, and when he pounded on the
rear floorboard, he noticed inconsistent sounds above the gas tank.227 Next, Roberts used a fiber
optic scope to examine the inside of the gas tank and saw several blue bags floating in the tank
which later turned out to be 23 kilogram-sized bricks of cocaine.228 Captain Roberts falsely
informed Castenada that the DAS driver had been arrested and his cargo seized. A few days
later, Roberts learned that someone had arrived and was attempting to claim the Explorer, but
was identified as Arturo Castellanos.229 Police located and detained Castellanos.230 He stated he
knew of Castenada and was there to pick up the vehicle. Police also seized two duffle bags.231
Castellanos denied that they were his bags. Officers searched the bags and found a cell phone
which matched the number provided by the DAS driver, earlier. Castellanos was later indicted on
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one count of conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine.232 Castellanos moved to
suppress the items contained in the duffle bag and cocaine found in the gas tank as his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s analysis. The
Court used both the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the Jones trespass test in
their analysis.233 The Court stated that parties may have a possessory interest in the vehicle;
however, Castellanos had not established ownership of the vehicle or raised he was the
“exclusive driver.”234 Thus, the Court reasoned based on the facts of this case, Castellanos had
not properly established a “close connection to the vehicle” and therefore, Castellanos does not
have any reasonable expectation of privacy during the police search.235
Also, Castellanos lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy for a package that was searched
and addressed to someone else, even though later it turned out to be an alias or fictitious name.236
Originally, Castellanos position at the suppression hearing demonstrated that the name “Wilmer
Castenada” was another individual engaged in a sale transaction.237 The Court stated,
“Castellanos lacks standing because he failed to carry his burden to show that he had a
constitutionally sufficient connection to the Explorer to demonstrate an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy.”238 In sum, the Court found that defendant was not entitled to the
protections of the Fourth Amendment under Jones or Katz.
4. U.S. v. Anderson-Bagshaw (B-NS)
232
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Karen Bagshaw worked at a mail carrier in 1998 in the city of Wickliffe, Ohio.239
Approximately a year later, she was diagnosed with thoracic degenerative disc disorder and
underwent a failed spinal fusion surgery. The Department of Labor Office of Workers
Compensation awarded her disability payments from June, 2002 until July, 2011.240 She was
required to report any earnings from employment or other business involvement during that time.
However, in 2008, a claim examiner had notified Special Agent Stephanie Morgano of the
United States Postal Service Office the Inspector General of possible business activities with
Bagshaw and an alpaca farm.241
Following the investigation of the alpaca farm, agents conducted extensive surveillance on
Bagshaw. This included monitoring her on a Caribbean cruise which included recording her
“sunbathing, moving … luggage, walking, and playing bingo.”242 To further complete the
surveillance, the agents installed a pole camera in 2009. It had the ability to “pan as well as
zoom” but did not have the capability to examine the interiors of the house.243 Karen Bagshaw
argued that the use of the pole camera violated the Fourth Amendment due to her backyard being
within the curtilage of her home, and she therefore had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
that area.244 Furthermore, she argued that the sheer quantity of constant video surveillance
footage for twenty-four days invaded her reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded Jones does not apply to the events in
this case because GPS tracking is considered a much greater trespass than a fixed camera,
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capable of surveillance from a fixed position.245 This form of surveillance only revealed
Bagshaw’s activities outside in her yard, which was already open to public view. The Court
stated, it did not “‘generate [] a precise record of [her] public movements that reflect[ed] a
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’ like
a GPS would have done.”246
The Court also examined this case from a Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Due to
the “backyard” being easily visible from various public locations, the government agents were
constitutionally permitted to view inside the “curtilage” area. With reference to Katz, the Court
mentioned, “what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”247 The Court held that any further Fourth
Amendment violations in this case would be harmless and declined to resolve whether long-term
video surveillance of curtilage would require a warrant.248 The length of surveillance from the
fixed camera lasted from June 16 until July 10, 2009.249 Furthermore, the Court ruled that these
clips of Bagshaw in the backyard were “utterly insignificant” and thus, harmless to use against
Bagshaw during trial.250 The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny her suppression
motion. In sum, the court found no search occurred under either Jones or Katz.
5. Grady v. North Carolina (J-S)
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The facts of this case start by describing that the petitioner, Torrey Grady was convicted of
various sexual offenses in 1997 and 2006.251 Grady was ordered to appear in superior court after
having finished his sentence. The New Hanover County Superior Court would be responsible for
determining whether Grady should be placed under satellite-based monitoring as a recidivist sex
offender. Grady argued against the monitoring program because it violates his Fourth
Amendment rights.252 The trial court declined his argument and ordered him to be enrolled in the
lifelong monitoring program. Grady appealed and relied heavily on the Court’s decision in
United States v. Jones. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected this argument, relying on
State v. Jones.253 The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and
dismissed Grady’s appeal.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the North Carolina Court of Appeals analysis.254
The Court turned to its prior decision in United States v. Jones stating that “the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the
vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”255 Moreover, the Court explained the importance of
the Government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information”
being tantamount to a search.256 Furthermore, the monitoring system set forth by North Carolina
included: 1) continuous tracking with time stamps and 2) reported subject’s violations and
proscriptive locations.257 Thus, the Court concluded such monitoring was intended to obtain
specific information on the individual and because “it does so [by] physically intruding on a
251
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subject’s body, it effects a Fourth Amendment search.”258 However, the Court declined to decide
on the constitutionality of the program, as it was not previously examined by the lower courts.
The Court vacated the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s judgment. The Court found that the
satellite-based monitoring system is tantamount to a search based on the Jones trespass test.
6. U.S. v. Wahchumwah (K-NS)
The defendant, Ricky Wahchumwah, appealed his jury conviction for offenses related to the
illegal exchange of eagle parts. He contended that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when an undercover agent used a concealed audio-video device to record an illegal transaction
Wahchumwah conducted in his home.259 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument because the Fourth Amendment's protection does not extend to information that a
person “voluntarily exposes” to a government agent, including an undercover agent.260
Furthermore, the Court held that an undercover agent’s warrantless use of the hidden recording
device inside the home, which he has been invited to enter, does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. When examining from the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court
determined that Wahchumwah “forfeited his expectation of privacy when he invited the
undercover agent and knowingly exposed incriminating evidence.”261 As a result, Wahchumwah
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the encounter taking place between the
undercover agent and himself. In sum, the Court determined that no search occurred under the
Katz test.262
7. U.S. v. Skinner (B-NS).
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In May and June 2006, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents were tracking drug
courier Melvin Skinner, AKA “Big Foot,” through cell information data, “ping” data, and GPS
real-time location from his phone.263 These actions were certified by a federal magistrate judge.
By continuously “pinging” the phone, agents tracked the whereabouts of Melvin Skinner from
Arizona to Texas. More specifically, agents tracked Melvin Skinner to a truck stop in Texas
where they located a motorhome.264 An officer approached the motorhome and Skinner
answered the door. Skinner denied the officer’s request to search the vehicle. Then, a K-9 officer
and his dog arrived at the scene and conducted a perimeter dog sniff around the motorhome.265
The trained K-9 alerted officers that there was a presence of narcotics. Subsequently, officers
entered the motorhome and found marijuana and handguns.266 Skinner and his son were placed
under arrest.267 Skinner appealed and argued that the use of the GPS information from his cell
phone violated his Fourth Amendment.268 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated for
Jones to apply to a Fourth Amendment analysis, “when the Government does engage in physical
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”269 The Court concluded that no physical
intrusion occurred in this case due to Skinner voluntarily using the cell phone for the intended
purposes of communication. The agents who used the cell-phone GPS technology were merely a
byproduct of the intended use.270
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Moreover, Jones does not apply to Skinner because, “the majority opinion’s trespassory test”
provides little guidance on “cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not
depend upon a physical invasion on property.”271 Furthermore, this form of tracking does not
implicate Justice Alito’s concern he expressed in his concurrence opinion.272 In Jones, Justice
Alito explained, “constant monitoring of [Jones’] vehicle for four weeks…would have required a
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance.”273 However, this is a
different set of circumstances in the current case of Skinner. The surveillance on Skinner was for
three days and therefore does not give rise to the concern of Justice Alito. In fact, the Court
mentioned that Justice Alito stated, “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements
on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as
reasonable.”274
Due to authorities tracking a known number that was voluntarily used while traveling on
public thoroughfares, Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data
and location of his cell phone. Accordingly, the Court found under either the Jones trespass
doctrine or Katz reasonable expectation of privacy criteria, no search occurred. Therefore,
suppression is not warranted and the district court correctly denied Skinner’s motion to suppress.
8. Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney General of U.S. (B-S)
This case involved a collection of individuals and entities who are a part of various aspects
of the adult media industry who had brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 18
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U.S.C. §§ 2257 and 2257A.275 These statutes are “criminal laws which imposed recordkeeping,
labeling, and inspection requirements on producers of sexually explicit depictions.”276 The same
Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of certain regulations.277 Plaintiffs claim that the
statutes and regulations encroach upon various provisions of the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution. With regard to the Fourth Amendment claim, the statute states
that producers make their records “available to the Attorney General for inspection at all
reasonable times.”278 More specifically, these statutes “authorize investigators, at any reasonable
time and without delay or advance notice, to enter any premises where a producer maintains its
records to determine compliance with the recordkeeping requirements or other provisions of the
Statutes.”279 Additionally, “[p]roducers must make these records available for inspection for at
least twenty hours per week, and the records may be inspected only once during any four-month
period unless there is reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation has occurred.”280
When deciding whether a search had occurred the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
found it was not clear due to the lack of specific information, such as “which specific members
of the Free Speech Coalition, Inc. (FSC) were searched, when and where the search took place
(i.e., offices or homes), and the conduct of the government during the alleged search.”281 The
Court stated this type of information is required when attempting to analyze the government’s
actions. According to the Court, “[t]his factual context is necessary for determining whether the
government's conduct was a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to either the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test set forth in Katz or the common-law-trespass test
275
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described in Jones.”282 Accordingly, the Court “vacate[ed] the District Court's order [dismissing]
Plaintiffs claims under the Fourth Amendment, and remand[ed] for development of the record. In
particular, remand will permit the District Court to consider the impact, if any, of the recent
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jones.”283 On remand, the District Court found a
search had occurred under both the Katz and Jones test upon reexamination, which was later
upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.284 In sum, this case found a search had
occurred and that the District Court correctly used both tests.285
9. U.S. v. Cowan (B-NS)
Information from a confidential informant led officers to conduct surveillance on the
apartment owned by Johnny Booth.286 The tip included information on Johnny Booth receiving a
shipment of crack cocaine to later be sold. During the surveillance of the apartment, officers
observed two individuals in vehicles who they believed to be involved in a drug trafficking
scheme. The officers obtained a warrant to search the apartment, the persons inside the
apartment, and the parking areas for controlled substances, including keys.287 A squad of seven
officers broke down the exterior door of the building and administered the search.
Officers executing the warrant discovered eight adults, including Cowan, inside the
apartment.288 Detective Canas conducted a frisk of Cowan’s clothing and found a set of keys in
his front pocket. The Detective questioned Cowan about how he got there and suspected Cowan
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was lying.289 After finding crack cocaine in several locations, Detective Canas removed the
handcuffs from Cowan and explained “he could leave if the keys did not match any of the parked
vehicles.”290 The Detective walked outside with Cowan and continued to press the key fob until
it set off an alarm of a car in front of the apartment.291 An accompanying officer re-handcuffed
Cowan and brought a drug dog near the scene who alerted officers of the presence of drugs in
Cowan’s vehicle. The subsequent search of Cowan’s car revealed crack cocaine inside the
vehicle.292
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied both “search” tests to this case.
Accordingly, the Court stated, “[a]n individual may challenge a search if it violated the
individual’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ or involves an unreasonable ‘physical intrusion
of a constitutionally protected area.’”293 First, the Court determined that Cowan “did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his vehicle.”294 Even if Detective Canas’ use
of the key fob to locate the car did constitute a search, it would be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment’s automobile exception. Second, applying Jones to this case, Detective Canas did
not “trespass on the key fob itself because [Detective Canas] lawfully seized it” (i.e., under the
warrant and as part of the pat-down).295 Therefore, under both the Katz and Jones tests, the Court
concluded that no search had occurred.
10. Lavan v. City of Los Angeles (J-S)
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The facts involve the Appellees, who are homeless people living on the streets of Skid
Row.296 These individuals store their personal possessions, including personal identification and
other important documents, in containers provided by social service organizations. In this case,
the Appellees kept their possessions in distinctive carts provided by a soup kitchen, hosted by
Los Angeles Catholic group.297 On multiple occasions between February 6, 2011 and March 17,
2011, Appellees stepped away and left their personal property on the sidewalks. They had not
“abandoned their property;” however, City of Los Angeles (City) employees seized and
immediately destroyed their property. This was in accordance with “a policy and practice of
seizing and destroying homeless persons’ un-abandoned possessions.”298
The City’s only argument on appeal is that its seizure and destruction of Appellee’s unabandoned property implicates neither the Fourth nor the Fourteenth Amendment.299 The City
based its argument on the Appellees having no legitimate expectation of privacy in unattended
property. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated due to the facts of this case, it is
unnecessary to focus on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard.300 Instead, the
Court focused on the Jones test for this analysis. Consequently, as stated in Jones, the Katz test
“did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope, but added to not substituted for, the commonlaw trespassory test.”301
The Court concluded in this case, from the immediate seizure and destruction of Appellee’s
un-abandoned property, that the “City meaningfully interfered with Appellee’s possessory
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interests in that property.”302 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that un-abandoned property by the
homeless are still protected by the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the Court concluded “once the
City destroyed the property, it rendered the seizure unreasonable.”303 In sum, the Court found
that a seizure did occur under Jones, and it violated the Appellee’s Fourth Amendment rights.304
11. Patel v. City of Los Angeles (B-S)
Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.49 “requires hotel and motel staff to keep records with
specified information about their guests.”305 These records must contain the guest’s name,
address, the number of people in the party, vehicle, license plate number, etc. This case is
focused on the constitutionality of the warrantless inspection requirement. This states that hotel
guest records “shall be made available to any officer of the Los Angeles Police Department for
inspection,” provided that, “[w]henever possible, the inspection shall be conducted at a time and
in a manner that minimizes any interference with the business.”306
The City of Los Angeles argued that a police officer’s non-consensual inspection of hotel
guest records does constitute a Fourth Amendment search.307 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that the business records are the hotel’s private property, and the hotel therefore
has both a possessory and an ownership interest in the records. The Supreme Court in Jones
established that a search occurs when “the government physically intrudes upon one of these
enumerated areas, or invades protected privacy interest, for the purpose of obtaining
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information.”308 The Court in Patel held that a police officer’s non-consensual inspection of
hotel guest records plainly constitutes a “search” under both the property-based approach of
Jones and the privacy-based approach of Katz.309 These types of “inspections involve both a
physical intrusion upon the hotel’s private papers and an invasion of hotel’s protected privacy
interest in those papers for the purpose of obtaining information.”310 These types of inspections
upon hotel records do in fact involve a physical trespass into the hotel’s protected privacy
interest.
The Court stated that these “papers” are classified as business records, which means that they
are the hotel’s private property and the hotel shares a possessory interest in the matter. The Court
found that the § 41.49 requirement concerning hotel guest records being made available upon an
officer’s request is “facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment” because it authorizes
inspections of records without affording an opportunity to “obtain judicial review of the
reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply.”311
12. Florida v. Jardines (J-S)
In 2006, Detective Pedraja received an “unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the
home of Jardines.”312 After watching his home for approximately 15 minutes, Detective Pedraja
and Officer Bartelt, a canine handler, approached Jardines’ residence. After Officer Bartelt’s
trained canine conducted the dog sniff of the front door, it sat which signaled to Officer Bartelt
that he discovered an odor of drugs.313 The officers returned to the vehicle and Detective Pedraja

308

Id. (citing U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949-51(2012); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360-61, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967)).
Id. at 1062.
310
Id.
311
Id. at 1065.
312
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
313
Id.
309

72

applied for and received a search warrant for the residence based on the dog sniff. The warrant
was executed that day and Jardines was arrested for the trafficking of cannabis, which the
officers had discovered during their search.314
The Supreme Court held “[w]hen ‘the Government obtains information by physically
intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’”315 Additionally, the Jones Court reasoned that
property rights “are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,” in reference to Katz
still having a place in Fourth Amendment analyses.316 The Court in Jones stated, a person’s
“Fourth Amendment rights dot not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”317 The Court held that
“the use of a trained police dog to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings does
constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” because the officers had
initially trespassed on Jardines’ property (i.e., when they approached the area immediately
surrounding the property with the canine).318 Moreover, the Supreme Court held it was
unnecessary to decide whether the officers violated Jardines’ expectation of privacy under the
Katz test.319 Accordingly, through the single lens of Jones, the Supreme Court found a search
did occur.
13. U.S. v. Jackson (B-NS)
On May 26, 2011, Virginia police officers pulled two bags of trash from a trash can.320
These trash cans were located directly behind the apartment of Sierra Cox. The officers had
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received a tip from a confidential informant that Dana Jackson was selling drugs from the
apartment. Jackson was Sierra Cox’s boyfriend. During the trash pull, officers recovered items
from the bags that were consistent with drug trafficking.321 Subsequently, the police officers
obtained a warrant to search the apartment. The officers found evidence of drug trafficking.
Jackson argued that the trash pull violated his Fourth Amendment right as the police “physically
intruded upon a constitutionally protected area” to obtain evidence found inside the trash.322
Additionally, Jackson argued his reasonable expectation of privacy was violated during the trash
pull. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated, under Jardines (an extension of Jones)
this would be considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if it occurred
within the curtilage of Cox’s apartment.323 A further analysis of what constitutes the curtilage of
Cox’s residence, under Dunn, revealed that the trash cans were located outside the apartment’s
curtilage. As a result, under the Jones trespass test, officers did not physically intrude upon a
constitutionally protected area.324 Next, the Court decided whether Jackson had a reasonable
expectation of privacy under Katz in the trash can’s contents as the “property rights are not the
sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations” and “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectations test has
been added to .. the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment.”325 The
Court held that the trash can was “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops,
and other members of the public” and as a result, the owner of the contents had a diminished
expectation of privacy.326 Therefore, the Court concluded that the trash pull was a lawful
investigatory procedure due to the trash can sitting in the common area of the apartment complex
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courtyard. Additionally, the Court concluded that no search had occurred after applying both
Jones and Katz tests to the circumstances of this case.
14. U.S. v. Davis (B-S)
On August 29, 2000, Davis arrived at Howard County General Hospital with a gunshot
wound to his leg.327 He claimed he was a victim of an unfortunate robbery which went terribly
wrong. As part of Maryland law, the hospital staff called the police. Officer King found Davis in
the emergency room. He was conscious, sitting up, and able to communicate with Officer King.
As per procedure of the hospital, the clothing of Davis was removed, placed in plastic baggies,
and then placed under the bed by the hospital staff.328 After arriving on the scene, Officer King
observed Davis’ gunshot wound. He then secured Davis’ clothes as evidence of the
shooting/robbery and without the permission of Davis or a warrant. Police and forensic
specialists were able to extract DNA from the blood stains on Davis’ pants, without a warrant,
and created a “DNA profile” from the results.329 This “DNA profile” was later used to compare
with samples found at the scene of an unrelated murder of Michael Neal; however, these profiles
were not a match. Nevertheless, the “DNA profile” was kept in police databases and used against
Davis in the robbery and the murder of Mr. Schwindler.330 This was a “cold hit” which resulted
in law enforcement being able to obtain a warrant and extract direct a DNA sample from Davis,
which subsequently matched the samples from the Schwindler murder scene. This evidence was
used against Davis at trial.331
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Davis argued to suppress the DNA evidence due to officers violating his Fourth Amendment
rights.332 Davis explained that the contents of the hospital bags (clothes) were not in plain view
and thus, law enforcement seized and searched the bag illegally. 333 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the plain view doctrine justified both the warrantless seizure and the
subsequent search of the plastic bag which contained the clothes of Davis.334 The Court’s
rationale behind their decision was due to the years of experience of Officer King, the normal
procedures of the hospital placing patient’s clothing under the bed, and the appearance of the
“victim” when Officer King had spoken with him.335 Furthermore, the Court explained that
Davis did have an expectation of privacy in the bags and clothing; however, the evidence was in
plain sight of the officer and thus, was legally obtained under the plain view doctrine. Next, the
Court examined whether the creation and retention of the “DNA profile” was lawful.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.336
Protections of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights are in effect when there is a
“constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy;” however, when there is a lack of
reasonable expectation of privacy, then the Fourth Amendment protections do not occur.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently found a search can occur when the “Government
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physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.337 The Court
concluded that though Davis may not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
clothing, the extraction of DNA and the retention of the “DNA profile” are subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry.338 Furthermore, the Court held that Davis retained his
privacy interests in the DNA on the material and therefore, the DNA sample extraction and the
creation of the “DNA profile” constituted a search.339 Additionally, once officers had lawfully
obtained Davis’ clothing, there was no intrusion upon his property.340
The Court held that the retention of Davis’ “DNA profile” in police database was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.341
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the good-faith exception applied to law enforcement extraction
and tests of Davis’ DNA. The officers “had no reason to question that Davis’ blood was lawfully
within HCPD custody and indeed, we have concluded that the clothing was properly in police
custody.342 Furthermore, the Court stated though Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his DNA, that does not necessarily mean the police and lab technicians were not acting in
good faith. The Court explained the actions of the police classified as “isolated negligence
attenuated from the arrest” and not the actions motivated by reckless law enforcement.343 The
Court concluded for these reasons, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to
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this case.”344 In sum, the Court found a search under the Katz test, but it did not find a search
under the Jones’ trespass test.
15. U.S. v. Patel (B-S)
Dr. Patel was a cardiologist in Louisiana.345 A grand jury indicted Dr. Patel on 91 counts of
health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. In February 2002, Neil Kinn, a nurse who
worked alongside Dr. Patel, contacted the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) with concerns of Dr. Patel’s illegal behavior. Nurse Kinn provided documents
from a mobile laboratory that Dr. Patel leased several days each week at his office. After meeting
with HHS Agent Alleman, the nurse gathered additional records from the lab.346 On Mach 26,
2002, the nurse mailed agent Alleman a letter with additional information. Toward the end of
2003, agent Alleman obtained a search warrant “for documents and electronic storage media” in
Dr. Patel’s permanent and mobile offices.347
Dr. Patel argued his Fourth Amendment rights were violated and the warrant was based on
the fruits of an earlier warrantless search, which lacked probable cause to permit a lawful
seizure.348 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated when the Supreme Court had decided
Jones, it gave new guidance as to what constitutes a search. In Jones, the Supreme Court
explained that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted
for, the common-law trespassory test.”349 The Court, however, found that they did not need to
squarely address how Jones would affect the holding, and essentially left intact the finding of the
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lower, district court that a search had occurred. The Court stated if Dr. Patel had sufficient
privacy or possessory interest in the mobile lab to implicate the Fourth Amendment, as the
district court had found, it would be irrelevant because evidence gathered by Nurse Kinn does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment before March 15 as Nurse Kinn was acting as an
independent source (i.e., private, non-state actor).350 In this vein, the Court stated, “Even if Dr.
Patel had a sufficient privacy or possessory interest in the mobile lab to implicate the Fourth
Amendment and render Nurse Kinn's post-March 15 evidence gathering a violation, because
there was an independent source for it [i.e., the warrant based on information handed over
initially and voluntarily to the government by the Nurse], the evidence was properly
admitted.”351 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the warrant was not defective as officers
relied on statements from informants which were in good-faith.352 The additional information
supplied after the meeting with HSS Agent Alleman also does not matter as that information was
not used as part of the warrant’s probable cause. Thus, the Court a search had occurred under
both the Jones or Katz criteria.
16. U.S. v. Flores-Lopez (B-S)
Law enforcement officers had reason to believe that the Flores-Lopez was a supplier of
illegal drugs.353 Officers received information about a drug deal between Flores-Lopez and
another dealer, Alberto Santana-Cabrera, from a paid informant. Police listened to a phone
conversation between Cabrera and Flores-Lopez, who stated a delivery of meth had been ordered
to a garage. Police immediately arrested both Flores-Lopez and Santana-Cabrera.354 Flores-
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Lopez had driven a truck containing the drugs and officers found a cell phone on Flores-Lopez
and two other cell phones. Flores-Lopez admitted that the cell phone found on his person
belonged to him. Flores-Lopez argued that the search of his cell phone violated his rights as it
was not conducted pursuant to a warrant.355 Flores-Lopez argued that “[t]he [cell] phone number
itself was not incriminating evidence, but it enabled the government to obtain such evidence
from the phone company, and that evidence … was the fruit of an illegal search [of his phone]
and was therefore inadmissible.”356 More specifically this evidence includes the call history,
including the overheard phone conversation and calls made between him and his associates.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined the Fourth Amendment search
around the reasonableness of the search of the cell phone. The Court stated that a modern cell
phone is similar in one aspect to a diary. Moreover, a warrantless search of a cell phone, is
justified by police officers’ reasonable concerns for their safety.357 The Court elaborated that
some types of “stun guns” have been made to look like cell phones and as a result, officers may
reasonably believe there is a safety concern. However, once the officer has the cell phone, they
are able to distinguish it from a weapon. As a result, there would be no reason to go further and
manipulate it since safety is no longer an issue.358 The Court stated that opening the diary found
on the suspect whom the police have arrested, to verify his name and address and discover
whether the diary contains information relevant to the crime for which he has been arrested, is
permissible. The Court mentioned that Jones held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle is a
search because “the Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
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obtaining information.”359 The Jones Court thus breathed new life into the trespass doctrine.
Also, the Court in United States v. Concepcion, found that testing the keys of a person that law
enforcement had in custody was said to be a “search.”360 However, the Court held in Concepcion
that a minimally invasive search may be lawful in the absence of a warrant, even if the usual
reasons for excusing the failure to obtain a warrant are absent. Since the officers in the case-athand did not thoroughly search the contents of the phone, and only obtained the cell phone’s
phone number, this type of search was minimally invasive and thus did not require a warrant.361
The search did technically occur under both the Jones and Katz criteria; however, the Court of
Appeals found it was minimally invasive.
17. U.S. v. Duenas (B-NS)
On April 19, 2007, Guam Police Department (GPD) officers, DEA, and ATF agents executed
a search warrant at the home of the Duenas family for narcotics trafficking.362 Ray and Lou
Duenas were asleep and when the officers entered the residence the scene was described as
“chaotic.” No single officer was clearly in charge of managing the scene even though
approximately forty officers were at the scene. As a result, civilians and journalists were able to
go on Duenas’ property. Law enforcement instructed media to remain in the front yard and to not
pass a certain shipping container.363 The media was permitted to film and photograph the scene
and Officer Wade was dedicated to escorting the media members around the scene. During the
execution of the warrant, which lasted two days, police found drugs, drug paraphernalia, stolen
property, and weapons. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially stated it was difficult
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to determine if the Duenas’ Fourth Amendment rights were violated based on the factual record,
namely due to the uncertainty of whether any members of the media actually entered the Duenas’
residence or its surrounding curtilage.364 In Katz, the Supreme Court held that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places” in which citizens are entitled to a reasonable
expectation of privacy.365 Conversely, the Supreme Court in Jones “reaffirmed that the home and
its curtilage are sacrosanct, and that nothing in Katz requires courts to apply reasonable
expectation of privacy standard in addition to finding that the subject of the search was ‘persons,
houses, papers, [or] effects.”366 The Court determined that the curtilage warrants the “same”
Fourth Amendment protection as the home. Thus, the Court turned to Dunn to determine whether
the area is considered curtilage.367
The Court found that only the first of the four Dunn factors suggested the front yard was
considered curtilage. In this case, the federal circuit court agreed with the assessment made by
the district court in which the front yard was not considered curtilage and therefore, does not
receive Fourth Amendment protections.368 This is important because the majority of journalists
and other media members were confined to the front yard. However, some journalists were
escorted throughout the property, beyond the front yard. The Court concluded these facts
(including the inadequate management of the search scene by GPD), are in agreement with the
district court’s analysis, in that the media presence did not violate the Fourth Amendment.369 In
sum, the Court found a search had not occurred under Jones or Katz tests.
18. U.S. v. Perea-Rey (J-S)
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On April 19, 2010, border patrol agents watched a man “hop” the Mexico-United States
border fence.370 Border patrol agent Trujillo followed the individual, later identified as Pedro
Garcia, to Perea-Rey’s home. Agent Trujillo witnessed Garcia enter the front yard through the
gate, knock on the door, and speak to Perea-Rey briefly before being signaled to the carport of
his residence.371 Agent Trujillo was unable to see into the carport and therefore proceeded to
follow both individuals. Agent Trujillo found them standing right inside the carport. The agent
announced his presence and detained both of them. Perea-Rey refused to allow border patrol
agents to enter his house. As a result, the agent Trujillo waited for back up and once back up
arrived, they ordered everyone to exit the home.372 The individuals who exited the home were
later found to be undocumented illegal immigrants. Perea-Rey argued in court that the evidence
of the “aliens” was “fruit” of a warrantless search and seizure and should be excluded from
court.373
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined if the curtilage of the home was
protected by Fourth Amendment search. In Jones, the Supreme Court held, “where the
government physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information,”
that is a “‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”374 Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals turned to the decision Payton v. New York which held that “[s]earches and seizures
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”375 Additionally, the Court
stated that searches and seizures in the curtilage of a home are presumptively unreasonable,
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absent a warrant.376 Based on the Dunn factors, the Court determined the agents searched the
curtilage of Perea-Rey’s home when they entered the carport.377 Since the carport is classified as
curtilage, then it is subject to Fourth Amendment protection. As a result, the Court stated that
this warrantless trespass by government agents into the home or its curtilage does constitute a
search. As the Supreme Court found in Jones “[w]here …the Government obtains information by
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, … a search has undoubtedly
occurred.”378 However, Jones did not remove the possibility of the application of the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Indeed, the Court in Jones stated “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to,
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.379
The Court concluded that the agents could observe the curtilage from the sidewalk and these
observations, in turn, could serve as a basis for a warrant application; however, they were unable
to commit a warrantless entry into the carport.380 This occurred when the border patrol agents
“physically occupied” the carport, which was part of the curtilage of Perea-Rey’s home. The
Court in Perea-Rey concluded that the “warrantless intrusion into the curtilage of Perea-Rey’s
home by border patrol agents resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure, which violated
Perea-Rey’s Fourth Amendment rights.”381
19. U.S. v. Wilfong (B-NS)
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On January, 15, 2011, Wilfong arrived at his mother’s house and got into a dispute with his
brother, Eric.382 Wilfong pulled out a gun and fired a shot at Eric’s feet, hitting the floor.
Wilfong took the keys to the pickup belonging to his mother and drove away. Eric reported the
events to the police. Wilfong had an outstanding arrest warrant for violating his supervised
release. Local officers and United States Marshal Albright learned of the whereabouts of the
pickup and set up surveillance, but Wilfong never returned.383 Deputy Albright received
permission from Eric to place a GPS device on the vehicle. The next morning, the GPS signaled
the movements of the pickup and law enforcement were able to track the vehicle to another
apartment complex. A car chase ensued.384 Eventually, Wilfong decided to abandon his weapon
by throwing it out of the vehicle. A postman found the gun and immediately called 911. Wilfong
was later arrested. Wilfong stated that the placement of the GPS on the pickup was not
authorized which would mean the gun was the fruit of an illegal search.385 Recently, the Supreme
Court had held in Jones that a GPS tracking device attached to a vehicle by law enforcement
does constitute a search.386 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained that Wilfong
lacked standing to raise the claim to suppress the gun as he had no privacy interest in the stolen
vehicle. Furthermore, the Court reasoned even if Wilfong had standing, the attempted
suppression of the weapon would prove unsuccessful. In particular, the court focused on the fact
that an exception to the warrant requirement exists in the form of “voluntary consent by a third
party.”387 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the “totality-of-the-circumstances” would cause a
“reasonable officer” such as Deputy Albright to believe Eric had the authority to consent to
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placing the GPS on the stolen vehicle.388 If the search was a Fourth Amendment violation under
Jones, the exclusionary rule would not apply due to the application of one of the three
exceptions: independent source, attenuated basis, or inevitable discovery. Finally, the Court
mentioned how Jones may not be applicable here because the presence of exigent circumstances
of a fleeing, armed felon.389 The Court elaborated by stating that Wilfong had a pre-existing
arrest warrant and thus the placement of the GPS device was purely to locate Wilfong, not to
obtain incriminating information. Thus, the Court stated, it could be argued that Jones may not
necessarily be applicable in this case. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals found no search had
occurred after it applied both tests.
20. U.S. v. Gibson (K-NS)
Drug Enforcement Administration agent Greg Millard suspected James Gibson and his
associates of drug trafficking.390 As a result, DEA placed a tracking device on the vehicle of
James Gibson. The device was installed on the vehicle without a warrant on January 27, 2009.
On February 18, 2009, Agent Millard received information which suggested that James Gibson
would be traveling. Between February 18 and February 20, DEA used the tracking device to
locate the whereabouts of James Gibson and his accomplices.391 Agent Millard notified Deputy
Sheriff Haskell of Gibson’s estimated location. Agent Millard instructed Haskell to search the
vehicle if the deputy was able to establish probable cause for the search. Deputy Haskell stopped
the vehicle, smelled burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle, was given consent to search the
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vehicle, and found 2 kilograms of cocaine inside the vehicle.392 The driver was an individual
named Burton and Gibson was not in the vehicle.
James Gibson argued that all evidence obtained from the tracking device placed on the
vehicle should be suppressed because the installation and use of a GPS device constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.393 Conversely, the government also argued that the
evidence obtained from the tracking device was admissible under the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule because agents attached the GPS device on the vehicle in reliance on thenbinding circuit precedent.394 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the
notion of “standing” in the vehicle to determine the Fourth Amendment search question. This
was a two part question; first, does Gibson have privacy interest on the day it was searched;
second, does Gibson have privacy interest on the other times (February 18-19) the vehicle wasn’t
searched.
First, the Court reasoned that Gibson had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he
was neither the driver nor the passenger of the vehicle when the vehicle was searched.395
Additionally, due to Gibson not being present, he had neither control nor custody of the vehicle
during the search. Second, the Court stated that Gibson does have privacy interests in the vehicle
on the other days of February 18-19 while the vehicle was in his possession. However, he could
not challenge the tracking device because it was used while he was traveling public roads.396
Furthermore, the Court stated that even if Gibson had standing to challenge the search of the
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vehicle when it was in his possession and control, the admission of any GPS-related evidence
from this time-frame into court was harmless.397
21. U.S. v. Davis (J-S)
Police were alerted of a robbery that had occurred at a Radio Shack on March 3, 2011.398
Soon after, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents stopped a vehicle which matched the
description of the Radio Shack robbers’ vehicle, a gray Nissan Sentra. The vehicle was driven by
Asabi Baker and Mark Davis was the passenger. The vehicle was registered to neither Baker nor
Davis, but to Baker’s girlfriend. Inside the vehicle police found evidence of clothes, tools, and
weapons which matched the robbers’ description. Baker and Davis were charged and convicted
of armed robbery.399 Prior to the events on March 3, police were investigating a string of
robberies occurring in the Kansas City area. As a result, officers began to suspect that Baker’s
girlfriend’s vehicle was used at multiple scenes. Accordingly, on March 2, 2011, a warrantless
global positioning device (GPS) was placed on the vehicle.400 Prior to March 2, officers had
obtained a warrant to place a GPS device on Mr. Baker’s phone. During the events of the
robbery, police coordinated and tracked the whereabouts of the vehicle using a combination of
vehicle GPS tracking, cell phone GPS tracking, and visual tracking.401
Davis moved to suppress the evidence of the robbery in district court because he claimed
attaching a warrantless GPS device under Jones violated his Fourth Amendment rights.402 The
district court failed to grant Davis’ motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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focused on whether defendant Davis had “standing” to challenge police use of the GPS device on
the vehicle, although it did address the search issue as part of the standing analysis.403 For
example, as part of its standing analysis, the Court essentially noted the basic holding of Jones,
and then proceeded to refer to the warrantless attachment and monitoring of the GPS device by
police in the case as a “search” and a “Fourth Amendment violation.”404 However, because the
Court found that defendant lacked standing to challenge police use of the GPS device on another
individual’s vehicle, it ultimately held the evidence discovered by police in the vehicle
admissible against Davis.405
The Court reasoned that Davis’ lacked standing was due to the fact that Davis did not
have “possessory interest or reasonable expectation of privacy” in the vehicle which belonged to
Baker’s girlfriend; hence, the “poisonous tree was planted in someone else’s orchard.”406
Therefore, Davis lacked standing to challenge any tainted fruits. The Court stated that the
officers obtained the information on which they tracked the vehicle through a variety of means,
where only one appeared to be unconstitutional. Although, it may appear that it violated
someone’s rights, those rights were not those of Davis. The Court affirmed the district court
decision. In sum, the Court stated that police “trespassed” onto Davis’ property by attaching a
warrantless GPS device to his vehicle; however, Davis lacked a possessory interest in said
vehicle and therefore, lacked standing to gain Fourth Amendment protections. In other words, a
search did occur.
22. U.S. v. Gutierrez (K-NS)
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In November 2012, Indianapolis police received a tip that Oscar Gutierrez may be involved
in drug trafficking.407 A joint task force consisting of local law enforcement officers, detectives,
and a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent and a drug dog (Fletch) went to the home of
Oscar Gutierrez to investigate the tip. Officers approached the residence, knocked on the door,
but no one answered; however, they did notice movement inside the residence. Detective
Sergeant Cline obtained Fletch and had him examine the front door, whereupon Fletch positively
alerted the handler of the presence of narcotics.408 Again, the officers knocked on the door and
received no response. After consulting with the Marion County Prosecutor, officers forcibly
entered the home and conducted a sweep. Meanwhile, Detective Sergeant Cline left the scene to
obtain a warrant based on the informant tip, attempt to enter the residence, and Fletch’s positive
alert.409 Detective Sergeant Cline was given the warrant. In the meantime, officers at the scene
found Gutierrez and another tenant, Cota, and immediately arrested them. Officers did not
conduct an official search until Detective Sergeant Cline arrived with the warrant. Once the
search began, DEA Agent Schmidt found a duffel bag containing 11.3 pounds of
methamphetamines.410
The Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit held that the methamphetamines discovered
during the search under warrant based on the drug dog’s positive alert did not need to be
suppressed, even though it was later determined that the actions of the drug dog constituted a
search.411 The Court of Appeals reasoned that normally a case such as this would be governed by
the precedent of United States v. Jardines, which held that the use of the drug dog to sniff the
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premises constitutes a search and therefore implicates all protections under the Fourth
Amendment.412 However, Jardines was decided after the facts of this case; as a result, the Court
had to decide between United States v. Jones (with defendant Gutierrez claiming that the basic
rule from Jardines was already in effect at the time of Jones), or its binding circuit precedent of
U.S. v. Brock.413 The Court concluded that Brock remained good law after Jones and had not
been overruled until the United States Supreme Court decided Jardines.414 Thus, before Jardines
and according to the Brock precedent, police were allowed to conduct dog sniffs at residences
without a warrant. Finally, the Court stated because officers’ actions falls under the binding
appellate precedent of Brock, the officers are afforded the Davis’ good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.415 The Court concluded that no search had occurred under Brock because
police did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy by conducting the residential
dog sniff. In sum, this case used the specific language of privacy when analyzing the Fourth
Amendment search question involving facts occurring after the decisional date of Jones. As a
result, this was categorized as a case which used the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
23. U.S. v. Wheelock (K-NS)
Minneapolis Police Officer Dale Hanson discovered child pornography was being
downloaded from a certain Internet Protocol (IP) address.416 This information resulted in Officer
Hanson obtaining an administrative subpoena which ordered the Internet Service Provider (ISP),

412

Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 755 (citing U.S. v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013)).
U.S. v. Brock held that “the dog sniff inside Brock’s residence was not a Fourth Amendment search because it
detected only the presence of contraband and did not provide any information about lawful activity over which
Brock had a legitimate expectation of privacy.” 417 F.3d at 696.
414
Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 756. Jones did not call into question the underlying search question of Brock regarding an
individual’s lack of legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband, which concluded that a drug dog sniff is not a
Fourth Amendment search.
415
Gutierrez, 760 F.3d at 758.
416
U.S. v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2014).
413

91

Comcast Communications, to produce specific subscriber information linked to the IP address. 417
Comcast provided Wheelock’s name and address which were associated with the IP address. A
criminal history check on Wheelock revealed he had previously been charged and convicted for
the possession of child pornography. Officer Hanson used this information to obtain a search
warrant of Wheelock’s house, specifically searching for hard drives, DVDs, and CDs which
contained child pornography. Wheelock was later charged and pled guilty to possessing,
receiving, and attempting to distribute child pornography.418 Wheelock argued that Officer
Hanson’s use of the administrative subpoena violated his privacy rights.419 More specifically,
Wheelock contended that such rights were violated due to Justice Sotomayor’s concurring
opinion in United States v. Jones.420
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated for Fourth Amendment protections to be
bestowed to defendant Wheelock, it must be proven that “he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy” and that “society is prepared to accept this privacy expectation as objectively
reasonable.”421 The Court in Wheelock found that defendant had no Fourth Amendment
protections because of the third party doctrine. The Court stated that normally, the Fourth
Amendment does not forbid the Government from obtaining information from third parties.422
Additionally, the Court responded to Wheelock’s reliance upon Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
by describing that “she did not advocate the abandonment of the third-party disclosure doctrine,”
and until such time as the Supreme Court revises the third-party doctrine, courts across the
417
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country are bound by existing precedent.423 The Court held that the officers were not required to
have a warrant as Wheelock had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information
obtained from Comcast.424 This case distinguished itself from Jones and instead relied upon the
Katz test, which the Court finding no search had occurred because Wheelock lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine by disclosing information to the ISP (i.e.,
his name, address, etc.).
24. U.S. v. Stephens (J-S)
The defendant, Henry Stephens, was suspected of being connected to possible drug and
firearms crimes in Baltimore after federal and state law enforcement received information from a
confidential informant.425 As part of a joint task force consisting of federal and local law
enforcement commanded by Officer Paul Geare, Geare himself attached a battery-powered GPS
device to the underside of Stephens’ vehicle without a warrant on May 13, 2011.426 The vehicle
happened to be parked in a public parking lot in Maryland at the time of the installation. Officer
Geare discovered that Stephens worked at a nightclub called “Club Unite” and that he was
scheduled to work there on May 16. He also found out that Stephens typically carried his firearm
with him at work, even though he is a convicted felon.427 Three days later, the GPS device was
used to locate Stephens’ vehicle at a school. Officer Geare and Sergeant Johnson then physically
followed Stephens to his residence where they saw him reach around to the back of his
waistband. The officers interpreted this motion as a check for a weapon and notified fellow
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officers they had reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed.428 Next, Officer Geare followed
Stephens, using a combination of visual observations and GPS monitoring. When Stephens
arrived at “Club Unite,” officers approached Stephens, conducted a pat down, and found an
empty holster located in the middle of his back. Soon after, a k-9 unit arrived on the scene and
alerted officers of the presence of drugs from the exterior of the vehicle. At this point, officers
searched the vehicle and found a loaded pistol.429 Shortly after discovering the pistol, the officers
arrested Stephens for illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared that the GPS device used without a
warrant to locate and monitor Stephens in May 2011 constituted an unreasonable search
according to Fourth Amendment guidelines. In so holding, the Court essentially endorsed the
district court’s earlier finding that a search had occurred under Jones.430 However, as of May
2011, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit had given a clear decision
on the use of warrantless GPS devices. As a result, the Court of Appeals turned to the earlier
Supreme Court case of Knotts, which had found that the use of beepers to track vehicle on public
roadways does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.431 The Court of Appeals
ruled that under Davis, the exclusionary rule was not applicable as the officers were acting in
good-faith by relying upon binding precedent which allowed officers to attach a GPS device
without a warrant.432
25. U.S. v. Davis (B-NS)
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The government obtained an order from the district court to obtain “cell site location
information” on defendant Davis. This information also included a call list made by Davis.
Although it was possible to obtain more generalized location information, it was not possible to
pinpoint an individual’s precise location from the information.433 The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that cell site location data does not fall within one’s reasonable expectation
of privacy and therefore, the government did not violate Davis’ Fourth Amendment rights.434
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined this Fourth Amendment issue using a
combination of the trespass and privacy test. More specifically, the Court acknowledged that
since there was no trespass because police neither placed or used a GPS device or conducted a
physical trespass, then Jones did not apply to provide Fourth Amendment protections.435
The Court instead viewed the cell site location data as being held by a private telephone
company and obtained by the government through a court order.436 In addition, the United States
Supreme Court in Jones concluded that “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of
electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to [the] Katz [privacy] analysis.”437
Accordingly, the court in Davis turned to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to
analyze the Fourth Amendment “search” issue. The Court relied on former precedent cases of
Miller and Smith and found Davis was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections as he has
not subjective or objective reasonable expectations of privacy in MetroPCS’s business records.438
Finally, the Court turned to the third-party doctrine and reasoned that individuals who use cell
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phones “voluntarily convey” the cell information to their respective telephone companies.439
These users are aware of voluntarily exposing information to a third-party service provider. As
such, the Court concluded that the government’s order did not constitute a search when it
acquired the historical cell tower data from MetroPCS. In sum, the Court found a search had not
occurred.
26. U.S. v. Ganias (B-S)
During the 1980s, Ganias started his own business after working for the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) for fourteen years.440 In 1998, Ganias had contracted services to James McCarthy
and his businesses, American Boiler and Industrial Property Management (IMP). IMP had been
later contracted by the Army to maintain and keep secure a vacant facility in Stratford,
Connecticut. On August 2003, a confidential source came forward and tipped off the Criminal
Investigative Command of the Army that some individuals within IMP were engaging in stealing
copper wire and other valuable items, while simultaneously billing the Army for work.441 This
information led to the start of an investigation. Over the course of the investigation, the Army
investigators obtained numerous search warrants, including one for Ganias’ accounting offices.
This particular warrant was issued on November 17, 2003, and executed two days later. The
investigators were accompanied by computer specialists who made identical copies of the
contents of all hard drives at the offices.
As evidence was being reviewed, the Army investigators discovered that payments were
being made by IMP to an unregistered business.442 As a result, Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
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joined the investigation. By December 2004, the Army and IRS investigators uncovered data
relevant to their investigation and were careful to review only data pertinent to the November
2003 warrant. However, investigators failed to purge any unrelated data. Accounting
irregularities were discovered in the data entries. The IRS case agent wanted to review the data
obtained on the hard drive, but was aware that the data was beyond the scope of the initial
warrant.443 In February 2006, Ganias was asked permission if the United States government
could access the files that were beyond the scope of the initial warrant. Ganias did not answer;
thus, the government obtained another warrant to search the copies of the hard drives that was in
its possession for two and a half years.444
Ganias argued that the government’s seizure and long-term retention of his business records
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.445 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on
both Katz and Jones tests to analyze this case. The Court explained that Fourth Amendment
protections apply if there is a search by government officials and is accompanied by either a
physical intrusion by those officials or a violation by them of defendant’s reasonable
expectations of privacy.446 Furthermore, the Court explained that Fourth Amendment protections
do apply to the government’s examination of a suspect’s computer files. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Ganias concluded that the government failed to demonstrate any legal
basis for the prolonged retention of the copied electronic data; therefore, it violated Ganias’
Fourth Amendment rights.447 The Court’s analysis encompasses the limited question of whether
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the Fourth Amendment permits the indefinite retention of every computer file obtained
subsequent to the execution of a warrant.448 The Ganias Court concluded in the negative.
27. U.S. v. Gomez (K-NS)
In 2009, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) suspected defendant Axel
Gomez of distributing drugs and organized an operation to have a government informant
purchase 20 grams of heroin from Gomez.449 The informant also provided the DEA with
Gomez’s cell phone. The DEA obtained a court order and monitored Gomez’s calls through a
“pen register” and “trap and trace” device from July 9, 2009 until August 18, 2009. The DEA
was able to access phone numbers who called and were called by Gomez, have time stamps for
when individuals called, and recorded multiple drug purchases.450 This call data, along with other
evidence uncovered by undercover officers, was used to obtain a wiretap for Gomez’s cell phone
on August 24, 2009. At one point, Gomez swapped phones and the DEA was able to get access
to the new phone through a confidential informant.
The DEA obtained a search warrant for Gomez’s apartment based on the conglomeration of
evidence obtained.451 The search of the apartment uncovered $6,000 in cash, a firearm, a digital
scale, and materials for packing drugs. Gomez was immediately indicted and found guilty on
drug distribution, conspiracy, and possession of a firearm with drug trafficking. Gomez argued
the DEA’s initial “pen register” and “trap and trace” violated his Fourth Amendment privacy
rights. Additionally, Gomez argued that the concurring opinions in Jones joined by five United
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States Supreme Court justices effectively restrict the application of the third party doctrine as
enunciated in Smith v. Maryland.452
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gomez held that defendant Gomez’s rights
were not violated because, “Gomez provided a third party-in this case, Sprint-with all the data
and the DEA obtained [it] through the use of the pen register and trap and trace device.”453 The
Court further explained once this occurred, Gomez had relinquished any privacy interest in the
data. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that the concurring opinions in Jones had
effectively revised Smith. According to the Court, no search had occurred because Gomez did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a third-party, in this case
Sprint. With the mention of reasonable expectation of privacy, this case falls more in line with
the inquiry used in Katz for Fourth Amendment searches.
28. U.S. v. Sellers (J-S)
Drug Enforcement Administration agents and Orangeburg County officers conducted
surveillance of various persons of interest, including: Sellers, Matthews, and James from January
19, 2008 until July, 2008.454 Accordingly, DEA agents attached a warrantless GPS device to the
vehicle owned by James, and monitored the whereabouts of the vehicle. In February, the device
malfunctioned and stopped transmitting information. In March, the officers removed the device
and subsequently began wiretapping James phone.455 A total of seven wiretaps were issued from
January until July of 2008. On August 14, 2008, Sellers was stopped for improper lane change
and subsequently arrested after police found drugs, a pistol, and approximately $3,000. The
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plethora of evidence obtained from various surveillance methods were used against James,
Sellers, and Matthews for drug conspiracy charges, including the wiretaps and GPS data.456
The appellants argued under Jones that the district court erred by admitting evidence
obtained from the installation of the GPS device.457 James further contended the GPS tracking
data and the resulted wiretaps should be suppressed as they are fruits of the poisonous tree. In
Jones, the Supreme Court noted, “[t]respass alone does not qualify [as a search], but there must
be conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain
information.”458
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit relied on Jones to ultimately find that the police
use of a warrantless GPS device on James’ vehicle did constitute a search.459 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the search in this case violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The Court
did mention the good faith exception, but decided against it as the Court explained this evidence
was never introduced in trial. In sum, the Court found that a search occurred under the Jones test.
29. U.S. v. Fisher (J-S)
In May 2010, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents and law enforcement officials
received confidential information that Brian Fisher was involved in selling drugs in various
locations within Michigan and Illinois.460 In May 28, 2010, law enforcement officers attached a
GPS device to Fisher’s vehicle. In June, 2010, the informant told officers about a possible drug
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run to Chicago, Illinois.461 The police followed Fisher’s movements using 10-12 vehicles and the
GPS information. Police stopped Fisher once he entered Michigan, used a narcotics dog who
alerted the officers that drugs were near the vehicle, and subsequently found three ounces of
cocaine.462 Fisher was arrested and convicted of possession and trafficking drugs.463
Fisher argued that the warrantless installation of the GPS device and subsequent tracking by
law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment rights.464 During the course of the litigation,
Jones was decided, and both the lower (district court) and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit stated under Jones police searched defendant Fisher’s vehicle when they installed the
GPS device and used it to monitor the vehicle’s movements.465 These types of actions require a
warrant. However, under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court of Appeals
ultimately deemed the actions undertaken by the officers were to be justifiable under Sixth
Circuit binding precedent. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to suppress the GPS evidence was
denied.466
30. U.S. v. Martin (J-S)
Matthew Martin was suspected of taking part in multiple robberies in Burlington, Iowa in
2009.467 Police officers received a tip regarding Martin’s involvement in the robberies and
subsequently attached a warrantless global positioning system on Martin’s vehicle.468 Through
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several tips, detectives were able to contact the accomplice, Jackson.469 After interviewing
Jackson, detectives contacted law enforcement in Indiana with information about Martin. Indiana
law enforcement got a tip from a Super 8 motel clerk that Martin had checked in. Law
enforcement attached a GPS tracking device to his vehicle on the 19th of November. A few days
later, the GPS device malfunctioned for a short amount of time and then resumed proper
functions.470
Detectives followed Martin and eventually contacted Illinois law enforcement for support.
Law enforcement officers had stopped the vehicle and conducted a search of the vehicle. The
officers discovered marijuana, cocaine, and a revolver. Martin was subsequently arrested.471
Martin pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm, which is against the law as he was a convicted
felon.472 On appeal, Martin cited Jones and argued that the evidence should be suppressed as his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to the warrantless GPS device. The trial court
concluded that the evidence should not be suppressed because of Davis v. United States.473
In this case, the good-faith exception applied due to heavy reliance on then-existing
precedent, which allowed law enforcement to attach a warrantless GPS device to the
undercarriage of a suspect’s vehicle. However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this
argument because there was no binding precedent.474 Conversely, the court concluded that the
evidence Martin sought to suppress had little to do with the fact that a GPS device had been
used. This information was “significantly ‘attenuated’ from the inappropriate installation of the
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GPS device” (i.e., without a warrant under Jones). 475 The Court affirmed the district court’s
initial ruling, “there was probable cause for Martin’s arrest [and] it was reasonable for the
officers to believe Martin’s vehicle contained evidence of the bank robbery.”476
The GPS data only aided law enforcement in tracking down Martin. In Jones, a search occurs
when “[t]he Government physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.”477 This is an essential component as in the current case of Martin the GPS data was
used primarily to locate him. The court further explained that if Martin had further developed the
argument at district court they would be able to touch on the subject more in depth; however, that
was not the case.478 This case resulted in a finding that a police search did occur under Jones, but
it did not violate the defendant’s rights due to attenuation.
31. U.S. v. Pineda-Moreno (J-S)
In 2007, Drug Enforcement Administration agents suspected Juan Pineda-Moreno of
growing marijuana in southern Oregon.479 The DEA began investigating the men and monitored
the movements of Pineda-Moreno. The agents attached a mobile tracking device to PinedaMoreno’s jeep without a warrant. DEA used the device to pin-point the Jeep’s location and
agents learned that it traveled to two suspected marijuana grow sites on July 6, August 14,
August 16, and September 12.480 The Jeep traveled public thoroughfares for the majority of the
recorded monitoring. Based on their surveillance, DEA and law enforcement officers stopped
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Pineda-Moreno’s Jeep on September 12. A subsequent search incident to arrest uncovered
marijuana within the Jeep.481
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a search had occurred based on the facts.
The Court relied on the recent Supreme Court decision of Jones.482 The Court of Appeals found
that in accordance with Jones the GPS surveillance of Pineda-Moreno’s vehicle and subsequent
monitoring constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore,
since these officers did not have a warrant, based on Jones, it would be unreasonable.483
However, related to the admissibility of the evidence issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that since
the events occurred prior to Jones, they needed to turn to binding appellate precedent from
within the circuit for this purpose. The Court ultimately found that agents were acting in
compliance with binding appellate precedent and therefore, under Davis, exclusion was not
warranted.484
32. U.S. v. Smith (J-S)
Law enforcement officers and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
suspected Smith had been transporting cocaine from Alabama to Florida.485 Special Agent Davis
obtained driver records from Florida Driver and Vehicle Information Database regarding the
vehicles Smith had obtained. Special Agent Davis installed GPS trackers on two of Smith’s
vehicles.486 They did not obtain a warrant. Officers monitored the movements of the vehicle from
January 6, 2011. However, on February 5th, 2011, Smith had discovered one of the trackers. On
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April 12, 2011, the officers obtained a search warrant for Smith’s residence. Once the search
warrant was executed, they discovered nearly ten thousand dollars in cash, a firearm, drugs, a
disposable cell phone, and digital media seized from Smith’s computer and camera.487
Smith was indicted on drug and firearms charges and found guilty in the trial court on these
charges. Smith appealed and argued that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they
searched his residence, which relied on some of the information which was obtained during the
GPS surveillance.488 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that Jones applied to
the actions of the law enforcement during their GPS monitoring.489 In Jones, the Supreme Court
held that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that
device to monitor a vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.”490 However, the Court concluded that even though the police violated Smith’s
Fourth Amendment rights with the warrantless GPS search, the evidence seized should still be
admissible under the Davis good-faith exception. More specifically, the Court stated, “[e]ven if
Jones would have rendered the warrantless searches in this case unreasonable [under the Fourth
Amendment], the officers’ good-faith reliance upon [binding appellate precedent permitting
these searches at the time they were conducted] renders exclusion inappropriate here.”491 The
Court concluded to allow the evidence to be admissible since officers were acting in good-faith
when they conducted the GPS search of Smith.492 In sum, a search did occur.
33. U.S. v. Pope (K-S)
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On August 16, 2009, Forest Law Enforcement Officer Ken Marcus responded to an incident
of loud music in El Dorado National Forest.493 When the officer reached the scene, he discovered
the music had gathered a large crowd. Officer Marcus was arresting an individual when he was
approached by Travis Pope. During their conversation, Officer Marcus became suspicious of
Pope being under the influence of marijuana. Officer Marcus asked Pope if he had been smoking
marijuana and Pope stated he did.494 Pope was then asked if he had any marijuana on him. Pope
denied having marijuana in his possession. Officer Marcus then asked him to empty his pockets;
however, Pope did not comply with this request. Pope was asked by Officer Marcus if he had
any marijuana on him a second time, and this time Pope said that he did.495 Pope took the
marijuana out of his pockets and placed it on Officer Marcus’ vehicle. Officer Marcus cited Pope
for possession and told him he could leave. Pope was charged with one count of misdemeanor
possession of marijuana.496
Pope argued that Officer Marcus’ initial command constituted a Fourth Amendment search,
which was illegal unless accompanied by a warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement.497 Furthermore, he argued that the trial court erred in determining that the law
enforcement officer had probable cause to conduct the search. Finally, Pope argued against the
facts surrounding the incident falling under the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception as no
arrest occurred during the search.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when
“the government infringes on a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
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recognize as reasonable.”498 Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently announced a “propertybased” approach in addition to the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” when analyzing
Fourth Amendment search questions.499 The Court stated there was no question that Pope had a
reasonable expectation of privacy inside his pockets, but whether the officer’s command was
sufficient to intrude upon that expectation required further consideration. Although the Court
reasoned Pope had a reasonable expectation of privacy inside his pockets, the Court concluded
the command was not sufficient to intrude upon Pope’s privacy expectation.500 The Court’s
rationale focused around Pope’s initial denial.501 Because Pope refused to comply with Officer
Marcus’ initial command, he did not produce any materials that were not already exposed to the
public. Thus, the Court concluded the initial command does not constitute a search. Additionally,
based on the Court’s initial analysis, it found no reason to address whether the search lacked
proper justification in the form of probable cause since it did not qualify as a search.502
Next, the Court examined the second command by Officer Marcus.503 The Court held that the
second command by Officer Marcus to place marijuana on the vehicle did constitute a search
because Pope had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items located inside his pockets.504
However, the warrantless search of Pope could be considered justified if it fell under an
exception to the rule requiring searches under warrant, such as “probable cause already existed to
arrest Pope, a high risk of destruction of evidence, or the search was commensurate with
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circumstances necessitating the invasion.”505 The Court concluded Officer Marcus had probable
cause to arrest Pope for possession of a controlled substance after Pope admitted he had
marijuana in his possession. Furthermore, had Pope left with the marijuana in his possession
there would be a high probability of destruction or concealment. Finally, the Court determined
the search was “minimally intrusive” as Officer Marcus commanded Pope to place the marijuana
on the hood of his vehicle. The Court concluded Officer Marcus’ warrantless search was
justified.506 In sum, the Court found a search had occurred and it was justified as a warrantless
search because Officer Marcus had established probable cause that Pope was engaged in a crime,
had evidence which could be destroyed, and the search was “minimally intrusive.”507
34. U.S. v. Scott (K-S)
During August 2009, detectives arranged for a confidential informant to purchase drugs from
Reynolds in Indiana.508 The detectives attached a listening device to the confidential informant
and placed a second one inside his vehicle. When the confidential informant arrived at the motel,
Reynolds arranged a meeting with the supplier.509 Together, the confidential informant and
Reynolds left and drove to the gas station. The confidential informant exited his vehicle and
Reynolds drove it to Scott’s residence (i.e., the supplier), alone. Scott met Reynolds outside of
his garage and they began talking for about five minutes. During the course of the conversation,
the police were still able to record their conversation as they were close enough to the vehicle.510
Police had also followed the vehicle back to Scott’s home. Scott and Reynolds talked about the
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price of heroin, “yay,” which police believed was code word for cocaine, “ball,” which
detectives believed was an eighth of an ounce of cocaine, and “quarter,” which police believed to
be a quarter of an ounce of cocaine. After their conversation ended, Scott returned to his home
and Reynolds drove back to the gas station, still under police surveillance.
Five days later, the same events occurred between the confidential informant, Reynolds, and
Scott. They met in the motel, Reynolds then drove to the gas station and dropped off the
confidential informant, and then Reynolds went to Scott’s house.511 This time, Reynolds entered
Scott’s house for about five minutes and then left to pick up the confidential informant from the
gas station. Two days later, detectives submitted an affidavit for a search warrant of Scott’s
house. The affidavit explained that the confidential informant had been proven credible from
corroborated information by police.512 The officers were awarded a search warrant and Scott’s
house was searched. Police found a loaded handgun, cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. On appeal,
Scott argued that the recorded conversation between himself and Reynolds violated his Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy.513 Furthermore, Scott argued that without the
conversation, the police would not have probable cause to apply for a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined if Scott had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the conversation located on his driveway and if this evidence was
illegally obtained then the police would no longer have enough probable cause to apply for the
search warrant.514 The Court of Appeals turned to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
when deciding the first question. The Supreme Court stated that in Katz, “the Fourth Amendment
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protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .. [b]ut what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”515 However, the Court held that it was not required to answer whether the
conversation recorded by police was reasonable because, even if had been unreasonable, the
search warrant was “sufficiently supported by facts separate and apart from the recording.”516
Although the Court explicitly avoided answering the reasonableness question, the Court moved
forward under the assumption that the recorded conversation was a search and illegally obtained.
The Court concluded that even if the recording was illegally obtained, the affidavit itself had
been filled with a plethora of other facts to support probable cause and therefore, the application
and issuance of the search warrant was legal.517 In sum, although the Court analyzed the facts
using the Katz test to determine if Scott had both a subjective and objective reasonable
expectation of privacy in the conversation in his driveway, the Court did not explicitly answer
the question; however, the Court moved further with their analysis under the assumption the
recording of the conversation did constitute a search.
35. American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez (K-NS)
The American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois (ACLU) filed a suit against Alvarez seeking
to barr her from enforcing the eavesdropping statute.518 The Illinois eavesdropping statue “makes
it a felony to audio record ‘all or any part of any conversation’ unless all parties to the
conversation gave their consent.”519 The eavesdropping statute exempts recordings made by
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police for law-enforcement purposes from public disclosure. This is to ensure police have
discretion over any “enforcement stop,” such as traffic violations, assistance given to civilians,
pedestrian stops, requests for identifications, and any investigative purposes. Therefore, the
ACLU argued that this statute is a violation of the First Amendment’s speech, press, and petition
clauses.
The Government argued that privacy of communication is an important interest which served
First Amendment interests because “fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well
have a chilling effect on private speech.”520 The Court stated that when analyzing privacy
interests the Fourth Amendment is more directly implicated. Moreover, the Court held that these
interests are not an issue in this particular case. The ACLU wants to openly audio record police
officers performing their duties. This would entail officers speaking loud enough for witnesses to
hear, and “communications of this sort lack any reasonable expectation of privacy.”521
Furthermore, under Katz, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protections. Conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.”522 In
sum, the Court found that based on the circumstances posited by the ACLU, there would be no
privacy interests implicated as the officers would have to speak loud enough for bystanders to
hear, which means no Fourth Amendment protections would be given, and thus, a search would
not occur.523
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But this does not prevent the Illinois General Assembly from strengthening the First
Amendment protections for conversational privacy. The Court concluded that the ACLU’s
argument would be successful when focusing on the First Amendment.524 The eavesdropping
statute “restricts” information and ideas and does not serve the government interest of protecting
conversational privacy, and thus, is viewed as unconstitutional according to the First
Amendment.525
36. U.S. v. Wells (K-NS)
FBI agents were informed by witnesses that Officer J.J. Gray had engaged in illegal acts
while on duty.526 This included stealing money and drugs from suspects detained by Officer
Gray. FBI Special Agent Joe McDoulett went undercover as a Mexican drug dealer known as
Jason Lujan who adopted the moniker “Joker.” FBI attached recording equipment to a room
rented at the Super 8 Motel. Agent McDoulett received $13,620 in cash from the government
and placed part of it in a Crown Royal bag in a bedside table drawer. The remaining funds were
under his pillow.527 Once the room was ready, FBI cooperating witness, Debra Clayton,
informed Officer Gray that a drug dealer was in the room. Gray immediately contacted Officer
Wells and together they surveyed the Super 8 Motel for some time. They re-contacted Debra
Clayton and instructed her to go to “Joker’s” room. She reported back that she had successfully
purchased the drugs.528
“Joker” left the hotel room and entered the hotel lobby where he was detained and
handcuffed by Officer Eric Hill. Wells approached “Joker” and obtained consent to search his
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room. Through the use of the recording equipment in the room, it was learned that approximately
$2,000 was stolen by Gray and Wells and an additional amount of money was allowed to be
stolen by the other officers in the room. “Joker” explained the details of his “operation” in that he
brought five pounds of methamphetamines and sold it all. 529 Wells and Gray agreed to not arrest
him if he could help set up additional drug dealers.
After the initial sting operation, the officers kept in contact with “Joker” by encouraging
future trips; meanwhile, Gray introduced a new customer, Ryan Logsdon.530 As part of a second
sting operation, another FBI agent was introduced as one of “Joker’s” customers. Wells and
Joker met at a nearby restaurant. The meeting focused on the impending sale of a pound of
methamphetamines to a customer Wells could arrest if he wanted to.531 The customer, who was a
new undercover agent, arrived at “Joker’s” motel room and they engaged in a drug transaction.
However, the customer did not have enough money to buy the pound and “Joker” notified Wells
after the customer left. Eventually, Wells and other Tulsa Police Department officers were
indicted on multiple counts of official corruption.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit started their analysis by first explaining that
“Wells’ voluminous assertions on appeal” could be simply re-stated as the district court should
have reviewed “Wells’ personal privacy expectation in the content of the conversation.”532 In
other words, Wells claimed that a search had occurred when the government recorded his
conversation and thus, required a search warrant. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Katz stated,
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“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”533 The Court concluded that Wells did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his dealings with “Joker,” including in the motel
room rented by “Joker,” with or without “Joker” physically being present.534 The Court reasoned
that Wells had no “socially meaningful connection” to the motel room. At times, Wells was just
merely legally present in the room for a short amount of time. Thus, the Court found Wells
lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the presence of “Joker” and in the
conversations which took place between them in Joker’s motel room. In sum, the Court found
no search had occurred.
37. Gennusa v. Canova (K-S)
In 2009, Detective Marmo investigated a possible misdemeanor violation of a domestic
violence injunction by Mr. Studivant.535 Detective Marmo arranged a non-custodial interview of
Mr. Studivant at the Sheriff’s Office. Mr. Studivant had his attorney, Ms. Gennusa, present at the
interview. Unknown to either of them, Detective Marmo had a concealed camera in the room.
During the course of the interview, Mr. Studivant agreed to prepare a written statement. 536
Detective Marmo left the room and closed the door. Ms. Gennusa and her client proceeded to
discuss their matters in private and once their discussion was completed, Ms. Gennusa left the
interview room and met with Detective Marmo.537
When she returned to the interview room, she closed the door and informed Mr. Studivant he
was going to be arrested by Detective Marmo.538 Mr. Studivant no longer wished to give a
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written statement.539 The Detective demanded the written statement when he returned to the
interview room. Both Mr. Studivant and Ms. Gennusa refused after a heated discussion. The
detective left the room to speak with his superior, Sgt. Canova. During their conversation,
Detective Marmo and Sgt. Canova actively monitored Mr. Studivant and Ms. Gennusa. Sgt.
Canova instructed Detective Marmo to retrieve the statement.540 Detective Marmo forcibly
grabbed the statement from Ms. Gennusa’s hands and then subsequently arrested Mr. Studivant.
Mr. Studivant and Ms. Gennusa filed suits against Sgt. Canova, claiming their Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated because of the warrantless recording of their privileged
conversations and the ultimate seizure of the written statement.541 Furthermore, the district court
found that Detective Marmo and Sgt. Canova did not qualify for immunity. Thus, these officers
challenged the district court’s findings based on that neither Studivant nor Gennusa had a
reasonable expectation that their conversation would be kept private.542 Additionally, they
argued that it was not “obvious to a reasonable officer” that such monitoring violated the Fourth
Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Studivant and Ms.
Gennusa did in fact have a reasonable expectation of privacy inside the interview room and that
the officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights when they recorded their attorney-client
conversations.543 Furthermore, the Court held there was no exigency to justify the warrantless
“search” and “seizure” of the written statement. Therefore, the officers do not qualify for
immunity from their reckless behavior which resulted in an unlawful “search.”544 In sum, an
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unlawful search and seizure did occur through the recording of Mr. Studivant’s and Ms.
Gennusa’s private conversation by law enforcement.
38. U.S. v. Pirosko (K-NS)
In March 2012, Nebraska Department of Justice Officer Edward Sexton detected a specific
IP address sharing several files of child pornography.545 On this IP address, Officer Sexton was
able to discern three Globally Unique Identifiers (GUIDs).546 Officer Sexton gave special
attention to the third GUID and attempted to both connect and obtain any files of interest being
shared over the network. Over the course of a few months, Officer Sexton was able to download
several files and track the IP addresses from hotels across the nation. Officer Sexton acquired the
guest list of the hotels and was able to determine that Joseph Pirosko owned the GUID. On June
4, 2012, Officer Sexton applied for a search warrant, which he was granted, and officers seized
Pirosko’s computer and USB drive. The contents of Pirosko’s computer revealed child
pornography and an online account with a share folder.547 Pirosko argued his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated because the Nebraska officers obtained the search warrant “using unreliable
and unsupported information.”548 However, the district court rejected this argument.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the District Court properly denied
Pirosko’s motions to suppress.549 In the first part of the analysis, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit found that the argument was meritless because Officer Sexton’s affidavit contained
his experience, qualifications, the software used, and the files obtained from Pirosko’s computer.
This came out to be more than 10 pages of work. Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
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Circuit reviewed the issue of unconstitutional warrantless tracking. Originally, Pirosko’s motion
to suppress did not argue this point, nor did it refer to United States v. Jones.550 Furthermore,
Pirosko voluntarily agreed to plea, and therefore, waived the majority of his rights to appeal,
except for review of the Court’s denial of his suppression motion. With that in mind, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed this portion of the case for plain error.551
The Court concluded that Pirosko’s reliance on United States v. Jones is misplaced, as his
main argument is for the adoption of the theory put forth by the concurrence in that case.552 The
Court explained adopting this theory would simultaneously disregard the Supreme Court
precedent and “give a free pass to on-the-road downloaders of child pornography.”553 Therefore,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the adoption of Jones, and instead relied on
other precedent which acknowledged an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy on nonshareable data on his or her computer, but that does not extend to files which are accessible
through a shared-online folder.554 The Court ruled that Pirosko lacked objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data; therefore, no search had occurred prior to the warrant allowing
the extraction of the data.
Pre-Jones
1. U.S. v. Titemore (K-NS)
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On April 27, 2003, Vermont State Police were called to resolve a dispute between David
Titemore and Kevin Lothian.555 Additionally, Titemore had assaulted one of Lothian’s
employees. When police arrived, they had issued a citation to Titemore. The next evening,
Lothian returned to a vandalized home. He called the police and reported the incident.556
Amongst the destruction, a .22 Marlin rifle had been stolen. While waiting for police to get there,
Lothian and a friend, Larry Tatro, witnessed Titemore come on to Lothian’s property and smash
some lights, “play” with a propane tank, and try to enter the home. Lothian called police again
and the dispatcher immediately connected Lothian’s distress call to Trooper Thad Baxter.557 The
trooper and Lothian agreed to meet up on Main Street. After explaining the situation to Trooper
Baxter, they decided (Trooper Baxter, Lothian, and Tatro) to meet back up at Tatro’s house.
From there, the three men began walking towards Lothian’s residence, when Trooper Baxter
decided to talk to Titemore before inspecting the damages of Lothian’s dwelling. At about 10:20
p.m., they arrived at the edge of Titemore’s property, where Trooper Baxter ordered the other
two men to stay near the house.558 Before the men left, they informed the trooper that Titemore
might be drunk and may have the missing rifle. Furthermore, they advised Trooper Baxter to
approach the door from the western side to activate the motion-sensing light so as to not be
mistaken for Lothian or Tatro to Titemore.559
When Trooper Baxter approached the residence, he saw a television on through a slidingglass door on the eastern side of the porch.560 “As the district court found, he chose this route for
two principal reasons: (1) because the television was on in the room adjacent to the porch, he
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thought that he was more likely to find Titemore if he knocked on the sliding-glass door next to
that room; and (2) Baxter was concerned about approaching from the western side of the house
because the motion-sensing light would permit Titemore to see him approach, but he would not
be able to see Titemore.”561 Once at the door, Baxter noticed that the sliding door had been left
open; however, the screen door was shut. Trooper Baxter peered through the screen and saw
Titemore facing him watching television. The rifle was also lying within Titemore’s reach.
Trooper Baxter immediately identified himself. Trooper Baxter had noted Titemore had been
acting strangely, as if during their conversation Titemore was seeing “through” him.562 Trooper
Baxter asked if he was David Titemore and Titemore acknowledged. Trooper Baxter asked
Titemore if he could either come in or Titemore come outside and talk. Titemore decided to
come outside and during the course of their conversation, Trooper Baxter had detected numerous
indicators that Titemore may be intoxicated, such as the odor of alcohol on Titemore’s breath,
slurred speech, and sluggish thought processes.563
Trooper Baxter asked Titemore if he was a convicted felon, to which Titemore responded, “I
may have been once.”564 Additionally, Trooper Baxter asked if he was supposed to have a gun.
Titemore replied in the negative. Trooper Baxter asked the make and model of the gun and if it
was loaded. Titemore replied the rifle was a loaded Marlin. Trooper Baxter asked if he could
have permission to retrieve the rifle. Titemore replied in the affirmative. Trooper Baxter then
opened the screen door, grabbed the rifle, and stepped back outside of Titemore’s residence.565
Trooper Baxter was unfamiliar with this weapon and asked Titemore how to unload it. Titemore
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explained and then Trooper Baxter successfully unloaded the weapon and removed the bullet
from the chamber. Next, Trooper Baxter asked about Lothian’s home being vandalized. Titemore
claimed he was in his house all day. Moreover, Titemore claimed Lothian had assaulted him
during their previous altercation.566 Trooper Baxter issued a citation for unlawful mischief and
trespass to Titemore. Titemore argued that Trooper Baxter violated his Fourth Amendment rights
by effecting a “warrantless entry on his protected property” because the lawn and deck of his
home were associated with the home itself and therefore, should be considered protected
curtilage of the home.567
Titemore argued that Trooper Baxter violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a
“warrantless entry onto [his] protected property.”568 Furthermore, Titemore argued that the lawn
and deck of his residence should be considered falling under the protection of curtilage of his
dwelling. When examining a Fourth Amendment search question, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit turned to Katz, which adopted the concept of “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”569 However, Katz did not eliminate all Fourth Amendment inquiries related
to a particular place. This case corresponded more closely with Hester v. United States, which
dealt with the concepts of the curtilage of a home and open fields.570 Hester was historically
important because it was the Court’s first acceptance of a distinction between open fields and the
curtilage of a home. To complete the analysis, the current court in Titemore turned to United
States v. Dunn.571 The Court in Dunn recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy existed
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within the curtilage of a home. Furthermore, the Court provided indications as to how future
courts should determine curtilage and its boundaries.
However, the court in Titemore ultimately concluded Titemore had no reasonable expectation
of privacy.572 Their rationale focused around the sliding-glass door.573 The Court held that
although normally it would be considered part of the curtilage, the sliding-glass door had a
diminished expectation of privacy as it was the principal entranceway. Next, the lawn and porch
area were not enclosed or fenced off in an attempt to “separate” or delineate public from and
private space. Lastly, there were no steps taken to “shield” the contents behind the sliding-glass
door or the porch. It is for these reasons that the court concluded Titemore had no expectation of
privacy.574 “Thus, there was no offense to the Fourth Amendment when Trooper Baxter
approached the sliding-glass door to talk to Titemore about the vandalism that took place on the
Lothian property.”575 As a result, the rifle seized and the statements made by Titemore were
lawfully obtained and therefore, admissible in trial. A search had not occurred under Katz due to
the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
2. Taylor v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources (K-NS)
On February 20, 2003, Paul Rose, a conservation officer, approached Alan Taylor’s 240-acre
fenced property.576 The officer was called to investigate a complaint regarding a fencing
problem. Under Michigan law, it is viewed as a misdemeanor to “unlawfully erect a barrier
denying ingress or egress to an area where the lawful taking of animals may occur.”577 There was
no violation; however, Officer Rose did notice tire tracks and footprints continuing onto the
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property towards a house. These tracks went right through two “NO Trespassing” signs. Officer
Rose shouted and asked if anyone was home and then proceeded toward the house. He peered
inside the windows of the home and garage, but he could not see anyone. After about five
minutes, Officer Rose left his business card in the door.578 Officer Rose claimed he did these
“checks” in case a trespasser might be on the property. Another suspicious observation made by
Rose was the curtains being left open. Based on his years of experience, most residents would
close their curtains upon leaving.579
Alan Taylor found the card when he returned home and called the officer as was requested by
Officer Rose.580 Officer Rose explained the fence complaint and offered assistance in the event
of future trespassing problems, but he did not mention the property check he had conducted.
Alan Taylor reviewed his home security tape and immediately contacted the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) to report the illegal check conducted by Officer
Rose.581 The director stated that the conduct of Officer Rose fell within departmental policy.
Alan Taylor filed a complaint in federal district court. He argued that Officer Rose’s conduct did
constitute a search, and that his conduct was not protected by qualified immunity.582
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit started its analysis with an examination of
whether the conduct of Officer Rose constituted a search.583 A search is defined in terms of
whether a person had a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”584 The
Court agreed with the analysis of the district court in that “Officer Rose’s conduct does not

578

Id.
Id.
580
Id.
581
Id.
582
Id. at 455.
583
Id.
584
Id.(citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967)).
579

122

constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”585 The rationale behind its
decision focused on the second prong of Katz.586 The Court agreed with the district court’s
decision in that the methods and purposes for the observations made by Officer Rose constituted
a low level of intrusion. Furthermore, due to Officer Rose’s twenty-plus years of experience, he
had reason to believe that the situation could lend itself to a wintertime break-in and thus,
warranted a protective check.587
The Court stated that “without physically intruding upon the home or employing any
technology to substitute for a physical intrusion, Officer Rose observed the home in an effort to
ensure the integrity of the property for the homeowner.”588 Thus, the Court found Officer Rose’s
protective check did not constitute a search. Furthermore, the Court need not answer if Officer
Rose was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate the constitutional rights of
Alan Taylor.589
3. Warshak v. U.S. (K-S)
In March 2005, Steven Warshak and his company, Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc.,
were being investigated on allegations of various types of fraud and money laundering.590 The
government obtained an order from a magistrate judge which requested Warshak’s internet
service provider (ISP), NuVox Communications, to supply information regarding Warshak’s email. The order was based on “specific and articulable facts” and prohibited NuVox from
585
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“disclosing” the order to the customer, Warshak. The judge ordered that the notification by the
government of the search request to Warshak may be delayed for ninety days. On September 12,
2005, the government obtained a similar order directed at Yahoo; however, it added another
individual, Ron Fricke, to the order. On May 31, 2006, over a year later after investigators
obtained the initial order, Warshak was notified of both orders.591 Warshak filed suit on June 12,
2006, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the government. Warshak claimed his
Fourth Amendment right was violated when the government compelled the disclosure of e-mails
without a warrant.592
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the contents of the e-mail are meant to be
private and thus, it is reasonable to have an expectation of privacy.593 The Court reasoned that,
“like telephone conversations, simply because the phone company or the ISP could access the
content of e-mails and phone calls, the privacy expectation in the content of either is not
diminished, because there is a societal expectation that the ISP or the phone company will not do
so as a matter of course.”594 According to the Court, a government search did occur, and it
violated Warshak’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his email.595
4. Rehberg v. Paulk (K-NS)
Anonymous harassing faxes were sent by Charles Rehberg to the management of Phoebe
Putney Memorial Hospital.596 Then District Attorney Hodges and Chief Investigator Paulk had
investigated Rehberg’s actions. From October 2003 to February 2004, Hodges and Paulk
subpoenaed BellSouth, Alltel, and Sprint for Rehberg’s telephone records. Additionally, Chief
591
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Investigator Paulk subpoenaed Rehberg’s email accounts from his internet service provider.
Rehberg’s case was presented to a grand jury on December 14, 2005.597 During the course of the
investigation, media coverage revealed a furtive relationship between Hodges and the hospital.
As a result, Hodges recused himself from the prosecution; however, he still gave “support” to the
prosecution team and was in contact with Paulk.598
Throughout the history of this case, the prosecution attempted to indict Rehberg for various
charges. The first indictment was for charges of aggravated assault, burglary, and “harassing
phone calls” to Dr. James Hotz.599 A closer investigation revealed that Reherg had never been at
Dr. Hotz’s residence nor had Dr. Hotz reported an assault or burglary to police. The second
indictment charged Rehberg for simple assault charges and harassment (via telephone) to Dr.
Hotz on August 22, 2004. However, it was later dismissed due to a lack of evidence. Finally, the
third indictment on March 1, 2006 charged Rehberg for simple assault and telephone harassment.
On May 1, 2006, the trial court dismissed the charges.600
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined the subpoenas during the
investigation through a Fourth Amendment lens. The Court held that Rehberg “lacked a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone and fax numbers he dialed.”601 Moreover, the
Court reasoned once Rehberg made a phone call through a third party, the dialing-related
information he provided to Bellsouth, Alltel, and Spring could be turned over to law enforcement
officers as Rehberg lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. When the
Court analyzed Paulk’s subpoena of the e-mail contents, the Court found there was a lack of
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jurisprudence in this area of law regarding defendants’ privacy rights in e-mail and the contents
voluntarily transmitted over the Internet.602 Thus, the Court found “Paulk could not have known
the scope of the privacy rights, if any, that Rehberg had in email content stored at his third party
ISP.”603 The Court concluded that due to federal law not being clearly established, Paulk
qualified for immunity. Therefore, a search did not occur.
5. Georgia v. Randolph (K-S)
In May 2001, Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet, separated due to marital difficulties.604
After their separation, Janet left their home in Americus, Georgia, and took their son to live with
her parents in Canada. Janet and her son returned to Americus, Georgia a few months later. On
July 6th, Janet called police and explained after a heated dispute between her and her former
husband, Scott had taken her son. When police arrived at the house, they were informed by Janet
that her husband was a habitual cocaine user.605 Janet further explained to police their previous
marital problems and that she had recently returned from being with her parents in Canada. Soon
after, Scott Randolph returned home and explained he had left their son at a neighbor’s house
because he was fearful of his wife taking him out of the country. When police questioned Scott
about his cocaine usage, he declined ever using the drug and stated that his wife was an alcoholic
and drug user.606
Sergeant Murray had taken lead role at the scene and took Janet Randolph to find the missing
child from the neighbor’s residence.607 When the child was found and Janet returned to the
scene, she repeated her initial complaints about Scott’s drug problems and also explained that
602
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there were “items of drug evidence” inside their residence. Sergeant Murray asked Scott for
consent to search the house, but he declined. Next, Sergeant Murray turned to Janet and asked
for consent, which she eagerly granted. Janet led Sergeant Murray upstairs to Scott’s bedroom
and Sergeant Murray observed straws with a powdery substance, which he suspected was
cocaine.608 After finding this evidence, Sergeant Murray exited the house to retrieve an evidence
bag and simultaneously called the district attorney (“DA”) to check on the validity of the search.
The DA immediately instructed him to stop the search and obtain a warrant. Subsequently, Janet
withdrew her consent when Sergeant Murray returned. The police seized the straws found
previously, and then took both Scott and Janet to the police station. Afterwards, officers obtained
a valid search warrant and returned to the Randolph’s house to seize more drug evidence.609
In court, Scott argued the evidence should be suppressed as it was obtained from a
warrantless search of his house in the absence of his expressed consent.610 The trial court denied
the motion, ruling that Janet had common authority to consent to the search. The Court of
Appeals of Georgia reversed the decision and the State Supreme Court affirmed on the principle
that “the consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occupant is not
valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant who is physically present at the scene to
permit a warrantless search.”611 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and was in
agreement with the Court of Appeals and State Supreme Court decisions. After establishing no
exceptions were present to permit entry into the dwelling at the time (i.e., exigent circumstances
or the possibility of evidence being destroyed) the United States Supreme Court applied the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. The United States Supreme Court stated, “Since the
608
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co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social
practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more,
gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in
the absence of any consent at all.”612 In short, the United States Supreme Court held an
unreasonable search had occurred.
6. Groh v. Ramirez (K-S)
Special Agent Jeff Groh of the Bureau of Alcohol and Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had been
notified by a “concerned citizen” that they had seen a small armory of weaponry on the ranch
owned by Joseph Ramirez and his family.613 The citizen had explained to Special Agent Groh he
had previously visited the Ramirez ranch and observed the family owning automatic rifles,
grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher.614 Special Agent Groh applied for a search
warrant to obtain “any automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, destructive device to
include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and any and all receipts
pertaining to the purchase or manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or
launchers.”615 Although the warrant elucidated the expected illegal items to be found as well as
the physical location to be searched, it failed to enumerate the items to be seized. In the section
detailing the “person or property” to be seized, it described the Ramirez house, but not the supply
of firearms. Nevertheless, the Magistrate issued the warrant and the following day, Special Agent
Groh executed the warrant with a team of officers. Joseph Ramirez was absent during the
execution of the warrant; however, other members of his family were present (i.e., his wife and

612

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114.
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 554 (2004).
614
Id.
615
Id.
613

128

children).616 Special Agent Groh explained the items of the search to Mrs. Ramirez, and to Mr.
Ramirez over the phone. The search uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. Special Agent
Groh left a copy of the search warrant, but not a copy of the application. The following day,
Special Agent Groh faxed a copy of the application in response to a request from Ramirez’s
attorney.617
Joseph Ramirez sued Special Agent Groh and other officers with claims related to violations
of the Fourth Amendment. The district court found no Fourth Amendment violations and the
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, with one exception against Special Agent Groh.618 The
Court of Appeals held that the warrant was invalid since it did not specify the places to be
searched and the items to be seized. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held
both that a search did occur, and that it was “unreasonable.”619 Moreover, the Court reasoned
even though the Magistrate issued the warrant, it did not mean that he agreed to the scope of the
search. Therefore, according to the Court, “even though the petitioner acted with restraint in
conducting the search, the inescapable fact is that his restraint was imposed by the agents
themselves, not by a judicial officer.”620 Consequently, the Court concluded a search did occur
and that it violated the constitutional rights of Ramirez.
7. U.S. v. Amanuel (K-S)
On March 19, 2002, police obtained an eavesdropping warrant which authorized the
interception of digital papers which belonged to Joseph Amanuel.621 Contrary to the
specifications of the warrant, police did not record the interception of digital communications.
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Instead, a written log was kept. On May 30, 2002, police obtained a wiretap based on the
information acquired previously, and later renewed it on June 7, 2002. The wiretaps were used to
support the application for a search warrant which, in turn, led to the discovery of incriminating
physical evidence against the defendant.622 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the initial interception was a violation of Amanuel’s statutory rights. “The holding in Katz lead to
the well-established conclusion that law enforcement authorities seeking to engage in electronic
surveillance must comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”623 However, this
case required the evaluation of police compliance with a statute, which is not necessarily the
same as a constitutional violation. As a result, the Court concluded that the failure to record the
interception and seal does not meet the level of a constitutional violation and thus, found that
suppression of the evidence would be unsuitable.624 In effect, the Court found that though a
search did occur under the Fourth Amendment, there was no violation of defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights but rather a violation of his statutory rights.
8. Cassidy v. Chertoff (K-S)
On July 1, 2004, Lake Champlain Transportation Company (LCT) ferry workers searched
passengers as part of protocol.625 This involved asking passengers to open carry-on items and to
present other items for inspections. Car passengers had a visual inspection conducted on their
vehicle which included the opening of their vehicle’s trunk or tailgate. Michael Cassidy, who
commuted daily with ferry, had been asked to open the trunk of his vehicle, which he did.
Another passenger, Cabin, had been asked to open his bike pack. These two individuals
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explained in court that use of the ferry is necessary or the alternative route would take at least
twice as long.626 The plaintiffs alleged that the ferry’s searches were unconstitutional and
violated their Fourth Amendment rights.627
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the LCT ferry passengers did not
suffer a diminished privacy interests in their carry-on luggage.628 The Court reasoned that even
though airline pre-boarding searches were reasonable, airline commuting differs from traveling
by ferry.629 The Court explained for air travel, society had accepted the increased security
measures and intrusion on their privacy since the 9/11 attack. However, the Court found that the
pre-emptive checks of the carry-on luggage and vehicle trunks of ferry passengers were
minimally intrusive.630 Finally, the Court agreed with the government’s argument in that the
prevention of terrorist attacks (via searches on only the nation’s largest ferries) supported their
searches under the special needs doctrine. The Court explained, “Indeed, given that both the
intrusions on plaintiffs' privacy interests are minimal and the measures adopted by LCT are
reasonably efficacious in serving the government's undisputedly important special need to
protect ferry passengers and crew from terrorist acts, we find no constitutional violation.”631 In
sum, the court concluded that the searches by LCT are reasonable under the special needs
doctrine to protect ferry passengers and the crew from terrorist acts.632
9. Caldarola v. County of Westchester (K-S)
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An investigation of correctional officers suspected of receiving disability benefits on
fraudulent job injury claims led to the arrest of Freeman and several other correctional staff. 633
Evidence was obtained through Department of Corrections (DOC) surveillance. On July 12,
1999, correctional officers were summoned to DOC headquarters, placed in separate rooms, and
eventually arrested. The same day correctional staff members were arrested, the County of
Westchester held a press conference with the intent to publicize the investigation. During the
associated arraignment, the media filmed Freeman and other correctional officers, which
included when they were in the police vehicles until they walked into the courthouse.634 The
media had shown the accused being led by police to the courthouse handcuffed, and this
particular story continued to be featured in various newspapers and news stations for several
decades to illustrate that police/correctional corruption is not tolerated.635
Freeman argued that his Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unreasonable search and
seizure was violated when the County’s act of coordinating the arrests and videotaping the “perp
walk” was made public. The district court, however, rejected his claim.636 Freeman appealed and
contended that the district court erred in its analysis. The Court of Appeals held that under the
circumstances, the broadcasting of the videotape implicated Freeman’s privacy interests. 637
Moreover, while on DOC property, Freeman and other correctional officers had a reasonable
expectation of privacy; however, this interest was diminished.638 Ultimately, the court concluded
that the privacy interest of Freeman and the other arrestees was “outweighed by the County’s
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legitimate government purposes. Therefore, Freeman sustained no actionable Fourth Amendment
injury.”639 A search occurred, but it was found to not have violated Freeman’s rights.
10. Cressman v. Ellis (K-S)
The plaintiffs alleged the state technical college officials violated their Fourth Amendment
privacy rights.640 More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that state technical college officials
began surveillance in squad rooms of the college police department for forty-five (45) days
without obtaining a warrant. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo the
dismissal ruling by the district court. First, the Court began its analysis with a two-pronged test
to determine if there had been a violation of privacy: (1) first, was there a subjective expectation
of privacy and if so, (2) was it objectively reasonable.641 When reviewing de novo, the Court
examined the original petition and concluded that “the plaintiffs could prove a set of facts in
support of their claims which would entitle them to relief.”642 The Court claimed it was
premature for the district court to deny their action as it is possible to provide both a subjective
and objective expectation of privacy. The Court again rejected the district court’s final analysis
in that, if law enforcement’s conduct was illegal that their actions would be protected under
qualified immunity.643 Thus, a search occurred and it violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
rights.
11. Zaffuto v. City of Hammond (K-S)

639

Id. at 577.
Cressman v. Ellis, 77 Fed.Appx. 744, 744 (5th Cir. 2003).
641
Id.at 745.
642
Id.
643
Id. at 746.
640

133

In 1997, Sergeant Terry Zaffuto placed a call from his private office to his wife. 644 The two
talked about the police department’s impending re-structuring, which was to affect his superiors.
His wife, Susan, stated that “those SOBs will finally get what they deserve.”645 Unbeknownst to
them, the conversation was being recorded by Assistant Police Chief Kenneth Corkern and in
1999 officer Zaffuto learned that Corkern had played the tape to two other police officers.
Officer Zaffuto filed a complaint against Corkern, the police chief, Roddy Devall, and the City of
Hammond. The Supreme Court held in Katz that recording private conversations without a valid
warrant is a violation of the speaker’s reasonable expectation of privacy.646 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court stated in Katz that “the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of
tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any
technical trespass under local property law.”647 Based on the evidence and jurisprudence of Katz,
the court concluded that the recording policy of the police department was well understood by
the officers, in that all incoming communications were being recorded.648 This did not include
outgoing calls from private offices. As a result, the court concluded that Officer Zaffuto had
reasonably believed that his outgoing call to his wife was private. A search and seizure did occur
in violation of Zaffuto’s constitutional rights.
12. U.S. v. Hardin (K-S)
On August 29, 2005, Officer Kingsbury received a tip from a confidential informant on the
whereabouts of Hardin.649 Officer Kingsbury and Officer Jason Tarwater went to the building
described in the tip and saw the vehicle described by the confidential informant. The officers
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talked to the manager of the building, which was an apartment complex, and found out Hardin
had not leased an apartment or been seen on the property. After explaining that Hardin had been
convicted of a shooting at a school and an armed robbery, the manager agreed to assist the police
in their investigations. Accordingly, one of the officers explained that the manager could enter
the apartment of a Germaine Reynolds, who they suspected had a relationship with Hardin, and
investigate if Hardin was there, under the ruse of “maintenance.”650 The officers watched on
CCTV and the manager entered the apartment with the use of his key and shouted out
“Maintenance.”651 Hardin answered the door and asked the manager about the purpose of the
visit. The manager explained there had been a leak and wondered if he could check the
bathroom.652 Hardin relayed the information to Reynolds through his cell phone. Afterwards, the
apartment manager confirmed to Kingsbury that Hardin was in the apartment. The officers called
for backup and broke into the apartment and arrested Hardin. The officers also found three
firearms, crack cocaine, marijuana, and $2,000 in cash.653 The court concluded in this case that
the apartment manager acted as an agent of the government and that the officers’ remaining
information based on the confidential informant did not establish either probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.654 The court held that the search of the apartment violated Hardin’s Fourth
Amendment rights and all evidence were “tainted” fruits.
13. U.S. v. Gooch (K-NS)
In Nashville, Tennessee, there was a nightclub, Club Prizm, which frequently had visits from
police in response to fights, loud music, shootings, and a murder.655 As a result of the rise in
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crime emanating from the club, police frequently conducted sweeps in the parking lot. The
owner of the nightclub, Fidanza, did not own the parking lot, but rather it was shared by all the
surrounding businesses. Fidanza had arranged a valet service for his nightclub. On May 20,
2004, police arrived to do a “sweep” and Officer Mark Anderson approached a Lincoln Town
Car and shined his flashlight inside it.656 He saw a velvet Crown Royal whiskey bag underneath
the driver side of the vehicle. He also observed what was to his knowledge a firearm handle
sticking outside of the bag. Anderson pulled his car alongside the vehicle and ran the license
plates to determine the vehicle’s owner. It was determined to be owned by defendant Gooch,
who did not have either a valid gun permit or a valid driver’s license.657 Gooch also had an
extensive criminal history. Later, Gooch left the nightclub with his wife, Seniqua King, and
entered the Lincoln. Officer Anderson approached the car with his firearm drawn and demanded
Gooch to place the vehicle in park, and exit the vehicle. Gooch complied with Officer
Anderson’s commands, and Officer Anderson then placed Gooch under arrest.658 The officers
conducted a search of the vehicle and found a firearm. In 2005, Gooch pled guilty, but
“preserved the suppression issue for appellate review.”659
The Court of Appeals in this case had to determine whether Gooch did in fact have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the “VIP” area of the parking lot. “In order to be afforded
protection under the Fourth Amendment, a person must exhibit a subjective expectation of
privacy and society must be willing to recognize this expectation as reasonable.”660 The Court
held that Gooch had no reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court reasoned that “members of
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the public and police officers had access to, and were able to walk through, the VIP area.”661
Thus, the court found that no search had occurred.
14. U.S. v. Ellison (K-NS)
Officer Mark Keeley observed a male inside a white van parked in a “Fire Lane” and “No
Parking” area.662 Instead of issuing a citation or requesting the male to move the vehicle, Officer
Keeley parked in a spot and ran a check on the license plates. The database stated the vehicle
belonged to Curtis Ellison, who also had an outstanding felony warrant. Officer Keeley called for
back-up. After a few minutes, another male entered the vehicle and then the van drove off.
Officer Keeley followed the van for a few moments, until his back-up was close. He then
stopped the van.663 Officer Keeley approached the driver and asked for registration and proof of
insurance. The driver was identified as Edward Coleman, and Curtis Ellison was the passenger.
Officer Keeley moved to the passenger side of the vehicle and notified him he had an
outstanding warrant, and arrested him. During the routine pat-down, two firearms were
discovered. Coleman was released with a warning for parking in a fire lane.664
The district court found that the “van was not parked illegally, and thus, the officer did not
have probable cause to run the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) check of Ellison’
license plate.”665 The government appealed. The government argued Ellison had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information contained on his plates. The Court of Appeals stated
that the Fourth Amendment protects only what society intends to keep private. Moreover, the
Court in Katz stated “What a person knowingly exposes to the public … is not a subject of
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Fourth Amendment protections.”666 Thus, the court held in Ellison that “It is apparent that when
a vehicle is parked on the street or in a lot or at some other location it is readily subject to
observation by members of the public, it is no search for the police to look at the exterior of the
vehicle.”667 The Court concluded that a privacy interest does not exist for motorists such as
Ellison because they do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information on the
license plate.668 Moreover, the court reasoned as long as Officer Keeley was in a “position to
observe” the plates, then he did not violate the Fourth Amendment.669 No search had occurred.
15. Widgren v. Maple Grove Tp. (K-NS)
Kenneth Widgren, Sr., owned a twenty acre tract of land, which was largely undeveloped.670
His land was covered by trees, hills, and overgrowth. Over the course of about a year, from May
of 2002 until the spring of 2003, Widgren had built a house on the property. There was no fence,
but at the “mouth” of the driveway there were multiple signs posted, including “No Trespassing”
signs. Widgren did not purchase a building permit. Three times, zoning administrators and
Township tax assessors, Louis Lenz and H. Wayne Beldo, attempted to confront Widgren about
zoning violations, and conduct some minor observations of the exterior of the house.671 Unable
to get a hold of Widgren, they would post the civil infractions on the door of the house. When
Widgren learned of the infractions, he and his son filed a claim in federal district court asserting
various violations. The district court held that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred due
to the “open fields” doctrine.672
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The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court’s decision and held that all three separate
visits did not constitute a search. The Court reasoned that regarding the first inspection, the
“open field doctrine” applied and therefore, while it may be considered a trespass, it was not a
search.673 The objective of the second inspection was to issue a citation and did not seek
incriminating evidence against the Widgrens. Therefore, the Court held that the “intrusion” was
minimal in nature and therefore did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.674 Finally, the
last visit by a property assessor also did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The Court
reasoned the official did enter the curtilage, but for the sole purpose of “naked-eye” observations
of the exterior of the house.675 Furthermore, it did not violate the Widgrens’ Fourth Amendment
rights because the house was plainly visible. Concerning this final inspection, the Court
concluded that the Widgrens’ “expectation of privacy in ‘the plainly visible attributes and
dimensions of the exterior of their home’ is at the Fourth Amendment’s periphery, not its core,
when compared to the hidden features of the house’s interior.”676 No search had occurred.
16. Christensen v. County of Boone (K-NS)
In 1998, Boone County police officer Robert Alty arrested a friend, Edward Krieger, for
driving under the influence.677 Edward Krieger was also a Deputy Sheriff of Boone County. This
led toward an animosity in their relationship, which later manifested into face-to-face
altercations in 2001. Deputy Krieger would harass and intimidate Officer Alty and his girlfriend,
Anita Christensen This included a series of events consisting of Deputy Krieger following the
pair in Boone County, parking his squad car in front of the business in which Anita worked, and
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other intimidation tactics.678 Numerous complaints were filed against Krieger to his superior, but
no departmental actions were taken. Officer Alty and Anita Christensen claimed Deputy Krieger
deprived them of their rights of privacy and further claimed this harassment was tantamount to
an unreasonable search and seizure. The district court dismissed the claims.679
The Court of Appeals stated “a search takes place when the state intrudes upon an
individual’s legitimate interest in privacy.”680 In the present case, the Court concluded that the
actions of Deputy Krieger did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.681 The Court
reasoned that while driving on public streets, individuals do not ordinarily have a legitimate
expectation of privacy. The Court concluded that the district court appropriately dismissed the
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims.682
17. U.S. v. Lucas (K-NS)
In 2003, defendant Lucas escaped the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional
Services.683 On October 22, Director of Correctional Services Harold Clarke issued an arrest
warrant for Lucas. On January 4, 2004, a tip was given to Sergeant Timothy Carmody of Lucas’
location. Carmody passed the tip to Deputy Gerald Kellogg. Later that day Kellogg directed
officers to travel to the residence of Theresa Scaife, which was the location described in the tip.
When officers knocked on the door, they could hear a man and a woman inside. When Scaife
opened the door, she was asked if Lucas was inside.684 She responded that he was not inside the
residence. The officers explained to her that they had an arrest warrant for Lucas and based on
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the warrant, they intended to enter and search for him. Shortly thereafter, Scaife admitted Lucas
was inside and officers placed her in the squad car. Officers asked Lucas to come outside the
residence; however, he did not respond to their request. At that point, officers entered the
apartment and found Lucas in the basement dressed in boxer shorts. Due to department policy,
those placed under arrest must be dressed appropriately during winter weather. Deputy Kellogg
saw a pair of pants in a bedroom and asked Lucas if the pants belonged to him. Lucas
acknowledged ownership of the pants, but requested to wear a different pair. After Deputy
Kellogg picked up the pants and he discovered crack cocaine, marijuana, and $2,900 in cash
inside the pants.685 After officers took Lucas away, Scaife was allowed to enter her apartment.
She was asked by Sergeant Carmody for permission for the officers to search the apartment for
contraband or weapons which may have belonged to Lucas. Scaife verbally agreed and signed a
consent form. Officers found a firearm and another bag of marijuana.686
The Court of Appeals stated that because Lucas had escaped lawful custody, he possessed a
diminished expectation of privacy.687 The Court held that Director Clarke had met the standard
required to draft an arrest warrant for a prison escapee; therefore, the officers’ entry into Scaife’s
apartment was reasonable.688 Furthermore, the Court stated the dissent erred by failing to
consider the status of Lucas. Because Lucas’ reasonable expectation of privacy was limited by
his escapee status and in light of the fact officers had both a valid administrative warrant and
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reasonable cause to believe Lucas was in the apartment, the Court concluded Lucas’ Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated.689 Thus, a valid search had occurred.
18. Nelson v. National Aeronautics and Space Admin. (K-NS)
This case dealt with the employees who worked on the jet propulsion laboratory for NASA.
NASA had conducted routine National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI ) investigations of
all employees since its inception, excluding contract employees.690 NASA had determined this
exclusion posed a security risk and thus began requiring investigations into contract employees
in 2005. However, these changes did not affect those who worked for California Institute of
Technology (Caltech) until January 29, 2007. This team, in conjunction with NASA, were in
charge of working on the jet propulsion laboratory. At this point, NASA had modified its
contract with Caltech to require of all its (Caltech’s) contractual employees to undergo a
thorough NACI investigation.691 Caltech initially opposed the new security measures, including
the investigations, but ultimately conceded due to the nature of the contract they had previously
signed. These investigations would be conducted through Form 42 inquiries and a SF 85
questionnaire.692 Thus, on August 30, 2007, the appellants filed suits against NASA, Caltech,
and the Department of Commerce.693 One of the primary suits alleged NASA’s forced
investigations on contract employees constituted an unreasonable search.694 The district court
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rejected the argument and held the investigations required by NASA were not a “search” under
the Fourth Amendment.695
The Court of Appeals stated for appellants’ Fourth Amendment claim to be successful,
there must be evidence that the investigation conducted by NASA using Form 42 or the SF 85
questionnaire violated appellants’ “reasonable expectation of privacy.”696 The Court held Form
42 written inquiries did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment according to
Miller’s bright-line rule.697 This bright-line rule states that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy to any information voluntarily given to the government. Furthermore, the Court
concluded that the investigations conducted using the SF 85 questionnaire did not constitute a
search. The Court reasoned direct questioning was not a Fourth Amendment issue, but rather a
Fifth Amendment concern.698 Thus, the Court concluded that neither Form 42 written inquiries
nor the SF 85 questionnaire were considered “searches” under the Fourth Amendment.699 In sum,
no search had occurred.
19. U.S. v. Ziegler (K-NS)
FBI Special Agent James Kennedy had received a tip that a Frontline Processing employee
had accessed child pornography from a work computer.700 In response, Kennedy contacted the IT
administrator of Frontline. The administrator, John Softich, explained to Kennedy that a firewall
was placed on all work computers and internet activities were strictly monitored. During their

695

Id.
Id. at 875(citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967)).
697
Id. “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” Id. (quoting U.S.
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
698
Nelson, 530 F.3d at 877.
699
Id.
700
U.S. v. Ziegler, 456 F.3d 1138, 1139 (9th Cir. 2006).
696

143

conversation, Softich confirmed the tip and explained he had personally viewed the sites. Based
on the log, Softich said Jeffrey Ziegler’s office computer had accessed the site.701 Next, Agent
Kennedy interviewed William Schneider, an employee for the IT department. Schneider
confirmed Softich’s findings and reported he had “spot checked” the cache files on Ziegler’s
computer and it revealed images of child pornography. Subsequent events, however, were
disputed by the parties. Softich and Schneider claimed that Agent Kennedy instructed them to
make a copy of Ziegler’s hard drive. Conversely, Agent Kennedy claimed he was told by Softich
that the IT department had made a backup file and therefore, Agent Kennedy instructed them to
ensure its protection.702 On January 20, 2001, Softich and Schneider obtained a key to Ziegler’s
office, entered the office, and made two copies of the hard drive. Frontline’s counsel, Michael
Freeman, contacted Agent Kennedy and stated they would cooperate with the FBI during their
investigation and that a search warrant would be unnecessary. Agent Kennedy received Ziegler’s
computer and one of the copies of the hard drive on February 5, 2001.703
Ziegler argued that the evidence obtained from his workplace computer violated his Fourth
Amendment freedom for unreasonable search and seizures.704 The Court of Appeals stated for
Fourth Amendment protections to be applicable, “an expectation of privacy must be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”705 The Court concluded Ziegler had no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy on his computer in the workplace; as a result, no
search implicating the Fourth Amendment had occurred.706 The Court reasoned, “The workplace
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computer was company-owned; Frontline’s computer policy included routine monitoring, a right
of access by the employer, and a prohibition against private use by its employees.”707
20. U.S. v. Scott (K-S)
Raymond Scott was arrested for drug possession and then released.708 As part of his release,
Scott was required to comply with random drug testing and allow his home to be randomly
searched by a peace officer without a warrant. Sometime later, an informant tipped officers that
Scott might have been using drugs. As a result, State officers went to Scott’s house and
administered a urine test. The test concluded Scott was on methamphetamines. The officers
arrested him and searched his house, which revealed an unregistered shotgun.709
Scott moved to suppress the shotgun and any statements made at the scene.710 The district
court granted Scott’s motion because officers needed probable cause to justify the warrantless
search. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined if the searches were valid based on
the consent given during his release. When considering Fourth Amendment search and seizures,
the Court of Appeals turned to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy concept and further
decided the searches are on valid if they were conducted reasonably.711 To determine
reasonableness, the Court turned to whether the searches were supported by probable cause,
special needs doctrine, or “totality of the circumstances” approach. Ultimately, the Court
answered these various components in the negative. Thus, the Court agreed with the district
court’s decision in that there is no evidence to support the search, which means the statements
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made by Scott and the shotgun was correctly suppressed.712 In sum, the Court found an unlawful
search had occurred.
21. Johnson v. Hawe (K-NS)
On January 28, 2000, Johnson videotaped his friends at Sequim’s skateboard park and an
interaction they had with Chief Nelson.713 Chief Nelson arrived on the scene in his patrol car and
was looking for a missing juvenile. Johnson approached the vehicle from the passenger side.
Nelson rolled down the passenger window and asked what Johnson was doing. Johnson did not
say anything, but continued to face the camera at Nelson. Unbeknownst to Nelson, Johnson had
powered his camera down. Nelson told Johnson to stop because Johnson “did not have [ ]
permission to record [him] and … it was a violation of the law to record conversations without
consent.”714 Nelson then gave a second warning and then left the vehicle in order to retrieve the
camera. There was a physical struggle, but with the help of Nelson’s back-up officer, they placed
Johnson under arrest. Johnson had spent three days in jail before being charged of violating the
Washington Privacy Act of recording communication without permission and resisting arrest. 715
Johnson appealed and argued that the actions against him violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights.716 The Court of Appeals held that the conversation Chief Nelson was having
with dispatch did not qualify for Fourth Amendment protection.717 The Court provided three
reasons for this finding. First, the Washington’s Privacy Act does not prohibit or criminalize the
public from recording police while they are on duty. 718 Second, the Court reasoned that Chief

712

Scott, 450 F.3d at 874-875.
Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 670 (9th Cir. 2004).
714
Id. at 680.
715
Id.
716
Id.
717
Id. at 683.
718
Id.
713

146

Nelson had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he was in a public area, with his
vehicle window rolled down, and knew that Johnson had a camera when he approached the
vehicle.719 Third, the Court stated Chief Nelson lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
communications with dispatch.720 The Court stated, “Because the communications over Chief
Nelson’s police radio could be commonly monitored, overhead, and recorded by other officers
and private citizens owning scanning devices, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in
those communications.”721 Furthermore, the Court concluded Nelson’s arrest lacked probable
cause which ultimately violated Johnson’s Fourth Amendment right.722 In sum, no search had
occurred.
22. Callahan v. Millard County (K-S)
Police raided the residence of defendant Callahan on March 19, 2002.723 Police had received
a tip from a confidential informant (“CI”) that Callahan was selling and distributing
methamphetamines. The “CI” had been invited to Mr. Callahan’s home to try a “test” sample.
The officers learned that the “CI” had been drinking before heading over to the residence and
was intoxicated. Despite his inebriated state, police attached a wire to the informant and gave
him a marked $100 bill. When the “CI” was inside the house, he completed the transaction, and
then gave the signal.724 The signal alerted officers to enter the house, and they ordered the
residents to drop to the ground, including the informant. Mr. Callahan dropped a small plastic
bag, which was later revealed to contain methamphetamines. A search of the house revealed
evidence of drug sales, drug syringes, and methamphetamines. The police did not have a
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warrant.725 The Court of Appeals held that Mr. Callahan’s rights were in fact violated.726
Furthermore, the Court reasoned Mr. Callahan had not consented to the officers’ entry, and the
consent given to the informant could not be interpreted to extend to the officers. As a result of a
lack of a search warrant or exigent circumstances, the Court concluded the search and seizure
was illegal.
23. U.S. v. Hatfield (K-NS)
On October 10, 2000, police received an anonymous tip that Hatfield had been growing
marijuana.727 In response, Lieutenant Tim McCullum and Deputy Linda Sinclaire were sent to
Hatfield’s residence. Once at the scene, they decided to split up. Deputy Sinclaire went to the
front door on the north side of the house and McCullum walked to the parking pad located on the
southern side of the house, near a pickup truck.728 McCullum waited in this area so that he could
see individuals in case they exited the house through the backyard.729 When he heard Hatfield
had answered the door, McCullum left his position and returned to the squad car.
Sinclaire informed Hatfield of the tip they had received and asked permission to search the
premises.730 Hatfield refused. McCullum and Sinclaire radioed in to their superior and explained
the events which had transpired. In the meantime, Deputy Dale Harrold had overheard the
conversation on the radio and met with the other two officers at the scene. Deputy Harrold
reached Hatfield’s residence, and walked about fifty to sixty feet alongside the fenced property
to get a vantage point.731 At this point, Deputy Harrold could look into Hatfield’s backyard and
was able to make out marijuana being grown from inside a chicken coop and behind a tin shed.
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To get a better view, Officer Harrold walked south along the fence, back toward Hatfield’s
house, and from a particular vantage point he confirmed that marijuana was, in fact, being grown
on Hatfield’s property.732 Hatfield also walked on the inside of the fence and noticed Deputy
Harrold and began yelling at the officer for trespassing. Deputy Harrold placed Hatfield under
arrest for growing marijuana. While police secured the premises, Deputy Harrold left and
obtained a search warrant.733
Hatfield claimed that Officer Harrold’s observation of Hatfield’s backyard was a search
under the Fourth Amendment.734 The Court of Appeals held that Officer Harrold’s observation
into the backyard and discovery of the marijuana did not constitute a search.735 The Court
reasoned Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to the home and its curtilage from
“ordinary visual surveillance.”736 Therefore, the Court concluded Hatfield had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the observations made by Officer Harrold from the vantage point where
he detected the marijuana in Hatfield’s backyard.737
24. McClish v. Nugent (K-S)
Deputies Shawn Terry and Clifford Groves responded to a complaint between neighbors
Holmberg and Padzur.738 Furthermore, the complaint did not mention McClish, who was not at
home when the deputies arrived at the scene. The argument started over a property dispute.
McClish had reason to believe that the neighbors had encroached on his property line. When
McClish arrived home, he was angry that deputies were on his property. After McClish shouted
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profanities at the deputies, they stepped over to Padzur’s property.739 The Padzurs explained to
the deputies that Holmberg and McClish had issued threats to harm their family, fire guns into
the air, and shout profanities at them. McClish denied the accusations. During the deputies’
interview with the Padzurs, McClish got back into his car and drove past the property, and yelled
some profane language out the window.740
Deputy Terry reviewed the phone records at the Sheriff’s Office and in conjunction with the
statements he had received from the neighbors and personal observations, Terry concluded he
had probable cause to arrest McClish.741 Later than night, Deputies Terry, Calderone, and K-9
handlers Martinez and Magnum, returned to arrest McClish. Vehicle access to McClish’s
property was extremely limited because of an electronic gate. However, McClish did give an
electronic “clicker” to a neighbor, Lanny Baum, with the instruction to never give the “clicker”
to anyone. That night, Baum either left the gate open for the officers or lent them the “clicker” to
gain access to the residence. According to Deputy Terry, he and Calderone went up to the
residence, knocked on the door, and told McClish it was the Sherriff’s Office. McClish then
stepped out, and Terry arrested him.742 Conversely, McClish stated in district court that Terry
was standing directly in the front door and forcibly grabbed and pulled him out onto the porch. In
any event, Holmberg was also arrested for resisting an officer without violence. McClish argued
that Deputy Terry violated his Fourth Amendment rights during the arrest.
The Court of Appeals held that the arrest was unlawful and violated McClish’s Fourth
Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.743 The Court reasoned
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“McClish did not completely surrender or forfeit every reasonable expectation of privacy when
he opened the door, including, most notably, the right to be secure within his home from a
warrantless arrest.”744 A Fourth Amendment search and seizure occurred.
25. U.S. v. Young (K-NS)
Raymond Young had applied and received a particular certificate known as a “637
certificate” to buy and sell “off-road” fuel, which included fuel for marine use in the spring of
1987.745 He had stated to an IRS agent that he owned a nautical vessel; however, Young sold his
boat four months prior to obtaining his certificate. Young had begun the elaborate plan to
purchase tax-free fuel and sell it to cash-only retailers and trucking companies. IRS Agent
Sutherland interviewed Young on April 30, 1991. According to Sutherland, Young had hinted at
bribing him. As a result, the IRS Inspection Service arranged for Agent Sutherland to wear a
wire during the next interview with Young.746 During the second meeting, Sutherland found
Young’s invoices to be very suspicious. At the third interview, Agent Sutherland revoked
Young’s 637 certificate.
Meanwhile, IRS Agent Ruka continued investigations against Young through a different
approach.747 Agent Ruka had contacted Federal Express and asked the operational manager for
assistance in permitting IRS and United States Customs to view packages sent for and by Young
and Ahmed, the co-defendant in this case. They agreed and without a warrant, IRS x-rayed
several packages. The x-rays revealed the packages contained large amounts of currency. This
evidence was used to apply for a search warrant for a residence owned by Young.
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Young argued that the search and seizure of the packages violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. The Court of Appeals held that the IRS’ actions and Federal Express’ handing over the
packages for x-ray did not violate Young’s Fourth Amendment rights.748 The Court reasoned that
“No reasonable person would expect to retain his or her privacy interest in a packaged shipment
after signing an airbill containing an explicit, written warning that the carrier is authorized to act
in direct contravention to that interest.”749 Furthermore, the Court explained Federal Express’
package policy, which states to not ship cash and the contents of packages may be inspected at
any time. The Court reasoned based on their policy, this further “eliminated any expectation of
privacy” from within the package.750 Accordingly, no search occurred by government officials in
the first place.
26. U.S. v. Lee (K-NS)
Robert Lee was the president and co-founder of the International Boxing Federation (IBF)
which is a credited organization responsible for publishing the ratings of various boxers and
announcing the champion.751 These ratings are important because they determine who gets to
fight for the championship. The FBI began an investigation into the Lee’s company for
scamming and rigging the ratings. In May 1997, C. Douglas Beavers was questioned by the FBI
and then agreed to cooperate. Beavers explained he had solicited and accepted various bribes
while working for IBF. The FBI created a sting operation where they used Beavers to arrange a
meeting with Lee at a hotel room that had both audio and visual recording equipment.752 The FBI
relied heavily on Beavers’ consent and did not obtain a warrant for the operation. The FBI only
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recorded when Beavers was present in the room and accordingly, shut off the equipment when
Beavers left.753 Lee was later indicted, charged, and convicted of receiving bribes.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the FBI’s use of restraint by only
recording and surveying when Beavers was in the room aligned with Lee’s expectation of
privacy and therefore, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.754 The Court reasoned since
Beavers was invited into the hotel by Lee, Lee lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy when
Beavers was present in the room.755 Furthermore, the Court explained that the FBI solely used
the recording equipment to monitor their conversation when Beavers was present.756 In sum, the
Court found that the FBI did not violate Lee’s Fourth Amendment rights, therefore, no search
occurred.
27. U.S. v. Warshak (K-S)
Steven Warshak owned various small businesses in 2001 classified as a “nutraceuticals”
company.757 Later, the businesses were combined to create Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals,
Inc. This company was in charge of the product known as Enzyte, which was the male
enhancement supplement. The product was advertised through various media outlets, including
television commercials, radio, and eventually printed ads.758 The ads claimed a 96% satisfaction
rating; however, this was later revealed by James Teegarden, the Chief Operating Officer, to be
false.759 Teegarden stated he was asked to find 500 names in the database and then mark 475 of
them as satisfied to create the fabricated statistic. Finally, the ads also purported that the product
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was endorsed by a Dr. Fredrick Thomkins from Stanford and Dr. Michael Moore from
Harvard.760 Later, investigations revealed these doctors’ names were also fabricated.761
Berkeley also had its customers under an automatic shipping program, which continued to
charge the customer and ship the products until the customer notified the company to stop.762
The Better Business Bureau (BBB) contacted Berkeley due to the high volume of complaints
about customers’ inability to cancel the automatic shipping program.763 As a response, Berkeley
began recording and monitoring the interactions with the call center representatives and
customers. However, this response proved to be ineffective because representatives failed to
provide proper disclosure and customers continued ordering the product over the internet, which
failed to notify them of the automatic shipping program.764
In 2004, the President of the BBB mailed Warshak about the complaints. 765 Meanwhile, the
Berkeley Company experienced an enormous amount of “chargebacks,” which caused the loss of
Warshak’s merchant account.766 “Chargebacks” occur when customers dispute a charge.
Berkeley was able to get other merchant accounts; however, this was successfully done after
Warshak and his wife applied to numerous banks, and falsely stated they had never had a
merchant account terminated.767 Because of the problem of chargebacks, Warshak devised a ruse
to inflate the number of transactions through a process of diluting the transactions which would,
in turn, reduce the “chargeback” ratio. One approach included splitting up a single charge into
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two charges, also known as “double-dinging.”768 Another strategy involved employees making
small credit transactions using Warshak’s personal credit card. As part of the investigation, the
government requested Warshak’s ISP provider (NuVox) to maintain copies of his emails.769
Additionally, this requested prevented NuVox from informing Warshak of the government’s
actions. This request was submitted in October 2004, and in January 2005, NuVox received a
subpoena to hand over the emails.770 An additional mandate from the court ordered NuVox to
submit any supplementary emails. Warshak did not receive any notice until May 2006. 771
In court, Warshak argued that warrantless seizure of his private emails violated his Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.772 The Court held that Warshak
did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails.773 The Court reasoned email was
analogous to a letter or phone call, and therefore the government cannot compel an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) to turn over the emails without a warrant.774 Consequently, a search under
the Fourth Amendment had occurred. However, the Court held that although the government
violated Warshak’s Fourth Amendment right through the warrantless seizure of his emails, the
emails themselves were not subject to exclusion because the government acted in good-faith of
the Stored Communications Act (SCA).775
28. U.S. v. Cuevas-Perez (K-NS)
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Juan Cuevas-Perez was being investigated by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) of operating a drug distribution ring in 2008.776 ICE agents installed a pole camera
outside the residence of Cuevas-Perez to easily monitor his movements. This footage revealed he
owned a jeep. On February 6, 2009, Detective Shay attached a warrantless GPS tracking device
onto the Jeep while it was in a public area.777 Cuevas-Perez traveled to New Mexico, Texas,
Oklahoma, Missouri, and Illinois. During his time in Missouri, the GPS device began to run low
on power.778 Shay contacted a regional ICE agent and asked them to continue visual surveillance.
Once Cuevas-Perez entered Illinois, Illinois State Police (“ISP”) took over visual surveillance.
ICE agents instructed ISP to find a reason to pull over Cuevas-Perez and after 40 miles of
tracking him, ISP pulled him over for a minor traffic violation.779 A trained K-9 was sent to the
scene and the dog motioned to the handler that there were drugs present. A search of the Jeep
revealed heroin packed in secret compartments in the vehicle.780
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on Knotts precedent and held that the
placement of the GPS device on Cuevas-Perez’s vehicle did not constitute a search and therefore,
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.781 The Court explained the surveillance was not
lengthy (60 hours total) and therefore did not expose various aspects of Cuevas-Perez’s life.782
Additionally, this was all done during one continuous journey along public thoroughfares, which
was found to not be a search in Knotts. Furthermore, the purpose of the GPS device was strictly
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to track the defendant’s, Cuevas-Perez, movements as he travelled across the country.783 In sum,
the actions of ICE agent did not constitute a search.
29. U.S. v. Ward (K-NS)
Ward had contacted his mother after escaping custody.784 Federal marshals learned of his
whereabouts and notified two deputies of where his mother lived. When they arrived, they
discovered that Ward’s car had departed. The Federal marshals and local law enforcement
searched nearby motel parking lots for a maroon Buick. They found a vehicle that matched the
description at a Days Inn parking lot. The clerk explained that Ward was not a registered
guest.785 The marshals conducted a stake-out of the car and waited for Ward to reappear. When
Ward returned to the scene, the marshals moved in, but he managed to enter his vehicle and take
off. Marshals did not chase him because they feared he would cause an accident. They found his
vehicle at another motel and the manager confirmed that Ward was staying there. They obtained
a key to the room and knocked and announced their presence and entered the room. The
marshals found a bag with a firearm, ammo, an address book, and a pharmacy card.786 Ward was
eventually arrested in the nearby town of Midland. Ward pled guilty in district court, but retained
his right to appeal. Ward argued the evidence found in his motel room should be suppressed.787
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the marshals’ warrantless search of his
motel room and the bag did not violate Ward’s rights.788 The Court first stated the implications
for the different, possible statuses of Ward. If Ward was considered to share the status of a
probationer or parolee, then he would harbor a diminished expectation of privacy that “could be
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outweighed by government interests.”789 Conversely, if the status of Ward is more aligned with
that of a prisoner, then under Katz, “a prisoner cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment because
society is not prepared to recognize a prisoner’s expectation of privacy in his prison cell.”790
Finally, the court explained that since Ward’s status was that of an escaped prisoner, there was
enough probable cause for police to arrest him, search his dwelling (i.e., the motel room), and the
bag without a warrant.791 A search did not occur under the particular facts of this case.
30. U.S. v. Ramirez (K-NS)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Special Agent Hugas received a tip from a
paid informant, Martin Delgado, that a white Chevy Cavalier would deliver a large quantity of
marijuana.792 Delgado was an occupant of the Cavalier and he gave Agent Hugas the specific
timeframe and course of travel. The ICE agents found the Cavalier and followed it to 420
Esperanza. To get a better vantage, the agents drove past the property. Special Agent Hugas was
able to see over the gate from the new position and he saw two men, Jose and Nelson Ramirez,
allow access to the Cavalier onto their property.793 Delgado exited the vehicle, and began
unloading the contents of the vehicle (i.e., marijuana bundles). After they had completed their
task, Delgado and his cousin reentered their vehicle and exited the property. Next, a Southern
Union Gas truck was seen entering the premises, driven by Jesus Ramirez. After thirty to forty
minutes of surveillance, the agents approached the property.794 When they encountered Jose and
Nelson, the ICE agents explained they had reason to believe there were narcotics on the
premises. ICE agents presented a consent to search form to Jose. Jose signed the consent form
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and the subsequent search revealed no marijuana on the ground floor of the house or the
carport.795 The ICE agents then asked for consent to search the apartments located above the
carport. The apartments were owned by Vanessa and Jose Garcia, who granted permission to the
agents to search. Agents found large rolls of shrink wrap which they believed to be used for
drug paraphernalia. The agents then decided to examine the canal near the residence.796
At the canal, agents discovered loose bundles of marijuana wrapped in cellophane and black
plastic bags.797 When questioned about the marijuana, Jose denied ever knowing about it and
accused the Garcias’ of handling it. Agent Hugas explained in court that because no one had seen
either Jose or Nelson handle the marijuana the agents lacked probable cause to arrest, so they left
the residence.798 Agent Martinez returned the next morning and seized an additional 182 pounds
of marijuana from the canal. In July 2002, Agents Hugas interviewed Juan Cardenas and
explained he (Juan) was seen helping unload the white Cavalier of marijuana. Before Cardenas
agreed to aid the investigation against the Ramirez family, he was unfortunately deported. He did
not return to the United States until October 2003.799 Cardenas was later arrested and his
testimonial statements were used to indict Jose, Nelson, and Jesus of drug possession with intent
to distribute. Jose and Nelson pled not guilty, while their brother, Jesus, pled guilty.800 They were
convicted and Jose and Nelson appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Ramirez brothers had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the balcony of the carport.801 The Court reasoned this area was
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accessible to anyone since it was the only way to enter the upstairs and there were no measures
taken to restrict access. Also, the Court agreed with the district court’s analysis concluding that
the canal was part of the “open fields” outside the curtilage of the home.802 Since Agent Hugas
was standing on a lawful vantage point, the Ramirez family lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy when Agent Hugas saw into the canal.803 Thus, the Court found that the Ramirez
brothers also lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the canal area; accordingly, a search
under the Fourth Amendment did not occur.
31. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon (K-S)
Jeff Quon was part of a Special Weapons and Tactics unit for the Ontario Police
Department.804 In 2001, the City awarded the police department new pagers capable of sending
and receiving text messages. As a result, the City put a limit on the number of characters sent or
received per month. Before distributing the pagers, the City announced a new computer policy.
Although the language of the policy did not appear to cover text messages, the City explicitly
stated it would treat text messages the same as emails.805 During Quon’s first couple of billing
cycles, Quon had exceeded his monthly text message allotment. Lieutenant Duke reminded Quon
that the city treated the messages as emails and he could be audited. Quon wrote a check to
reimburse the City for the fees. The next few months, Quon exceeded his limits again and each
time he reimbursed the city. Duke notified Chief Scharf of what was going on and that he was
“tired of being a bill collector.”806 To investigate if the monthly allotment was too low, he
requested to the see the text message transcripts of officers who exceeded the limit. Arch
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Wireless provided the transcripts. Duke reviewed the transcripts and discovered that Quon’s
messages were not work related, and some were sexually explicit. Duke presented his findings to
Chief Scharf, who referred the matter to internal affairs.807
The United States Supreme Court held that regardless of the expectation of privacy that Quon
may have had related to the text messages, the “search” did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights.808 The Court reasoned that the search was justified because there were “reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search [was] necessary for [a] noninvestigatory work-related
purpose.”809 Furthermore, the Court reasoned the scope of the search was also reasonable due to
its efficiency and the purpose. It was also viewed as not “excessively intrusive.”810 A search
occurred, but it was deemed reasonable and did not violate Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights.
32. U.S. v. Crawford (K-S)
Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent David Bowdich was in charge of investigating
a series of bank robberies in San Diego between 1997 and 1998.811 Approximately two years
after receiving his assignment, Bowdich received a tip from an unnamed source that one of the
participants in the most recent robber of the Bank of America on Ulrich Street went by the name
of Ralphie Rabbit. Special Agent Bowdich later believed Ralphie Rabbit was an alias for
Raphyal Crawford. Upon further investigations, Bowdich learned Crawford was on state parole
with the special condition where Crawford had signed away his Fourth Amendment rights
through a “Fourth Waiver.”812
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Special Agent Bowdich explained the “Fourth Waiver” was a tool used against suspects to
help them “talk” about crimes. As a result, Bowdich contacted Crawford’s parole agent, Carl
Berner, explained the situations, and obtained his permission to conduct a parole search of
Crawford’s residence.813 Bowdich conducted the parole search on July 27, 2000 with the
assistance of four other law enforcement officers. Crawford’s sister, Abdullah, answered the
door when the officers knocked on the door. They explained their intentions to Abdullah and she
pointed them to the room where Crawford was asleep with his eighteen month old daughter.814
Officers entered the room with weapons drawn, told Crawford they were conducting a parole
search, removed him from the bedroom and escorted him to the couch, and the officers
administered the search. The search lasted approximately 50 minutes long. As planned, no
physical evidence was obtained from the search; however, this gave Bowdich the opportunity to
converse with Crawford. Toward the end of their conversation, Bowdich suggested they move
their chat to the FBI office so as to eliminate any distractions or the possibility of a creative
defense attorney claiming coercive atmosphere with five officers.815 Crawford agreed. At the FBI
office, Crawford was placed in an interview room, where he was free to leave at any time, but
the door was closed so as to keep the setting private. Bowdich began to read the Miranda rights
and Crawford interrupted. Bowdich assured Crawford he was not in custody and could leave at
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any time, but Bowdich never completed stating the Miranda rights.816 Ultimately, Crawford
admitted to being part of the robbery with a weapon.
The Court held that “after examining the totality of the circumstances-including Crawford’s
parole status, the parole condition, the location of the search, Crawford’s expectation of privacy
in his own home, the state’s interest in rehabilitating parolees, and the interest of both the state
and federal government in preventing and punishing recidivist crimes-we hold that a search of a
parolee’s home pursuant to a parole condition is reasonable only if it supported by reasonable
suspicion.”817 However, based on the information stated previously, the Court ruled that law
enforcement officials did not have reasonable suspicion. The Court agreed with the district
court’s analysis that there was an overall lack of reasonable suspicion to believe evidence of a
criminal activity would have been present during the search, which consequently, made law
enforcement not have the desired burden of proof to conduct the parole search, thus making the
parole search illegal.818
33. U.S. v. Scott (K-S)
Scott was released on his own recognizance after being arrested for drug possession
crimes.819 A condition of his release involved him consenting to the random drug tests,
regardless of the time of day or night and by any peace officer with or without a warrant.
Additionally, said peace officer may conduct a search of his home for drugs at any time of day or
night, with or without a warrant.820 Officers received an anonymous tip that Scott may have had
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some drugs. Officers went to his house and administered a drug test. Scott tested positive for
methamphetamines, which the officers then searched his house and they found a shotgun.821
The Court held that Scott’s drug test violated his Fourth Amendment rights.822 The Court
explained that Scott’s consent to a search, as part of his release, is only lawful depending on the
reasonableness of the search.823 The government needed probable cause to administer the drug
test and therefore the search of the house and the seizure of the shotgun, which relied on the drug
test being positive to establish probable cause, were illegal. The Court concluded searches did
occur; however, they were invalid as they lacked probable cause.824
34. Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Pimpare (K-NS)
James Knott is the President of Riverdale Mills Corporation in charge of making steel wired
related products.825 As part of the manufacturing process, alkaline and other toxic chemicals are
created. Riverdale Mills Corporation has an agreement to dump the wastewater into the public
sewer system as long as the company took the necessary steps to properly neutralize the harmful
chemicals.826 These steps include using a testing area (Manhole 1) which is two feet deep and
eventually flows into the public area (Manhole 2) which is 300 feet away. All parties consider
Manhole 1 as the testing area for Riverdale Mills Corporation as it is located on street they claim
to be on their property.827 Manhole 2 is not claimed and thus deemed as being the public. On
July, 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received an anonymous tip that the
plant may be dumping untreated wastewater due to a malfunction in the plant’s treatment
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facility.828 The EPA sent Inspectors Pimpare and Granz to investigate the allegation on October,
21, 1997. When they arrived at the factory, they did not have a warrant. Inspector Pimpare asked
President Knott if they could investigate the wastewater treatment facility to which he replied
yes, as long as they are with him or someone designated by him.829 Knott took the inspectors to
the treatment plant where they conducted some testing. After the first round of testing was
completed, Knott took the inspectors on a small tour of the facility.
After finishing the tour, both parties dispute the events which occurred next. According
to Pimpare and Granz, they asked to return to the treatment area to conduct more tests, and Knott
allowed it.830 On the other hand, Knott claimed he did not give them consent to return to the
treatment area. The second round of testing was later used to obtain a search warrant of the
facility and eventually a criminal warrant.831 Knott moved to suppress the evidence obtained
during the rounds of testing. The district court suppressed the evidence obtained in the second
round of testing, claiming the inspectors went beyond the scope of consent given by Knott.832 In
response, Knott brought a civil action law suit against the EPA for violating his Fourth
Amendment rights. The district court denied Granz’s and Pimpare’s qualified immunity claim.833
The defendants appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Riverdale Mills Corporation lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy when the wastewater was in the Manhole 1.834 The Court
reasoned that the wastewater will “inevitably” and “irretrievably” flow into the public area (i.e.
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Manhole 2). The Court explained this is very similar to trash being left on the curb, where they
have held in the past no one is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.835 Based on this,
the Court reasoned “Riverdale had abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the
wastewater by allowing it to flow irretrievably into a place where it will be ‘exposed’ … to the
public.”836 Thus, the Court found that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred and the
actions by the inspectors were not a search.
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Chapter 5 – Discussion and Conclusion
The Court in Jones in 2012 significantly renewed the old definition of a search under the
Fourth Amendment by reintroducing the common law trespass test to the largely accepted and
well-established reasonable expectation of privacy test laid out by the 1960s-era Katz decision.
In Jones, the United States Supreme Court’s holding depended on the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment search law. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court and stated, “It is important
to be clear what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for
the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would
have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”837 Justice Scalia
went on to further describe a strong association between the written text of the Fourth
Amendment and persons and property (i.e., houses, papers, and effects).838 This focused reading
of the Fourth Amendment bolstered the majority’s opinion in returning to the trespass doctrine as
a lens through which to evaluate Fourth Amendment searches. Thus, in Jones, the Court
narrowly held that the warrantless installation of a GPS device to monitor a suspect is a search
and, more broadly, revived the idea of the government physically intruding on private property
as being considered a search.839
In doing so, the Court added another level of protection associated with Fourth
Amendment searches, which both the police and the courts must now consider. This addition has
had the effect of strengthening individual rights as well as alerting law enforcement to newer
constraints they must consider in respect to possible Fourth Amendment intrusion. The propertybased approach in Jones to considering Fourth Amendment searches is in addition to the
837
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aforementioned reasonable expectation of privacy lens from Katz through which police and
courts must still continue to evaluate searches under the Fourth Amendment (i.e., Jones retained
Katz the privacy notion as a criterion for determining if a Fourth Amendment search has
occurred).840
In particular, prior to the Jones decision, the Katz test was used as the benchmark
precedent to determine if a police search for Fourth Amendment purposes had occurred. It would
only be found to be a search if the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy had been intruded
upon.841 Considering the status of search inquiries prior to the Jones decision helps lay a
foundation for studying the changes and trends in Fourth Amendment search law. Spanning 10
years before the Jones case was decided, 34 cases were decided to be relevant to this study. Of
these 34, the courts found no search had occurred in more cases than they found a search had
occurred. In fact, only 47% of the cases studied (16) found that a search had occurred (and
therefore the citizen’s rights were protected under the Fourth Amendment), and 53% of the cases
studied (18) found that no search had occurred (thereby offering no protection for the citizens
under the Fourth Amendment).
The Jones case itself brought to light specifically police use of GPS technology without a
warrant, and how this new technology may impact citizens’ rights through the collection of
private information for possible future use in court. In terms of the balance between citizens’
privacy rights and increased availability of technological tools for police to detect and prevent
crime, the United States Supreme Court, in Jones, appeared to “tilt” this balance towards
citizens’ privacy and individual rights by determining that police placement of a GPS device on
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the undercarriage of an individual’s vehicle constitutes a physical trespass and, hence, a search of
that individual under the Fourth Amendment.842
However, this finding by the Court in Jones does not represent a revolutionary new idea.
In fact, originally, Fourth Amendment search questions under the Court’s jurisprudence had been
governed by a trespass test until the late 1960s when the Katz test emerged, and with it, the
apparent, official elimination of the trespass test.843 This elimination was partially due to the fact
that the United States Supreme Court, at the time of the Katz decision, believed that the trespass
test no longer had a place in Fourth Amendment search analyses with the growth and increased
use by police of advanced technologies, including wiretaps. In particular, the United States
Supreme Court in Katz decided that the trespass doctrine had no place in an era of intangible
items, and, thus, created the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.844
This maneuver effectively killed at the time the trespass doctrine as an analytical approach to
determining Fourth Amendment searches.
In today’s world, however, one possible benefit for reintroducing the trespass test to the
Katz test, and using it as another lens through which to evaluate Fourth Amendment searches,
would be so that the law could attempt to keep up with further advancements and changes in
technology. In the modern era, society as a whole has become increasingly interconnected to the
point that individuals within that society arguably have a diminished expectation of privacy.
Thus, one possible benefit resulting from the modification of the Katz test could be increased
protection of individuals’ Fourth Amendment interests; that is, even in those instances where
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individuals lack a reasonable expectation of privacy, they may still retain Fourth Amendment
protections as a result of intrusions by police onto their physical property.
This fundamental change in Fourth Amendment search law as a result of Jones has been
accompanied by not only certain, distinct advantages, but also several disadvantages or problems
for courts, especially during the transition phase. For example, in terms of the advantages, lower
courts (i.e., courts below the United States Supreme Court) now have a means of analyzing
Fourth Amendment searches in situations where the Katz test could not reasonably apply.845 This
is a unique opportunity for lower courts to have more flexibility of adapting and tailoring the
Jones “trespass” test to apply to variety of unique factual situations. For example, in Lavan v.
City of Los Angeles, the homeless Appellees had no reasonable expectation in the property they
left on the curb; however, the Court ruled that the city’s actions were tantamount to search and
seizure after the city’s employees “meaningfully interfered with the Appellees’s possessory
interest in that property.”846 As another example, in Grady v. North Carolina, the United States
Supreme Court explained the monitoring system set up to track sex offenders was tantamount to
a search because the purpose was to obtain information “by physically intruding on a subject’s
body.”847 This flexibility allows the Jones decision to be more widely applicable, as well as
assist in offering more protection against the use of technology encroaching upon individual
citizens’ rights.
Conversely, the Jones decision has also created a certain level of ambiguity among lower
courts, as well. The United States Supreme Court’s holding in Jones provided little clarity on
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whether there were any circumstances to allow a warrantless GPS device or whether the decision
would be applicable retroactively. Furthermore, Jones did not elaborate on what lower courts
should do in the situation where one test, such as Jones test, would find a search, but the other
test, such as the Katz test, would not.848 Additionally, the previous use by police of now-largely
obsolete technology, such as beeper technology, had previously been found by the Court to not
constitute a search.849 If law enforcement were to strategically return to using these more
outdated technological devices, in particular, without first obtaining a warrant, it is unclear
whether this conduct would be allowed under Jones, as the Jones decision was specific to GPS
devices and attaching those physically to a vehicle. These unanswered questions and gaps in the
law have left the lower courts with little guidance until future cases are decided by the United
States Supreme Court resolving these issues.
Concerning specific problems arising from the Jones decision, the paradigm shift in
Fourth Amendment search law reflected in Jones has led circuit courts to encounter certain cases
during the transition phase. For example, certain circuit court cases included in this study
consisted of facts which occurred before the Jones decision, but the case had not yet been heard
or decided until after the Jones decision. Prior to Jones, the majority of circuit courts had ruled
that the warrantless placement and use by police of a GPS device on the undercarriage of a
vehicle did not constitute a search.850
In particular, due to this retroactivity issue, many federal appellate court cases (14, 24%)
in this study decided after Jones fell under the umbrella of “binding-appellate precedent,” which
848
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reduced somewhat the overall amount of data for the study. After removing the “bindingappellate precedent” cases, 38 cases from the federal appellate courts were left that cited either
Jones, Katz, or both. Of the 38 cases reviewed, 11 used Jones and physical trespass as the
requirements for a search, 11 used Katz and the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine as the
requirements for a search, and 16 used both. Of the 11 cases using Jones, all were found to have
determined a police search occurred. Of the 11 cases using Katz, 27.2% (3) were found to have
decided a police search transpired and 72.8% (8) found no search occurred. Of the remaining 16
cases, which used both tests, 37.5% (6) of the cases found searches and 62.5% (10) of the cases
found no search.
This research revealed that the category created by the study with the largest number of
cases following Jones is “Both” (i.e., 16 cases). Courts were using a combination of both tests to
solve various Fourth Amendment search inquiries instead of either solely Katz or Jones (i.e., 16
Both “versus” 11 Jones “versus” 11 Katz). However, majority of the courts in the study in the
aftermath of Jones are using a single test or “lens” to evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment
search had occurred (i.e., 22 courts “versus” 16 courts). There is a possible explanation for why
courts may be preferring a single “lens” versus the dual “lens”: Simplicity. Generally speaking,
when the case involved a GPS device being used to monitor a suspect’s whereabouts or property
rights, the Jones test was used.851 However, in other specific instances, such as involving a
search of a defendant’s home, both tests were typically used.852 This proves to be promising, as
these courts are not completely forgoing the former Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test,
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but instead are doing as the United States Supreme Court in Jones appears to have wished in
using both tests, either solely or in tandem, to solve Fourth Amendment search inquiries.
Of the cases which used both types of tests, a majority (10 cases or 62.5%) found no
search had occurred. This would suggest that the courts who considered both Jones and Katz
together are leaning more to a pro-law enforcement, crime control model in the wake of Jones.
When looking at the aggregate of decisions made post-Jones, though, another picture becomes
clear. Overall, 20 (52.6%) of the cases post-Jones found that searches had occurred, thus
suggesting a slight favoring of a due-process, rights-focused approach following Jones. This
information is interesting as, previously mentioned, there was a majority of cases where no
search had occurred when using solely Katz or a combination of both tests (i.e., 9 courts finding
a search “versus” 18 courts finding no search). Additionally, when comparing the pre-Jones data,
18 (53%) of the cases examined found that no search had occurred. This latter finding suggests
that there was a significant change in the number of search determinations by federal appellate
courts in the period examined prior to and following Jones.
Herbert Packer explained that the viewpoint of the criminal justice systems swings, like a
pendulum, between two different models: crime control and individual’s rights/due process. The
crime control model generally forfeits the rights of the individual in the interest of catching and
punishing as many offenders as possible. The due process model is focused around the protection
of the rights of the accused, even if it means justice in the form of successful apprehensions and
convictions is not being served in individual cases.853 In other words, during time periods
associated more with the crime control model, one should expect that the courts are generally
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more inclined to find no police search has occurred, and hence the accused does not gain Fourth
Amendment protections and in fact may lose them. Conversely, in times more associated with
the due process model, courts generally err on the side of individual protections and rights, and
are more likely to find that a search has occurred, and that the individual’s rights are protected
under the Fourth Amendment.
This “pendulum” may explain pre-Jones findings (i.e. 18 (53%) cases found no search).
After 9/11, the American criminal justice system moved swiftly into a phase where individual
rights were more willingly given up in favor of safety and protection provided by the
government, thereby encroaching further upon traditional citizen’s rights. At this time, courts
moved to supporting police and crime control much more stringently than individual freedoms in
an effort to protect the many (even if it meant intruding further on the rights of the few). The
pendulum, as explained by Packer, was strongly on the crime control side. The cases considered
in this study tracked the decisions of the courts from after 9/11 until the decision of Jones (20022012) as well as cases decided from Jones until May 31, 2015. Based on the post-Jones findings
(i.e. 20 (52.6%) cases found a search), it appears the pendulum has swung away from the crime
control model and toward the due process model (i.e. favoring rights of the individual over trying
to control crime). This would also suggest that courts are following the intent behind the Jones
decision and add another level of protections to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights.
It is important to note that this pendulum model only suggests possible trends. Based on
the data, this concept is not definitive of our courts grossly favoring crime control or due process.
Moreover, the search rate has remained almost the same pre- and post- Jones (i.e., the percentage
of determinations of searches being found to have occurred, remained similar in the period
examined prior to Jones and the period examined after Jones). This finding could suggest that
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the law may be less important to how judges determine case outcomes (i.e., privacy “versus”
trespass test) than other forces. These forces could include philosophical beliefs, decisions
favoring societal norms or policy trends, and the continued “balance” between due process and
crime control. Nevertheless, this concept suggests that in the aftermath of Jones courts are
leaning more toward a due process model.
On a related note, the Katz privacy test is not as concretely defined as the Jones property
test, and indeed privacy is much more of a nebulous idea or concept overall than property. The
lack of concreteness with the Katz privacy test gives the courts flexibility to change the meaning
of a search depending on the model which the criminal justice system is more influenced by at
the time. In contrast, the Jones decision was so specific (e.g., trespass on property or absence
thereof), that any cases that fell under the same factual parameters must be evaluated in the same
or at least fairly similar manner, as there are fairly clear delineations of what is and is not a
search under Jones. Even in a time when crime control is the more favored view, that trend may
be less likely to impact the application of the Jones decision. This may explain why all (100%)
of cases using the Jones trespass test in the study found a police search occurred. That is the
trespass test is more rigid than privacy test. For example, if there is a physical intrusion by police
onto defendant’s property, there is less interpretive room for courts to find no search. Also, this
finding could provide some evidence of a trend consisting of a “backlash” to the erosion of
privacy rights following 9-11. In particular, this may go beyond the law in that it is a societal
response rooted in concerns regarding an all-powerful, unrestrained, intrusive government in the
wake of 9-11.
In addition, in the wake of Jones, many of the federal appellate courts are still relying
upon the Katz test, whether in combination with Jones or alone (71%). This may be because

175

there is more modern precedent available for these courts to rely upon for guidance that either
uses or applies the Katz test (i.e., as opposed to the Jones trespass test), including relevant
precedent from the Supreme Court itself.854 Indeed, Katz had been the sole lens to evaluate
Fourth Amendment searches over the last forty years (i.e., from 1967 to 2012, the year Jones was
decided). As a result, courts have had more recent exposure and familiarity with Katz and are,
therefore, more likely to select its reasonable expectation of privacy test to apply to various
factual scenarios involving police searches under the Fourth Amendment. In turn, given its longterm existence as the sole criterion for evaluating Fourth Amendment search questions, police
are also more familiar with applying the Katz test when they decide whether and how to conduct
searches. If law enforcement is able to effectively understand and apply the law, then it is better
able to work within the guidelines of those laws, including constitutional laws designed to
protect citizens’ rights. To a degree, the federal appellate courts may be aware of these basic
effects of their decisions on police behavior, and accordingly choose Katz as the criterion
because they know police will be better able to apply it.
In addition, the reliance on Katz may be explained by a concern among the federal circuit
courts of avoiding possible findings of reversible error in light of the judicial uncertainties
remaining under Jones. Thus, this may have caused these courts to be somewhat more hesitant
or reserved in their application of Jones, including taking further steps to broaden Jones’
application.855 For example, in U.S. v. Skinner, the Court explained Jones does not apply to the
facts of Skinner because, “the majority opinion’s trespassory test [in Jones]” provides little
guidance on “cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a
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physical invasion on property.856” As future Supreme Court cases further interpret and apply
Jones, more cases may emerge from the federal appellate courts using Jones as the sole criterion
with which to decide Fourth Amendment search questions. Thus, any change in Fourth
Amendment search law as a result of Jones appears likely to be slow and gradual, and notably
not as revolutionary as one may have expected.
Nonetheless, the effects of the change in Fourth Amendment search law following Jones
are beginning to reveal themselves. For example, the United States Supreme Court in Jones
originally applied the trespass doctrine to police use of GPS devices to track the whereabouts of
a suspect’s vehicle. Since Jones, federal appellate court cases and United States Supreme Court
cases have applied the Jones trespass test to cases involving dog sniffs, electronic mail, computer
searches, and other forms of obtaining electronic data, such as cellular data.857 For example, in
Florida v. Jardines, the United States Supreme Court found that police using a dog sniff
technique at the front door of a residence constituted a search. The majority opinion agreed that
this action constituted a search because the officer had trespassed onto Jardines’ property.858 In
U.S. v. Skinner, DEA agents tracked Skinner through his cell phone as it was “pinging” off cell
sites and through GPS technology installed on his cell phone. The Court concluded that no
physical intrusion occurred in this case due to Skinner voluntarily using the cell phone for the
intended purposes of communication. The agents who used the cell-phone GPS technology were
merely taking advantage of technology the defendant chose to use.859

856

U.S. v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (2012)(citing U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 955)).
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.ct. 1409 (2013); Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Circ. 2012); In re
U.S. for Historical Cell Sit e Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Circ. 2013); U.S. v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Circ. 2012).
858
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1418 (2013).
859
U.S. v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 779 (2012).
857

177

On another note, scholars had some major concerns about the addition of the Jones test to
evaluate Fourth Amendment search inquiries. First, scholars worried that the Katz test would
become obsolete with the “new” search test.860 Second, scholars posited that the resurgence of
the property test in Jones may reflect the slow realization by society as a whole that reasonable
expectations of privacy are diminishing as a result of increasing technological
interconnectedness.861 Though where society may be heading with regard to its views on privacy
is beyond the scope of this study, this study’s findings clearly show that Katz has not been
eliminated from Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence; to the contrary, in the wake of Jones,
Katz was applied by many of the courts evaluated in this study either alone or in tandem with
Jones (71%). Additionally, it is important to recognize that 71% of the examined cases used
Jones trespass test in some manner either standalone or in combination with the Katz privacy
test.
This study was centered on two hypotheses to be explored through the effects of the
Jones decision. First, it was hypothesized that in the wake of Jones, a majority of the federal
appellate courts would be relying on the trespass doctrine to determine Fourth Amendment
search inquiries. This hypothesis is only partially accurate, as it did not take into consideration
the use, by federal appellate courts, of both the Jones and Katz tests to determine a search. As
such, this hypothesis, as it was stated, is rejected. Secondly, it was hypothesized that a majority
of the federal appellate courts after Jones was decided would find that no police search occurred.
860
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This study found that 52.6% (20) of the reviewed cases decided after Jones determined a police
search had occurred; therefore, this hypothesis is also rejected.
There are many areas which are ripe for future research in dealing with Fourth
Amendment search law, and specifically the impact which the Jones decision has had. One such
area would be to further explore the “pendulum” idea set forth by Herbert Packer. Researching
cases farther back than the ten years this study covered could help to identify a pattern in the
shifting view between a crime control model and a due process model, and the relationship
between the Katz test and the search determination. Expanding upon the cases reviewed in the
wake of Jones by including lower court decisions would also add another layer of insight into
Fourth Amendment search law. Not only including the variance among different jurisdictions in
the study, but also considering the political atmosphere of each jurisdiction in accordance with
their decisions would be yet another angle for future exploration (e.g., is a more conservative
state or region responsible for a disproportionately large percentage of cases in which a search is
not found, and/ or are states which are more liberal consistently siding with the due process
model of thought and finding a search occurs? ). Lastly, as more time passes, there will be a
clearer picture of Jones and its impact on Fourth Amendment search law, as this study’s largest
limitation was the lack of available cases to review in light of the Jones case decision being so
recent. As time moves forward, fewer cases will fall under the “binding-appellate precedent”
category, and there will be more cases to substantiate this study’s findings.
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Appendix A
1. U.S. v. Baez (BP)
In August 2009, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives agents attached a
warrantless global positioning system (GPS) device to Jose Baez 1989 Chevrolet Caprice. 862
ATF suspected Baez after a result of two fires that occurred earlier that year. At the scenes,
Baez’s vehicle was captured on camera, which ATF used to identify Baez as the owner. ATF
agents tracked Baez from August 2009 and continued to monitor and track his movements for
347 days.863 Baez drove his vehicle infrequently during the year of surveillance. However,
during the week leading up to his arrest, Baez drove his vehicle six times. During this week, the
Caprice had left the perimeter during the start of a fire.864 Following the reported fire, local
police located Baez inside his vehicle and arrested him. A search of his residence revealed
evidence which linked him to the two previous fires.865
Baez argued to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the GPS monitoring as it violated
his Fourth Amendment Rights.866 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that Jones
explained that majority of circuit courts had been misinterpreting Knotts and other prior cases
dealing with electronic surveillance.867 In Jones, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
“the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to
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monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’”868 In reference to Knotts, as stated by
Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence, “[that case] reserved the question whether ‘different
constitutional principles may be applicable’ to ‘dragnet-type law enforcement practices’ of the
type that GPS tracking made possible here.”869 However, ATF agents involved in Baez’s case
did not have the “benefit” of Jones. As a result, the Court turned to Sparks, which relied heavily
on Knotts and Davis.
Thus, the Court reasoned that according to Sparks, the applicable language is that officers are
responsible for complying with “precedent that is clear and well-settled”870 The court in Sparks
held that the warrantless installation of a global positioning system (GPS) device and subsequent
data retrieved from the eleven days of monitoring did not warrant exclusion because that
monitoring had occurred prior to Jones.871 ATF agents acted reasonably within the rules laid out
at the time by both their circuit and Knotts; in particular, Knotts had found that “[a] person
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his movements from one place to another.”872
This case represents pre-Jones warrantless GPS tracking by police, but of a significantly
longer duration. Nonetheless, the Court concluded under Davis that suppression would not serve
the purpose of the exclusionary rule because of good-faith reliance by the officers on thenapplicable or binding precedent.873
2. U.S. v. Sparks (BP)
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents had reason to believe Craig Sparks was
responsible for three bank robberies in 2009.874 As a result, FBI agents placed a GPS tracker on a
car owned by Sparks’ mother without a warrant in December of 2009. On January 4, 2010, the
FBI agents used the GPS to locate the car at the scene of a bank robbery and followed the car on
the highway until it wrecked in a ditch; the two occupants fled the vehicle and a brief foot chase
ensued.875 A search of the car revealed evidence of BB gun weapons, clothing, and tools used in
the bank robbery. Sparks moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracker as it
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.876
The Supreme Court held in Jones that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a
target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a
‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.”877 Furthermore, the Court held that a search occurred
because “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.878” However, the events in Sparks were conducted prior to Jones. As a result, the
court relied on Davis’ good-faith exception, “where new developments in the law have upended
the settled rules on which the police relied.”879 The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
applied under Davis because even though the warrantless GPS surveillance did violate the Fourth
Amendment rights, officers relied on “binding precedent” in the form of Knotts and Moore.880
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Therefore, suppression would not have the intended effect of deterring improper law
enforcement tactics.881
3. U.S. v. Hohn (BP)
Sheriff’s deputies installed a warrantless “slap-on,” battery-powered Global Positioning
System (GPS) device to Mr. Hohn’s truck on July 24, 2011.882 The sheriff’s deputy explained a
hard-wired GPS device required a warrant, but the battery-powered “slap-on” GPS device did
not require a warrant for installation and monitoring. Throughout the investigation, law
enforcement officers replaced the batteries in the device to continue tracking. Law enforcement
officers tracked the vehicle for 62 days, until November 9, 2011.883 Based on the information
they had collected during the course of the investigation, including the GPS device, officers
obtained a warrant to install hard-wired GPS devices to Mr. Hohn’s truck and another vehicle.
Officers were unable to install the hard-wired GPS device to the truck, so they continued to use
the “slap-on” GPS device.884 Finally, the officers obtained a warrant to search the truck on
December 23, 2011. Hohn moved to suppress the information obtained through the use of the
GPS device; however, the district court denied the motion.885 Mr. Hohn further argued that
police should not be afforded good-faith exception as there was no clear precedent in their
circuit.886 The district court reasoned that the device placement qualified as a warrantless search,
based on Jones, but the officers had acted in good faith which did not require exclusion.
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that the use of the “slap-on” GPS device
was an unreasonable search.887 However, the Tenth Circuit Court disagreed with Mr. Hohn’s
analysis in that officers were following Supreme Court decisions.888 First, in United States v.
Knotts, the Supreme Court held that warrantless monitoring through the use of beeper technology
to track the defendant on public highways and streets did not constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.889 Second, in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court held that the
placement of a beeper device and its subsequent transfer to the vehicle of the defendant was not
considered a search.890 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the officers’ actions were following
the binding precedent set forth in Knotts and Karo.891 Also, the Court mentioned that the Jones
decision did not abrogate Knotts and Karo.892 As a result, the Court agreed with the district
court’s analysis and found that law enforcement officers were acting in good-faith based on
Supreme Court binding precedent.
4. Elkins v. Elenz (BP)
David Elkins appealed aerial monitoring of his vehicle, which took place along a public
causeway.893 This surveillance was conducted by Drug Enforcement Administration agent
Robbins. David Elkins also challenged the legality of his probation officer requiring him to
submit a mental health examination. Elkins alleged that failure to comply with this request would
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have resulted in punishment by probation revocation.894 The district court held law enforcement
were entitled to qualified immunity and accordingly, dismissed the allegations of constitutional
violations.895
Elkins argued that the district court erred in dismissing his constitutional claims.896 The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that though “aerial surveillance” has been found to be
constitutional in other courts, the use of a warrantless GPS device does constitute a search.897
However, the events in this case, particularly the surveillance, occurred before Jones was
decided. As a result, because Jones was decided after the violations, it did not clearly establish
the relevant law; therefore, the Court concluded that the district court correctly held that Elkins
suffered no violation of constitutional rights.898
5. U.S. v. Aguiar (BP)
In 2008, local police were looking into a drug distribution ring.899 Over the course of the
investigation, police suspected Stephen Aguiar of transporting drugs and William Murray as the
distributor. Soon after, DEA agents joined the investigation agents and installed a warrantless
GPS device on Aguiar’s vehicle to monitor his movements.900 The taskforce continuously
monitored Aguiar until he was arrested on July 30, 2009. DEA agents used the GPS data to
identify numerous associates of Aguiar.901
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On appeal, Aguiar argued the GPS data and evidence obtained as a result is a violation of his
Fourth Amendment according to the recent decision of U.S. v. Jones.902 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit started their analysis by describing the differences of pre-Jones and postJones law. Additionally, the Court established their specific circuit “lacked” binding circuit
precedent on GPS devices.903 Although the second circuit had no established circuit precedent,
the Court explained the Supreme Court decisions of Karo and Knotts could acts as binding
precedents for all circuit courts.904 As a result, since the event occurred before Jones was
decided, the Court in Aguiar applied pre-Jones law (i.e., Karo and Knotts). Accordingly, the
Court held that the officers in the current case of Aguiar had reason to believe they could attach a
GPS device without a warrant based on the “then-binding precedent” of Karo and Knotts.905
Based on this information, the Court felt it was necessary to apply Davis good-faith exception
and allow the evidence to be admitted.906
6. U.S. v. Katzin (BP)
Harry Katzin and his brothers were prime suspects of a chain of burglarized pharmacies from
Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey from 2009 until 2010.907 The Katzin brothers had a
criminal history of burglarizing which made them suspects of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. FBI agents placed a warrantless GPS tracker on Harry Katzin’s van to track the
movements of his vehicle during December, 2010. Two days after the installation, the GPS
device revealed the Katzin brothers had driven to the area of a Rite Aid at 10:45 a.m. and the van
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remained inactive for over two hours.908 The FBI contacted local law enforcement to investigate.
When the van started moving, state troopers continued visual surveillance. Local law
enforcement relayed that the Rite Aid had been burglarized and the troopers immediately pulled
over the van.909 Inside the van, law enforcement found Harry, his brothers, and the merchandise
and equipment from the burglarized Rite Aid, including pill bottles and Rite Aid storage bins. 910
The appellees argued that the warrantless installation of the GPS device and the subsequent
monitoring violated their Fourth Amendment rights.911 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit stated that the events of this case occurred prior to Jones, and thus, must apply pre-Jones
law. First, the Court established that the third circuit court had no existing precedent which
governed the use of warrantless GPS tracking devices. However, in instances such as these, the
Court of Appeals explained the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent are binding to all circuits. Thus,
the Court of Appeals turned to Knotts and Karo, which found that the use of beeper technology
to track a suspect through public thoroughfares was not a search. The Court of Appeals
concluded the agents installed the GPS device onto Katzin’s van, they exhibited an “objectively
‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct [was] lawful.” 912
7. U.S. v. Brown (BP)
In 2006, a warrantless GPS device was attached to a Jeep owned by Kevin Arms who
notified police that an associate, Troy Lewis, was transporting drugs inside the Jeep.913 Police
followed the vehicle and subsequently stopped and arrested Lewis and his associates, including
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Brown. Brown argued that the GPS device violated his Fourth Amendment rights and evidence
should be suppressed.914
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided since the facts of this case occurred
prior to Jones and therefore the relevant police conduct is not subject to the Supreme Court’s
decision. In particular, the Court turned to “binding appellate precedent” in the form of United
States v. Garcia.915 However, Garcia was not established until February 2007, which also was
after the events of the present case. Thus, Brown contended there was no “binding appellate
precedent” in 2006 to guide the use of warrantless installation of GPS device to monitor a person
of interest.916 The Court turned to Knotts and Karo decisions to help them decide on the
warrantless electronic surveillance issue. The Court explained through Knotts and Karo that
tracking a vehicle’s location by GPS does not constitute a search.917 The Court concluded that
Knotts and Karo provided law enforcement (and the lawyers guiding them) enough jurisprudence
for objective reasonable reliance. Thus, the Court afforded law enforcement the Davis good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule based on officers’ reasonable reliance on Knotts and Karo to
shape their conduct in this case.918
8. U.S. v. Thomas (BP)
On February 28, 2010, Jonathan Thomas drove to United States Border Patrol checkpoint.919
He drove a pick-up truck with a large toolbox attached to the bed. Border Patrol Agent (BPA)
LeBlanc had his drug-detection dog, Beny-A. As Thomas’ truck passed the first inspection zone,
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the drug dog changed to “alert behavior.”920 As a result, BPA LeBlanc instructed Thomas to the
second inspection zone. BPA LeBlanc instructed Thomas and his children to exit the vehicle.
BPA LeBlanc and his drug dog walked around the truck. The drug dog, Beny-A, jumped up and
placed his paws and nose on the vehicle’s toolbox.921
After obtaining Thomas’ keys, BPA LeBlanc found bundles of marijuana inside the
toolbox.922 Thomas argued that the drug dog, Beny-A, invaded a constitutionally protected area
when his paws and nose were placed on the toolbox located inside the bed of the truck.923 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that the events of this case preceded Jones and
Jardines, and therefore, must apply pre-Jones law.924 The Court turned to Illinois v. Caballes,
which concluded the use of a dog sniff on a vehicle did “not rise to the level of constitutionality
cognizable infringement.”925 Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded
that LeBlanc acted in objective reliance on binding precedent, the evidence (i.e., the marijuana
seized) was admitted correctly and should not be excluded.926
9. U.S. v. Ransfer (BP)
A series of robberies took place between April 2011 and June 2011. 927 An informant tipped
law enforcement officers to believe a group of six individuals were responsible for the robberies.
Police attached a GPS tracking device to a vehicle without a warrant in connection with the
series of robberies. Through the use of the GPS tracking device, several individuals were arrested
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and soon after, physical evidence was recovered in connection with the robberies.928 In Jones,
the Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS to a vehicle constituted a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.929 However, in Davis, the Supreme Court held that “searches conducted in
objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary
rule.”930
In the pre-Jones era during which the facts of this case occurred, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that the warrantless use of an electronic tracking device to monitor the
vehicle’s movements on public thoroughfares does not constitute a search.931 The Court turned to
the then-binding precedent of Michael, which held warrantless electronic surveillance of a
vehicle required police to only have reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.932 Therefore,
as a result of this precedent, the Court found that the Davis good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies, and that officers had the necessary burden of proof (i.e., reasonable
suspicion) in this case. Therefore, the Court concluded that, the installation of an electronic
tracking device on the outside of the vehicle without a warrant did not violate the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights.933
10. U.S. v. Oladosu (BP)
Officer Robert DiFilippo of the Rhode Island State Police High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Area (HIDTA) task force suspected Abdulfatah Oladosu being part of a drug smuggling ring.934
As a result, Office DiFilippo attached a warrantless GPS device to the undercarriage of
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Oladosu’s vehicle. Subsequently, the GPS device was used to track Oladosu for forty-seven
days. The surveillance helped the task force to arrange a delivery of heroin where Oladosu and
accomplices were arrested.935 The Court decided that Jones does not apply in this case as the
events occurred before Jones was decided. Thus, the Court had to consider if the Davis goodfaith exception would apply.936
The Court did not consider or mention the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead,
the court turned to the pre-Jones precedent case of Sparks, which allowed warrantless GPS
monitoring for eleven days.937 As a result, the court concluded the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applied. Thus, the Court concluded that law enforcement were acting on
objectively reasonable reliance on then-binding precedent, based on Baez and Sparks.938
Therefore, the Davis good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to this pre-Jones
warrantless GPS case.
11. U.S. v. Barraza-Maldonado (BP).
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents were notified by an informant of a possible
drug trafficking plot.939 The informant described the vehicle as a maroon 2006 Nissan Maxima
and DEA agents found the car in a public parking lot. To monitor it, DEA agents installed a
warrantless GPS device on a vehicle and tracked its whereabouts. Four weeks later, BarrazaMaldonado drove the vehicle to travel from Arizona to Minnesota. Once it entered Minnesota,
DEA agents notified Minnesota State Police.940 Trooper Schneider stopped the vehicle and found
that neither of the occupants had a valid driver’s license. Additionally, when the Trooper brought
935
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out the drug detection dog, the vehicle “tested” positive for narcotics. As a result, police
discovered large amounts of drugs inside the vehicle after towing it to a nearby garage.941
Barraza-Maldonado argued the warrantless installation of the GPS device and subsequent
monitoring violated his Fourth Amendment rights.942 The events in this case occurred before
Jones was decided. The Ninth Circuit had frequently held that the installation of GPS devices on
a car did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, especially if there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle’s location.943 In this case, the warrantless GPS
device was installed in a public lot in the Arizona area and eventually tracked through various
public highways (i.e., the installation and tracking of the device occurred in non-private, public
locations). Therefore, the Court held that “the agents acted in objectively reasonable reliance on
binding Ninth Circuit precedent in installing the device, and binding Supreme Court precedent in
using the device to monitor the car’s movements on public highways.”944 As a result, the Court
concluded the officer’s actions qualified under the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.945
12. U.S. v. Holt (BP)
Co-defendant Lewis filed a motion which claimed that federal law enforcement’s use of a
GPS device to monitor and track her whereabouts from September 21, 2011 until September 29,
2011 violated her Fourth Amendment rights.946 The co-defendant argued that according to U.S.
v. Jones, the attachment of GPS devices by police to vehicles without a warrant, constitute
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unreasonable searches. However, the events in this case transpired before Jones was decided. As
a result, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Holt held that officers were acting in
reasonable reliance upon then-binding appellate precedent.947 The Court concluded that the
district court correctly applied the good-faith exception to the actions of the officers.948
13. United States v. Taylor (BP)
Indianapolis Metro Police received a tip that Dwan Taylor had in his possession both drugs
and illegal firearms in 2011.949 The investigation was led by Detective Sergeant Garth
Schwomeyer, who discovered Taylor had a history of drug related offenses. Further investigation
of Taylor’s phone records showed his most frequent contact had also been convicted of
distributing drugs. Detective Schwomeyer presented these facts to a Marion County Superior
Court judge who allowed Detective Schwomeyer’s petition for permission to attach a GPS
device to Taylor’s vehicle for sixty (60) days on Taylor’s vehicle.950 The vehicle was tracked to a
storage facility two weeks later. At the storage site, Detective Schwomeyer learned that Taylor
had rented a locker. A drug-detection dog was summoned to the scene, and the dog alerted
positive for drugs in Taylor’s locker.951 Finally, based on the evidence, Detective Schwomeyer
applied and obtained a warrant to search the locker.952 Inside the locker, police found drugs,
firearms, and other drug paraphernalia. Taylor was charged with drug possession.
Taylor argued that a warrantless attachment of a GPS device and the subsequent tracking of
his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights.953 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
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Circuit held that the police officers attached the GPS under existing binding appellate precedent
and therefore, under this precedent, a search had not occurred. As a result, no warrant was
required to attach the GPS device. 954 Additionally, since this case fell under the then-binding
precedent doctrine, Davis’ good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied here to prevent
the suppression of the drug evidence.955
14. U.S. v. Robinson (BP)
Fred Robinson was acting chair for a non-profit charter school, Paideia, in St. Louis in
2006.956 Robinson also worked at the Parking Division of the St. Louis Treasurer’s office. Since
1990, Robinson consistently recorded 40 hours of work at the Parking Division, including on
holidays. This pattern continued to occur after the parking services were outsourced to another
company in June 2009. This garnered the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI).957 Special agents interviewed former employees who worked in the same division as
Robison and the employees did not recognize or know of him. This prompted FBI special agents
to conduct surveillance on Robinson between December 2009 and January 2010.958 On January
22, 2010, “agents installed, without a warrant, a GPS device on his car while parked on a public
street.”959 The FBI agents tracked and recorded data until March 17. The investigation led FBI to
conclude Robinson no long inspected parking meters and was later charged with wire fraud,
program theft, and various other charges.960 On appeal, Robinson argued that the admission of
GPS evidence violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined if the GPS evidence warranted
suppression. Robinson’s argument relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, which
required a warrant to be used when installing of a GPS device to track the movements of a
suspect. However, the Court instead chose to use United States v. Knotts and United States v.
Karo, as the facts of this case occurred prior to the Jones decision.961 In Knotts, the Court
allowed the use of beeper technology to track and monitor a car traveling on public roads. 962
Additionally, in Karo, the Court allowed the government to track a target by using a beeper
inside a can transferred to the target vehicle.963 The Court of Appeals held that the FBI “agents
could reasonably rely on the precedent set forth by Knotts and Karo as binding appellate
precedent.”964 Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that the district court properly admitted the
GPS evidence during trial.965 Thus, the Court applied Davis’ good-faith exception. Additionally,
the Court elaborated that Robinson’s vehicle was in public view and on “public thoroughfares”
and therefore Robinson had no reasonable expectation of privacy, either.
15. U.S. v. Rayford (PE)
Rayford pleaded guilty in district court to various charges related to bank robbery.966 Rayford
pushed for a certificate of appealability (COA) in order to appeal district court decisions.
Rayford claimed “his counsel was ineffective because they failed to seek suppression of
evidence obtained through a warrantless satellite tracking device.”967 To support his claim,
Rayford relied heavily on the decision of U.S. v. Jones.968 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
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Circuit held that Rayford could not prove his defense counsel was ineffective.969 Accordingly,
the Court denied Rayford’s Certificate of Appealablity (COA).970
16. U.S. v. Baker (PE)
Between January and March 2011, a sequence of retail stores being robbed in Kansas City
led law enforcement to suspect Baker.971 During the commission of one of the robberies, a retail
camera caught images of the vehicle owned by Baker’s girlfriend. Officers monitored the vehicle
by installing a GPS device. Shortly after installation, the GPS device was used to link the vehicle
to a recent robbery, where Baker was stopped and arrested. Arresting officers found cash and a
loaded .40 caliber Glock handgun.972 Baker argued in his appeal that the GPS device installed
without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights.973 In Jones, the Supreme Court held
that the attachment of a GPS device and its subsequent monitoring constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.974 However, Baker failed to place a motion to suppress the evidence in the
district court and as a result, waived his right to do so. Therefore, the Court found that Baker
waived his Fourth Amendment right to object to the use of the GPS device by police without a
warrant. Accordingly, his argument in the appellate court “cannot provide a basis for disturbing
his conviction.”975
17. U.S. v. Curbelo (PE)
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In 2007, Ivan Curbelo worked as a carpenter for Jose Diaz.976 Diaz offered Curbelo an
opportunity to be a part of an indoor marijuana growing operation. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents began investigating Diaz and placed a global-positioning-system
(GPS) device on vehicles used by Diaz and his accomplices.977 The GPS device was placed on
the vehicle without a warrant. The DEA also conducted GPS tracking of cellular phones.978
However, DEA agents did obtained court approval to seize information through cellular phone
communications. Soon after, Curbelo and other members of the Diaz’s organization were
indicted in violation of Controlled Substances Act.979 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit examined the GPS tracking of the vehicles and cell phones. However, Curbelo did not
file a motion to suppress the GPS tracking evidence in the district court.980 The Court held
Curbelo failed to adequately challenge the tracking and waived his rights to challenge the Fourth
Amendment issue.981
18. Jones v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium (PE)
Albert Jones was charged and convicted of drug crimes with intent to distribute (i.e., cocaine,
crack cocaine, and marijuana) in 2001.982 Law enforcement obtained text message information
from one of the co-conspirators to use as evidence against Jones. Jones challenged the evidence
obtained on appeal, where the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
holding.983 As a result, Jones filed multiple motions, including § 2255 and § 2241 Petition.984
The district court had denied § 2255 because they had been previously been brought up in direct
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appeal. The district court dismissed § 2241. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed this case based on habeas relief under § 2241.985 The Court concluded that defendant’s
argument was without merit for several reasons. First, the Court explained the differences
between factual and legal innocence in this case.986 This is important because Jones argued he
was “actually innocent,” when in fact, Jones claimed he was wrongfully charged and convicted
based on unlawfully obtained text messages, which is the basis for “legal” innocence.987 Second,
Jones raised the text message issues in both his direct appeal and his first § 2255 motion.988
Thus, defendant argued his conviction was based on the unlawfully obtained text messages
which violated his due process rights. In addition, by admitting these text messages into trial,
defendant argued his Fourth Amendment rights were also violated. Third, the Court explained
“Jones deals the admissibility of the evidence and does not establish that Jones was convicted of
a non-existent crime or is factually innocent of the charged drug conspiracy.”989 Fourth, Jones
was not made retroactive to cases such as the defendant’s whose facts occurred prior to Jones.
This citing case falls within the category of procedural error because the court did not
specifically use the Jones search criteria, and listed the four previously mentioned reasons why
Jones cannot apply to defendant’s case.
19. U.S. v. Glay (PE)
William Glay scammed financial institutions and retail establishments with counterfeit
checks between the years of 1999 and 2007.990 On March 2, 2007, police obtained a search
warrant for the apartment owned by Emily Jallah, the suspected mother of Glay’s child. Officers
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had used information in obtaining this warrant from a previous warrantless tracking device on
Glay’s vehicle.991 On March 6, 2007, law enforcement executed the search warrant and obtained
evidence from the apartment to be used against Glay. Glay was later arrested and pleaded guilty.
Glay argued based on Jones that his conviction must be re-visited. However, Glay waived his
challenge to the warrantless use of the tracking device by pleading guilty.992 The Court
referenced United States v. Delgado-Garcia in commenting that “[u]nconditional guilty pleas
that are knowing and intelligent ... waive the pleading defendants’ claims of error on appeal,
even constitutional claims.”993 Accordingly, the Court held that Glay waived his right to
challenge. In sum, this case falls under the procedural error category.
20. U.S. v. Johnson (PE)
The government used a global positioning system device without a warrant during its
investigation of Johnson’s crimes.994 Johnson filed a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.995 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded
Johnson failed to properly establish a suppression motion and waived his argument.996 However,
the Court quickly ran through the analysis if he had properly filed the motion. In Jones, the
Supreme Court found that a search occurred when officers attached a GPS device to the vehicle
of defendant Jones under a stale, expired warrant.997 Although the court in Johnson admitted that
Jones may have had the effect of strengthening Johnson’s argument for a new trial, the Court
ruled no error occurred in the district court when they denied Johnson’s motion.998 The Court
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explained that pre-Jones law held “circuit precedent indicated that attaching an electronic
tracking device to a vehicle was neither a search nor a seizure under the Fourth Amendment”
hence, it did not require police to obtain a warrant.999 Thus, the police acted in objectively
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent and the evidence obtained is not subject to the
exclusionary rule in accordance with Davis.1000 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
“government could present the same evidence at any re-trial which would ultimately lead to
Johnson’s original conviction” and based on the reasons already mentioned, the Court found
Johnson suffered no prejudice.1001
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